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Written evidence
Written evidence submitted by Leo Burnett (PROC 1)
Parliamentary Inquiry into GPS
— A process bound in red tape;
— A lack of clarity on the process or the expectation;
— Limited human contact with no relevant experience;
— A “one size ﬁts all” approach with no understanding of the communications sector; and
— No ability to differentiate an agency's offering in any meaningful way with the questions asked.
For a government intent on reducing red tape and bureaucracy, the recent tender for communications has
demonstrated the complete opposite of this. A bewildering number of attachments, an unclear process and an
e-sourcing tool that was not ﬁt for purpose. The procurement document required agencies to appoint lawyers
to translate the language and understanding of what the GPS was looking for required a huge commitment of
senior management time, and this was before getting to the point of completing any of the forms.
The language used within the documents was mostly irrelevant to the communication sector and the “one
size ﬁts all” nature of the procurement process meant that there was a real lack of clarity on what the GPS was
looking for to enable a “winning” response.
With a system this bound up in bureaucracy and complexity, there were many situations where we found
ourselves unclear of the requirement and needing to speak to someone for clarity. There was no opportunity to
speak to anyone and the responses received over the e-sourcing tool were either irrelevant or unclear and very
obviously written by someone with no understanding of the communications sector.
The actual questions themselves gave agencies absolutely no opportunity to differentiate themselves in any
way. The questions established whether agencies had the capability, the processes they would undertake and
the amount they would cost. The aim was to judge agencies on purely objective criteria, the result was no
ability to differentiate an agency with a track record of effective and quality creative work versus an agency
that could articulate a good process (with no evidence as to whether they could also follow this process) and
that had low costs per hour for staff.
The absence of questions that allowed agencies to demonstrate effectiveness, creativity or experience in
working within the public sector means that the ﬁnal agency roster may not be ﬁt for purpose in any way. It
shows that GPS has no interest in creating effective work, creative that works and cuts through and therefore
has a high ROI for the tax payer. It shows that the GPS, in the interests of being “fair and objective”, has
rendered itself unable to discriminate between agencies with a strong track record and agencies that are cheap
and process driven. In “looking forward” rather than “looking back”, the GPS will be losing all the collective
agency experience and brains trust that would have enabled them to produce behaviour changing campaigns
cost effectively. In judging agencies on per hour costs, rather than looking at team structures and the cost of
creating campaigns, the GPS is procuring the cheapest rather than the most cost effective option… and the
cheapest may not be ﬁt for purpose in managing department hubs that, with their reduced headcount, will
require signiﬁcant agency support.
There are government departments already expressing concern in the process and questioning if they will
get the required support from the ﬁnal roster of agencies. There have been agencies with a strong government
track record knocked out of the process by “not demonstrating the relevant experience and capability”. These
agencies may not have got onto the ﬁnal roster but being knocked out for not demonstrating the “relevant
experience” when using fully integrated government campaign case studies as evidence seems incredible. Every
agency that has been knocked out has no idea what criteria they did not fulﬁl and their reasons for not
being successful.
This procurement process has failed on so many levels: From the simplest fulﬁlment such as a functioning
e-sourcing tool, to a clear and simple process with clarity of what was required and what the GPS was looking
for and ﬁnally to a process that allowed agencies to differentiate themselves on the things that matter in the
communication sector—creativity and effectiveness. In looking to save the taxpayer money, the GPS has cost
agencies (those SMEs that Government are meant to be supporting) thousands of pounds in resource cutting
through the red tape only to be judged against a set of criteria that will never bring best value to the taxpayer.
This blinkered process will potentially expose both Government and taxpayer to extra risk on the basis that
they will be foregoing proven agencies (without even a COI as a safety net) to ensure things have been
“done right”.
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Written evidence submitted by Panlogic (PROC 2)
1. How successful has the Cabinet Ofﬁce been at improving public procurement policy and practice?
As an SME, it is difﬁcult to get a complete overview of all the changes that have been made. Our experience
is that COI (which was a known quantity) has now been closed and we now either have to go through
framework agreements or use procurement portals such as Contracts Finder (which appears to be open to
anyone) and GPS eSourcing (which we get periodic invites to bid from).
To be honest, at our level (<£500K) I suspect that the need for procurement—which is inevitably costly,
procedural (eg mandating the need for three separate responses etc.) and often merely underlines the choice
that the project sponsor wanted to make in the ﬁrst place—outweighs any potential savings to the public purse.
In short, they overburden small projects.
In much the same way that personal health/care budgets and direct payments are both improving outcomes
and saving public money http://www.dh.gov.uk/health/2012/11/phb/I would suspect that it would be more
efﬁcient, more effective and simpler for public bodies (and their suppliers) to be able to (under this £500K
threshold) to be able to just appoint a preferred supplier if that is easier/more desirable for the public sector
body. This should at least be an option. Suppliers would have to sign up some widely accepted legal T&Cs
(without the possibility for amendments) in order to ensure this was robust and quick process. This would have
the added advantage of allowing projects to start and ﬁnish more quickly, allowing Government to get on with
the business of public service delivery.
2. What should be the strategic aim of the Government's public procurement policy?
Both the UK Government (http://www.cabinetofﬁce.gov.uk/news/sme-procurement-event-francis-maude-
speech/http://www.bis.gov.uk/brdo/business/business-diversity) and the World Bank (http://info.worldbank.org/
etools/docs/library/49256/fan.pdf) stress the importance of SMEs and state that SMEs are the “engine of
growth”. Given that growth is sorely lacking at the moment more must be done here and quickly. As a result,
support for SMEs needs to be at the heart of Government procurement. However, despite the (understandable)
need for economies of scale in some Government procurement, the stated ﬁgure of only 13.7% of Government
spending (p. 4 of http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/public-administration/
121106%20I%20and%20Q%20on%20procurement%20docx.pdf) going to SMEs is (still) a disgrace.
3. Does the Government have the right skills and capabilities to procure effectively?
I suspect that the West Coast mainline debacle would suggest not. At least not at that level. For our level,
our experience has been that most procurement people are sufﬁciently competent, but almost without fail
deliver the letter, rather than the spirit, of the law.
Occasionally, the individuals are over-inclined to say “no”, rather than being empowered to say “yes” or
“yes, but…” and they often use procurement rules to hide behind.
Does the civil service have the skills and capabilities required to negotiate and manage contracts effectively?
In our experience, yes.
What skills do procurement authorities require in-house, what skills can be bought in and what skills can be
contracted out?
No view
What lessons can central government learn from local government on procurement?
No view
How successful are government departments and their agencies at communicating their needs to potential
suppliers?
COI were excellent by the time it was abolished. Current experience is mixed. COI delivered consistency of
documentation, process and personnel. That has now gone and creates more of a mineﬁeld for SMEs (second
guessing, learning the ropes for each organisation, understanding the needs of multiple individuals etc.). That
said, I would not now re-invent the COI, just address the issues indicated elsewhere within this response.
4. How should the civil service ensure it recruits and retains staff with the right skills to run procurements, to
negotiate and manage contracts and to deliver major projects effectively?
I would suggest that all procurements that have a signiﬁcant business model behind them must have an
incredibly well-paid econometrician and/or economist assigned to them, as well as resources akin to Venture
Capitalists (ie people able to comprehend an overall business model incredibly quickly and then immediately
ask very penetrating questions to see if the thing actually stacks up). Salaries should be similar to what the big
banks/VC houses pay for this expertise. This need not be ridiculously expensive if someone was only broughtcobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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in for a few weeks from these types of institution for large (eg £50m+) projects. Even at commercial rates they
will be able to a) help avoid West Coast mainline situations and b) help drive down submitted costs.
5. Does the Government have the organisational structures in place to enable it to procure effectively? (For
example, how far should the Government centralise responsibility for public procurement?
Government should centralise the guidelines, legals etc., but decentralise the capability/capacity to be able
to procure and the actual decision-making process. Subsidiarity should be the watchword.
Do central government procurement “framework agreements” enable more effective public procurement?)
Yes and no. They are quicker and provide more certainty to all parties. However, pass-through style set-ups
can actually be negative. Please see the answer to #9 below for details as to why.
6. Does the Government collect the management information it needs to understand how public procurement
is working?
In general yes, but it's typically a burdensome and bureaucratic process. This is even more the case for pan-
European reporting/measurement requirements.
7. How should Government ensure that European directives on public procurement do not inhibit public
bodies' ability to procure effectively?
Do as other countries do and largely ignore them. UK Government procurement should be to the beneﬁt of
the UK and no-one else.
8. How should Government assess and manage risk when negotiating procurement contracts? (For example,
how much risk should Government be prepared to accept and what are the limits on the transfer of risk to
the private sector?)
Payment by Results (PBR) needs to be a model that the public sector can adopt. At the moment, procurement
has a budget and can only accept spend up to that budget. Under a PBR model the private sector takes on
some risk, but needs to receive additional remuneration for taking on that risk. Procurement therefore needs to
have allocated an “upside” budget to allow for this transfer of risk.
9. What is the best role for “prime contractors” and what are the advantages and disadvantages of relying
on “prime contractors”?
Typically the framework provider is a large corporate with no interest in paying their sub-contractors at all
quickly. The sub-contractors are often SMEs with very little market power compared to the public sector
organisation or the framework provider. This can have very negative cash-ﬂow implications for the sub-
contractors, not to mention potential reputational risks to the public sector organisation if personnel (etc.) are
not paid in a timely fashion. To help resolve this, the framework provider should either have to pay sub-
contractors a gross amount and then receive their pass-through monies back from the sub-contractor (the sub-
contractor is incentivised to pay the framework provider quickly or run the risk of contractual issues, in any
event) or to be mandated to pay sub-contractors within 10–15 days.
10. What are the key lessons to be learned from the experience of cost overruns, delays and project failures
in central Government procurement over the past ﬁve years or so?
— All contracts should prohibit/exclude the possibility for cherry-picking. The private sector provider should
have to take things on “warts and all” otherwise you privatise proﬁts and nationalise losses.
— Payment by Results (PBR) needs to be adopted (please see #8 above).
— Need for a cross-Government procurement platform with real-time pricing of goods (SKUs and prices
etc.).
— e-Reverse auction procurement: transparent, downward bidding from service providers (but still with
the ability for the public sector organisations to meet with the supplier, probe cost reductions, establish
rapport etc.)
— GroupOn style approach: meta-government procurement (public sector organisations sign-up to reduce
costs per framework and/or per purchase); If a certain number of public sector bodies sign up, then deals
become available to all; Ability to tag onto larger purchases/set time/price limits etc.
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Written evidence submitted by the Institute of Practitioners in Advertising (IPA) (PROC 3)
As a trade body with limited experience of Government procurement, the IPA has restricted its response in
this paper to Question 1 of those issues raised by the Committee (ie “How successful has the Cabinet Ofﬁce
been at improving public procurement policy and practice?”).
Having said this, our answer in this area will also cover aspects raised in Question 3 (“Does the Government
have the right skills and capabilities to procure effectively?”) and Question 6 (“Does the Government collect
the management information it needs to understand how public procurement is working?”)
How successful has the Cabinet Ofﬁce been at improving public procurement policy and practice?
1. Synopsis
1.1 The experience of the UK advertising industry of Government procurement has been poor;
1.2 The design and subsequent process of the most recent Invitation to Tender in which it has been involved,
have led to misunderstanding and confusion;
1.3 There was no consultation with the industry on the relevance to advertising of the questions asked—nor
their intelligibility—prior to publication, while the resource available to explain and answer queries was limited
and lacking in detailed knowledge of the industry;
1.4 The online submission process for applications was slow, confusing, difﬁcult to navigate and unreliable;
1.5 The length and complexity of the non-negotiable Framework Agreement and Call-Off Terms to which
our members were required to respond and agree, were daunting, unnecessarily onerous and plainly designed
for other sectors;
1.6 The entire process appeared to be governed by the need to follow ﬁxed procedures, leading to a situation
where the award of business was more likely to go to those companies able to negotiate the bureaucratic
process accurately rather than as a result of a rigorous evaluation of the talent, experience and creative ability
of the applicants to develop effective and efﬁcient advertising designed to stimulate social awareness/change
(ie the key objectives for the majority of Government advertising activity).
2. Main paper
The IPA welcomes the opportunity to submit views to the Committee on the above.
About the IPA
2.1 The Institute of Practitioners in Advertising is the trade body and professional institute for UK
advertising, media and marketing communications agencies. Our c.240 corporate members, who are based
throughout the country, handle over 80% of the UK's advertising agency business with an estimated value of
£16.1 billion in 2011 (Source: Advertising Association 2012), on behalf of many tens of thousands of their
client companies and organisations.
2.2 Working under the auspices of the old Central Ofﬁce of Information, our members have been responsible
for producing some of the most successful public service advertising in the world—from road safety and anti-
smoking to recruitment for the armed services and police.
Our members' recent experience
2.3 The abolition of the COI has brought a large number of our members into close contact with the
Government Procurement Service (GPS) in its running of the following:
2.3.1 Framework Activity RM 988—Creative Solutions, Execution and Related Services (August—
December 2012)
2.3.2 Agile Route to Market—Creative Content, Delivery, Execution and Related Services (July—August
2012)
2.4 These pieces of activity were designed to isolate a roster of accredited agencies, which public authority
customers could then call on to develop and produce creative work for their own campaigns—following a
competitive pitch involving companies from the approved list.
2.5 A second Framework addressing media planning and strategy is planned for January 2013.
How has this worked?
2.6 While individual agencies may be constrained by worries over potential commercial retribution resulting
from making negative responses re GPS—as a trade body which buys nothing from anyone, the IPA is free to
voice the concerns which it has heard from its members. It is these views, garnered from across its membership
that are spelt out below.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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Overall
2.7 While advertising agencies will gain most of their business as a result of a competitive pitch, little
prepared them for the onslaught of electronic paperwork and bureaucracy which accompanied the GPS
procurement procedure.
2.8 Although it is admitted that few agency staff had experienced the process whereby agencies were
appointed under the old COI, there was universal concern at the length, complexity and intelligibility of the
paperwork—and the cumbersome online procedure required both to access this and then to upload responses.
Speciﬁc areas of concern broke down as follows:
(a) The design of the Invitation to Tender paperwork was complex and difﬁcult to understand:
2.8.1 For advertising agencies, most of which cannot afford specialist departments for Government
tenders, the complexity of the system and volume of documentation posed a major challenge.
This was compounded by a process whereby queries could only be made via the procurement
system's online “e-sourcing suite”—resulting in generalised (and therefore not particularly
helpful) answers published on the GPS website, written by what appeared to be an
inexperienced, understaffed (and therefore harassed) department.
2.8.2 The ITT was so complex and unclear that many of our members were unable to understand
how to answer various questions it asked of suppliers.
2.8.3 This was particularly daunting since they were aware that failure to complete the paperwork
correctly would result in immediate exclusion from the selection process.
2.8.4 It was signiﬁcant that a number of the IPA's major member agencies, massively experienced
and highly successful in producing Government advertising under the COI, were excluded at
the outset of Framework RM 988 for failure to complete the paperwork properly—a cause for
rejection which, we were told, under the GPS rules, offers no opportunity for appeal.
2.8.5 We would contend that an ITT process which results in such an outcome cannot be what GPS
intended—nor can it operate in the best interests of sourcing the best and most effective
advertising for Government.
(b) No consultation took place with the advertising industry with regard to the relevance or
intelligibility of the questions for procuring advertising:
2.8.6 Although the GPS indicated to the IPA that it had consulted with Government departments as
to their needs, there was no such discussion with the advertising industry. As a result, many of
the questions asked were ill suited, with no consideration given at all to past experience or
success in the sector since—as we were informed by the GPS at a meeting on 10th October—
these would have been open to “subjective interpretation”.
2.8.7 Since the vast majority of agencies applying for Government business will have been able to
meet all the basic competency requirements laid down in the ITT—we believe this will have
resulted in a situation in which the GPS will have lacked any objective means of discriminating
between the respondents in terms of their talent and ability to produce the most effective work
for public authority customers.
2.8.8 At the aforementioned meeting with the GPS and Cabinet Ofﬁce , this was illustrated in terms
of a singer choosing between two songwriters. One of these, we stated, had had a conspicuous
lack of success and the other a lengthy list of hit records. Under the GPS selection procedure—
these individuals would only be asked their musical qualiﬁcations—which would have been
identical—and thus there would have been nothing to discriminate between them.
2.8.9 However, the simple addition of a question designed to discover success rates would have
avoided this problem.
(c) The online entry process was slow, confusing, difﬁcult to navigate and time-consuming:
2.8.10 Many of the IPA's member agencies will design and build websites commercially and they are
therefore extremely aware of what is possible in this area.
2.8.11 Feedback to an IPA questionnaire on the GPS online process was highly critical of its web
design, including its slow operation, its complex layout and its tendency to crash—requiring
applicants to retype their entire entries.
2.8.12 These (and other) observations have already been passed through to the Cabinet Ofﬁce.
(d) The length and complexity of the Framework Agreement and Call-Off Terms were daunting
and unnecessarily onerous:
2.8.13 Agencies applying for consideration for Framework RM 988 were confronted with 11
documents, including two non-negotiable contracts of approximately 100 pages each.
2.8.14 Research carried out by the IPA amongst its members revealed that each of the agencies which
engaged in this process took an average of 167 hours to read and complete their applications,
which at a charge-out rate of £300 an hour (ie the average rate which senior staff would
normally be charged to their clients) meant that the average agency spent over £50,000 just to
become involved in the procedure.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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2.8.15 Given that we were informed by the Cabinet Ofﬁce that over 400 applications were received
for Framework RM 988, and assuming the same levels of diligence and expenditure, this would
have meant the UK ad industry spent in man-hours in the region of £20 million to compete for
this activity.
2.8.16 While recognising the need for the Government to make its business open to all, we believe
this to be enormously wasteful—and this is not even allowing for the time spent by the
procurement service processing all these applications.
2.8.17 Moreover, drilling down into the paperwork, the IPA discovered a number of errors within the
lengthy and massively demanding contract documents which agencies were required to accept
in their entirety as a precondition for consideration. This, in addition to the absurdly onerous
nature of those documents, neither of which bore any resemblance to a typical advertising
services contract.
2.8.18 While we would accept that taxpayers' money needs to be protected, we would contend that it
is also the Government's responsibility to be fair in its dealings with its suppliers—and that the
demands placed by the above were self-evidently not so.
(e) The entire process appeared driven by the requirement for a standard approach rather than
to the achievement of an objective evaluation of the talent, experience or creative ability of
the applicants:
2.8.19 While it is recognised that the GPS will have set procedures designed to ensure transparency
and fairness, this appears to have been translated into the rigid application of common
paperwork to every business sector, regardless of its relevance or suitability.
3. Conclusions
3.1 We have no doubt that the staff of the GPS are dedicated and professional public servants.
3.2 However, we also believe they are understaffed and hide-bound by regulation which, while designed to
be open and minimise the risk of corruption, results in enormous bureaucracy, misunderstanding and waste.
3.3 Our experience has been limited to the advertising/communications area, however, we would surmise
that application of the standard, undeviating procedures which we have encountered would have a similar
outcome across most of the sectors in which the GPS is involved.
December 2012
Written evidence submitted by Lt Col Dan Ward, Duty Acquisitions Ofﬁcer, US Air Force (PROC 04)
— The Procurement process is neither the problem nor the solution:
— The DoD acquisition process delivers both successes and failures.
— Therefore the process is not a barrier to successful procurement nor is it to blame for failed
procurements.
— The way a process is executed matters more than the way it is documented.
— The actual drivers of acquisition outcomes are the four Cardinal Virtues of Acquisition, combined with
the True Goal:
— The four Cardinal Virtues of Procurement are speed, thrift, simplicity and restraint:
— Improve programmatic and operational outcomes, ie affordable gear that is available when
needed and effective when used.
— The True Goal is to deliver Affordable systems which are Available when needed and Effective
when used.
1. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program is over-budget and behind schedule to such a degree that
Acting Undersecretary of Defense Frank Kendall called it “acquisition malpractice.” In contrast, the US Navy's
Virginia Class submarine program has delivered a series of highly effective nuclear-powered submarines early
and under budget—in the case of the USS Mississippi, a year early and over $60M under budget.
2. Both programs were implemented under similar procurement policy environments and thus were subjected
to similar processes. The stark difference in their outcomes suggests that the JSF's problems cannot be entirely
attributed to the ponderous acquisition process, nor can the Virginia's success be credited to a process
improvement initiative. The true roots of their results must reside elsewhere. No doubt the British system has
similar stories as well.
3. Oceans of ink have been spilled on the topic of process improvement, and entire industries revolve around
such concepts as “continuous process improvement.” Despite decades of process improvement attempts within
the US Department of Defense, acquisition failures continue to be widespread. As J. Ronald Fox wrote in a
Jan 2012 paper entitled Acquisition Reform: An Elusive Goal “The problems of schedule slippages, cost growth,
and shortfalls in technical performance on defense acquisition programs have remained much the same…”cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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4. A report by the US Defense Business Board made a similar observation in April 2012, pointing out that
projects “take longer, cost more, and deliver fewer quantities and capabilities than originally planned.” In fact,
the DBB report quotes congressional testimony from 1982 on acquisition shortcomings and states the 30 year
old testimony could be given today, verbatim, with no loss of accuracy. Of course, the US does not hold a
monopoly in this area.
5. These results offer an interesting dichotomy. On the one hand, process improvement efforts have failed
to address systemic problems. On the other hand, some acquisition programs manage to deliver top-shelf
capabilities ahead of schedule and under budget. How can this be?
6. Because the same process delivers such widely divergent results, we must be open to the possibility that
process is not the actual problem. And if process is not the problem, ﬁxing the process must not be the solution.
Perhaps reform energies ought to be directed elsewhere. Instead of spending resources on yet another round
of procurement process improvements, it may be time to look deeper and examine the values which drive
procurement decisions.
7. One key concept is that process does not truly dictate behavior. Even the most rigorously deﬁned process
can be interpreted and implemented in different ways, so while two programs may have to accomplish identical
process steps, the way the programs take those steps may be worlds apart. In other words, the way a process
is executed matters far more than the way it is designed, documented and diagrammed.
8. Yes, acquisition and procurement processes tend to be ponderous, slow and inefﬁcient. In a word: broken.
However, ﬁxing them isn't the answer. The US has been ﬁxing our process for decades, to little avail. The
good news is that even a broken process can be interpreted and implemented well, as the Virginia Class
submarine program demonstrates.
9. Let's look at a concrete example. Most government procurement processes begin when the government
releases some type of Request For Proposals (RFP). This document explains to industry what sort of goods
and/or services are being requested. Companies then respond by submitting Proposals. Despite the uniformity
of these steps, there is great freedom in how to approach developing these documents. When the US Air Force
released its RFP for the aircraft that would eventually become the F-16, it was 25 pages long. Proposals were
limited to 50 pages.
10. Nothing in the procurement process required the F-16 team to insist on such brevity. The process simply
said “you must release an RFP,” with no care as to whether it was 25 pages or 25,000, so long as it contained
the necessary information. The F-16 Ofﬁce chose to create a tightly focused document instead of a hopelessly
convoluted one, and the results were fantastic. The resulting aircraft is on its way to 50 years of service and is
still a dominant ﬁghter in the air today. It begs the question as to whether any RFP should ever be longer than
25 pages.
11. Nothing prevents today's procurement leaders on both sides of the pond from implementing comparable
limits—not only on RFP's and proposals, but across the board on all sorts of documents, presentations, designs,
etc. As an additional data point, nothing in the current procurement process required the Pentagon's latest
brownie recipe to weigh in at 26 pages—one page more than the F-16's RFP.
12. The F-16 team did not have a better process than any other military acquisition team. They simply had
a preference for speed, thrift, simplicity and restraint—the Cardinal Virtues of Procurement. They expressed
these virtues at every opportunity and applied them to each program artifact, from documentation to system
architectures. Thus, the F-16 was developed in half the time and for half the cost of its predecessor, the F-15
Eagle. It is also physically half the size of the F-15. The reason for this difference has nothing to do with
process and everything to do with priorities.
13. Following their example is simplicity itself. There is no need to recreate or deconstruct the procurement
process, no need to ﬁght endless bureaucratic battles over removing a particular step or layer of oversight that
seems extraneous to one group of experts and essential to another. Instead of launching a major process
improvement initiative, let us consider ways to comply with the current process without spending decades and
billions to do so, by living according to the four virtues and using them to guide our decisions.
14. Another example might be informative. The American tax code is notoriously complex, so much so that
in 2011, 95 million taxpayers used paid tax preparation experts rather than prepare their own. How much
money they spent is a matter of some debate, with estimates ranging from $100B to $500B. Even the low
estimate is quite a lot. Annual cries to simplify the tax code have failed to produce much in the way of
progress. And yet, there is a way to make tax preparation easier, faster and less expensive for individual
taxpayers. Companies like TurboTax provide low-cost online tools that help people determine how much they
owe in a relatively rapid fashion.
15. It is important to understand that these companies did not rewrite the tax code or improve the ofﬁcial
process for determining how much someone owes. They simply ﬁgured out a way to minimise the amount of
time and effort involved in complying with the law. Their focus is on executing the process rather than
“improving” it. Using clever automation and thoughtful design, they provide taxpayers with a simple, click-
by-click roadmap through an otherwise bewildering forest and conveyed the beneﬁts of expert advice without
charging expert prices. Again, rather than rewrite the federal tax code (ie improve the process), TurboTax andcobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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other online tax software ﬁgured out a way to automate, simplify and accelerate the current process. Perhaps
it is time to create TurboAcqs for the acquisition and procurement community.
16. Of course, it would be nice to see both the procurement policy and the tax codes get simpliﬁed, but this
is a herculean task at which decades of intelligent, motivated people have consistently failed. Why anyone
would expect the next reform effort to be different is beyond me. Thankfully, we have a more promising
alternative. Virtually every instance of a successful procurement came about because the team focused on
results and made the process work for them rather than spending time changing or ﬁghting the process.
17. How does such a thing happen? How can we interpret and implement a broken process in such a way
we reduce the cost, time and complexity involved? One key is to make sure all our decisions express the
previously mentioned Cardinal Virtues of Procurement: speed, thrift, simplicity and restraint. The other key is
to deﬁne a successful procurement as follows: delivering affordable solutions that are available when needed
and effective when used.
18. The sentiments in the previous paragraph may sound like common sense, but there is nothing even
remotely common about them. Large budgets, long schedules and high degrees of complexity are widely
viewed as inevitable attributes of procurement programs. The Cardinal Virtues occasionally get lip service but
more often are rejected—implicitly and explicitly—in favor of the Deadly Sins of Procurement: Complacency,
Cynicism, Complexity, Selﬁshness, Fear, Apathy and Sloth. Note that the list of Sins is far longer than the list
of Virtues—it is ever thus.
19. This means large budgets, long schedules and high degrees of complexity are frequently viewed as not
only inevitable but even as desirable attributes. The Deadly Sins are treated as virtues. People act as if spending
more time and money on something inherently improves its quality, or as if a highly complex item is superior
to a simpler one. This is simply not the case. The data shows simpler, less expensive systems tend to outperform
more complex, expensive systems.
20. Further, procurement programs often focus on goals other than delivering solutions which are affordable,
available and effective. Instead, bureaucrats measure how much money has been spent compared with how
much was supposed to be spent—and woe to the manager who underspends his budget! This creates some
truly perverse incentives and discourages such subversive activities as delivering ahead of schedule or under
budget. Other times a technical system is judged on whether or not it advances the state of the art rather than
on whether we can afford to purchase, own and operate it, or whether its capabilities are aligned with actual
operational needs. Unsurprisingly, aiming at the wrong goal means we end up in the wrong place.
21. Again, this is not an artifact of the process, policies or laws. Rather, it is the result of rejecting speed,
thrift, simplicity and restraint, choosing instead to follow a different path in which procurement ofﬁcials aim
to solve problems by spending more time and money and making things more complicated. To be fair, nobody
explicitly aims to deliver a system which is unaffordable, unavailable and ineffective. But by failing to deﬁne
success in terms of affordable, available and effective, they implicitly aim to do exactly that. This idea is
further examined in an article titled The Goal of Defense Acquisitions, which appeared in the Nov 2011 issue
of Defense AT&L (http://www.dau.mil/pubscats/ATL%20Docs/nov_dec11/Ward.pdf)
22. In conclusion, the four Cardinal Virtues of Procurement should be recognised and embraced, then used
to guide our behavior across the spectrum of procurement decision making, from organisational structure and
procedures to technical architectures and documentation. At each decision point, procurement professionals
generally have an opportunity to make things faster or slower, more complex or less complex. There are
opportunities to spend less money or to spend more money. If speed, thrift, simplicity and restraint are our
guiding stars, they will lead us towards delivering systems which are affordable, available and effective. And
for what it's worth, if we start truly embracing these virtues, then we have a hope of someday applying them
to the process and policy as well. Not that we'll need to, but we could if we were so inclined:
Final Note: The ideas expressed in this paper are built upon an acquisition framework called FIST
(Fast, Inexpensive, Simple, Tiny). Further details about FIST are available in this article from the
Armed Forces Journal: http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2012/04/9772610
23. Lt. Col. Dan Ward is an active duty acquisitions ofﬁcer in the US Air Force, currently stationed at
Hanscom Air Force Base near Boston Massachusetts. The views expressed in this article are solely those of
the author and do not reﬂect the ofﬁcial policy or position of the US Air Force or the US Government.
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Written evidence submitted by Open Source Consortium (PROC 5)
A submission from the Open Source Consortium (OSC) a UK trade association for SME suppliers of services
based on Free and Open Source Software (OSS) seeking to promote the advantages of open standards and OSS
in an information society and knowledge economy.
Introduction and Summary
Our response is mainly directed to to aspects of procurement affecting SMEs and information and
communication technology (ICT) with speciﬁc reference to open source software (OSS) and the supply of
services based on OSS.
One of the reasons that the OSC was formed in 2006, was to explore the creation of consortia to bid for
large contracts. At that time we were advised by relevant parties in the public sector1 that if we didn't form
consortia we wouldn't win contracts.
The overall problem we identify is that of signalling in situations with asymmetric information.2 Too often
we have found it is not a question of what is being said but what is being done. In general we recognise that
it might not be easy for large bodies to transact with SMEs however limiting contracts to £100 million as the
Minister for the Cabinet Ofﬁce announced doesn't create many new opportunities.
For this reason individual members of the Open Source Consortium (OSC) have tended to steer away from
getting involved with large tender exercises, particularly in the public sector.
Observation and experience suggest that whatever the government says3 to suppliers, the past remains the
best guide to the future.
What basis do we have for assuming that next time it will be different?
Advice given to departments4 makes it clear that what ever is being required of them
[legislation coming into force on 31 January 2013] places a requirement on commissioners to
consider the economic, environmental and social beneﬁts5 of their approaches to procurement
before the process starts
it does not apply to services (eg, services based on OSS as OSS licences are most usually available at
zero-cost)
The Act will apply to framework agreements. When procuring an above threshold framework
agreement for public services procurers and commissioners must consider the [legislation] [except
it] does not apply to services contracts awarded by calling off from a framework.
In any event, in advance of this legislation coming into force two large government departments have just
signed enterprise agreements6 with one of the standard proprietary software vendors. These arrangements
cite money savings which would seem to depend on how the savings are calculated.7
Detail
We give three examples of the signalling problem.
1. ADDSS
When the ADDSS framework was put out to tender,8 we noted at the time that this £4bn framework
exercise was being conducted before Cabinet Ofﬁce had concluded its work on deﬁning an open standard. We
did not consider this to be a positive sign.
In early July 2012 we received an email9 from a body that had been working with Cabinet Ofﬁce on OSS
and public procurement:
I expect you and OSC are light years ahead of me on this but for completeness I append the details
as I have been asked to encourage as strong a response from the Open Source Community as
possible. Tenders due by 8 August 2012.
This appeared to be a signal that there were opportunities. Given the time scales we had to move quickly or
not at all.
1 ?????
2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signalling_(economics)
3 We understand there was a recent by-invitation event (January 2013) at which the Cabinet Ofﬁce again asserted its desire to see
more use of of open source software and open standard
4 http://www.cabinetofﬁce.gov.uk/sites/default/ﬁles/resources/Public_Services_Social_Value_Act_2012_PPN.pdf
5 Factors that are part of the OSS business case: http://www.opensourceconsortium.org/content/view/195/91/ (part 2)
6 Referenced subsequently
7 http://www.opensourceconsortium.org/content/view/203/89/
8 http://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:189134–2012:TEXT:EN:HTML&src=0
9 Original available if requiredcobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
Ev w10 Public Administration Committee: Evidence
We coordinated a decision and eleven members of the OSC agreed to take forward a bid.10
We raised funds from members to pay for the bidding process and engaged a suitable consultant to assist us
with maximising our chances for success. We expended considerable time and effort. Misallocation of these
two commodities is a major source of opportunity cost11 to SMEs.
In practice there were many reasons why this tender exercise was not suitable including but not limited to:
— Heavy upfront process—SMEs do not have dedicated marketing, contract and legal departments,
simply engaging with the tender required considerable time and effort. Pleas by all SMEs for a
time extension were ignored in the later stages of the procurement by the government procurement
service (GPS);
— Sheer size and complexity of the tender—this appeared to be a number of different tenders combined
into a super tender (Application Development, ERP, Information Management, Content Management
and Security Consultancy) which probably suited the government requirement for efﬁciency and, as
a result, beneﬁted the large as opposed to SME community irrespective of it being seemingly broken
into multiple lots;
— Over emphasis on essay writing skills—Part B of the Award Stage became a huge essay writing
competition (approximately 10,000 words), which beneﬁt large marketing departments. None of
these questions favoured such advantages that SMEs might be expected to bring (eg ﬂexibility,
responsiveness, innovation);
— Inconsistent use of CPV codes—the lot descriptions showed some marked inconsistencies with the
accompanying CPV codes, with 35 lots and up to 30 CPV codes per lot this was a huge pieces of
analysis for SMEs to undertake;
The tender showed few signs of being OSS friendly for reasons that included:
— The tender document format—an inbuilt assumption that the respondents were set up for Microsoft
Ofﬁce (.docx, .xlxs).12 The heavy formatting of the documents rendered them impossible to open
in Libre Ofﬁce. Requests that the documents be supplied in the older Microsoft formats.13 doc, .xls
were ignored, causing us to expend time and effort before we could evaluate our ability to participate.
— There was no mention of looking for OSS based solutions and where anything were mentioned it
was proprietary—Lot 24 (Application Support and Maintenance) expressly mentioned Oracle, SAP,
Siebel, JD Edwards, PeopleSoft and IBM
— Software licence costs and ﬂexibility—the criteria for the award of call-off contracts (Schedule 6 of
the Framework Agreement) was devoid of any guidance on how to apply life-cycle costs (an area
where OS can compete very effectively with proprietary standards).
We decided to withdraw from the tendering process as a damage limitation exercise which was more
prescient that we realised as ADDSS was subsequently cancelled by Cabinet Ofﬁce.14
2. Treatment of OSS by Cabinet Ofﬁce
We were not directly involved in this example from late 2011. A newspaper article informed us that:
“[A Cabinet Ofﬁce ofﬁcial] said that simply considering open source alternatives helps improve
competition, and mentioned that he encouraged a department to pilot open source LibreOfﬁce as an
alternative to upgrading its Microsoft software. This led to Microsoft providing the new software
for free.”
We made an FOI request15 to ﬁnd out more as on the face of it the example breaches EU state aid rules.
The FOI reply claimed that the newspaper article was:
[…] not an accurate account of what the Cabinet Ofﬁce ofﬁcial said at the EHI Live 2011 event. […
] The Department has contacted the [newspaper] about this inaccuracy.
We contacted the newspaper and received this reply from the section editor16:
[…] I've checked back on this and can tell you that we did make a change, but it was only to correct
a misunderstanding over [the ofﬁcial]'s position.
We originally reported him as being from CESG, but we received an email from their press
department telling us he is a Cabinet Ofﬁce ofﬁcial and made the relevant change. Nobody has
questioned what we reported him as saying at the event.[...]
10 We understood that no speciﬁc advantage was being offered to us, however , without the (semi) ofﬁcial encouragement we
would not have started
11 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunity_cost
12 At that time a relatively unstable format
13 This would have required no more effort than the documents being opened in the originating software application and then
choosing the “save as” option
14 http://central-government.governmentcomputing.com/news/three-framework-procurements-axed-after-government-review
15 http://www.opensourceconsortium.org/content/view/182/90/
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3. An NHS Scotland pilot project for an OSS desktop
The outcome of this exercise was a decision to enter into a new enterprise agreement for Microsoft
software.17
(we note also that both the Department for Education and HMRC18 have just signed new enterprise
agreements for Microsoft software.)19
OSC members formed a consortium to bid for this. On investigation we discovered requirements:
— to use hardware capable of supporting Microsoft Windows 7;20 and
— to use Microsoft Internet Explorer21 for which every instance requires a Microsoft Windows OS
licence.
Accordingly the cost and complexity of any solution in effect precluded sensible use of OSS.
January 2013
Written evidence submitted by David Chassels (PROC 6)
Author: David S Chassels CA. Current CEO of software technology company Procession plc, former partner
BDO and executive with ICFC/3i.
— The emphasis in this submission is on the Government's failure to achieve what was described in
the PASC report on Good Governance: effective use of IT as the “intelligent customer” which is
alluded to in a number of the questions.
— The perspective is from a SME Software Technology supplier and is relevant to the speciﬁc issues
regarding the three stages of procurement.
— The comments are to help “us” learn from past actions and gain knowledge to just get it right to the
beneﬁt of efﬁciency in Government and recognise that Government procurement can be leveraged
to aid economic wealth creation that lies within home grown technology companies. This latter point
is highlighted in the title of the House of Lords Science and Technology Select Committee, First
Report of Session 2010–12, Public procurement as a tool to stimulate innovation.
— The Appendix is a case study summary that addresses the challenges for Government in linking
procurement and stimulation of innovation
Answers to relevant Questions
Q1. How successful has the Cabinet Ofﬁce been at improving public procurement policy and practice?
A1. From the perspective of an SME tech company with relevant innovation it has been a failure. Despite the
PASC recommending that “the Government should establish a permanent mechanism that enables SMEs
to bring innovative ideas directly to government in conﬁdence, thereby minimising the risk of losing
business with prime contractors” this has not been implemented effectively. Initiatives such as the
Skunkworks, the Innovation Launch Pad, the Solutions Exchange and ICT Futures they have all failed
to not just deliver on taking innovation into Government contracts but to respond to innovators in an
appropriate manner.
Q2. What should be the strategic aim of the Government's public procurement policy?
A2. There should be two strategic aims.
— First be the intelligent customer by understanding and being in control of what you buy that
prioritises matching the speciﬁc needs not just on the lowest price. It is essential that you understand
how your vendors build their software, not just what they build and on that custom coding
transactional requirements is well out of date and relatively expensive. Government have failed to
recognise that there are new emerging technologies. For example where build of applications should
be object model driven with no coding described as the future by many see request for papers
here http://www.igi-global.com/publish/call-for-papers/call-details/733 and the rise of Adaptive Case
Management which can change the old Enterprise software model such as described here
http://www.acmlive.tv/agenda.html
— Second is the need to leverage Government spend to buy into home grown innovative technologies
to help not just gain efﬁciency from use of such innovation but build new UK based global players.
See www.beinformed.com a Dutch company that has been supported by the smarter than average
Dutch Government see the Ovum Radar report well worth a read and note now looking to build
their Universal Credit with knowledge gained from smaller projects
17 http://www.channelregister.co.uk/2012/10/08/nhs_scotland_microsoft_ea/
18 http://www.channelregister.co.uk/2013/01/09/hmrc_inks_microsoft_ea/
19 http://www.channelregister.co.uk/2013/01/11/microsoft_schools_mou/
20 Negating an opportunity to beneﬁt from a lower cost hardware speciﬁcation
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Q3. Does the Government have the right skills and capabilities to procure effectively?
A3. Yes but it needs direction to deliver on the strategic objectives. It needs greater “joined up” thinking and
more of a collaborative grass roots approach often called “systems thinking” as articulated by Dr W
Edwards Deming (¹) which is an approach that “optimises how business processes operate from end to
end, working together with the solution supplier, for the beneﬁt of the customer and ultimately for the
beneﬁt of their customers”. (²) This puts the onus on leaders to set the right environment. Disturbingly
some in Government think that the intelligent customer is about knowing what you need but this is the
intelligent business. As an intelligent customer it is vital you know what capabilities exist which will
inﬂuence selection of projects and articulation of needs.
Q5. Does the Government have the organisational structures in place to enable it to procure effectively? (For
example, how far should the Government centralise responsibility for public procurement? Do central
government procurement “framework agreements” enable more effective public procurement?)
A5 Currently no but the GDS initiative to appoint a “neutral vendor” to co-ordinate and facilitate has
interesting possibilities. Becoming the intelligent customer needs to be a central resource and this new
role would be an effective way to distribute knowledge. However Government as the customer should be
responsible for collection of the knowledge. It is important that suppliers understand Government have
and use such knowledge which will improve the working relationships with mutual respect something that
“framework agreements” never achieved?
Q8. How should Government assess and manage risk when negotiating procurement contracts? (For example,
how much risk should Government be prepared to accept and what are the limits on the transfer of risk
to the private sector?)
A8 This comes back to being the intelligent customer with knowing “the art of the possible”. It is a dynamic
environment as innovators push at the boundaries of the possible. But from such knowledge come not just
informed decisions on procurement but throughout the whole cycle of evaluation of a project including
policy decision making. As a result risks will be identiﬁed early in the process and managed accordingly.
Yes Government should accept risk where there are matching rewards in achieving strategic objectives.
Q9. What is the best role for “prime contractors” and what are the advantages and disadvantages of relying
on “prime contractors”?
A9. For large contracts it makes sense to have a “prime contractor” who is an orchestrator and administrator
of all relationships very much like the construction industry. They should not be the supplier of the
underlying technology “build blocks” which will be chosen with the acquired knowledge of being the
intelligent customer working with the prime contractor. The model being developed as the “neutral vendor”
will be a learning experience that could be used to good effect in establishing this model for larger
contracts.
There have been considerable disadvantages with the old ways where contractors' interests always ruled
exampled by their “unwillingness” to adopt cost saving innovation that would affect their revenue streams.
This is called “the innovators dilemma” and applies to the dominant suppliers if they adopt or make new
products that are simple to implement and easy to use, they will lose their massive streams of services
revenue. The most recent example was a direct introduction to a large prime contractor by the Skunkworks
and despite a good meeting where positive comments were made they backtracked and did nothing
eventually saying “bring us a contract”? The ecosystems that the core vendors build up with big serviced
companies who are the prime contractors will ruthlessly exploit (with of course a friendly smile) a
customer that is ignorant of then available capabilities. It is also part of their strategy to see senior
executives placed in position of “inﬂuence” to further secure their position.
Q10.What are the key lessons to be learned from the experience of cost overruns, delays and project failures
in central Government procurement over the past ﬁve years or so?
A10.The old ways have been very costly and it is not yet over. The way which large current contracts have
been designed and built such as the DWP Universal Credit will deliver more failures. The key lessons
should be
— Agree strategic objectives are much wider than just the cheapest options!
— Be smarter by becoming the intelligent customer and be prepared to engage with innovators with
proven new technologies
— Be aware of the successes showing not just successful delivery but real cost savings and learn from
these examples (unlike current policy of ignoring them)
— Recognition that procurement is not the end game it is a process where knowledge is shared across
functions and starts with the ideas even policy making
— “Agile” is only a methodology which undoubtedly can make signiﬁcant improvements but ﬂexibility
is vital as new supporting technologies will change how to approach delivery of successful outcomes
Conclusion
These views are from the perspective of an outsider seeing consequences of action over a decade and in
particular the past few years. Whilst it is particular to ICT procurement the principles are equally valid across
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covering what is known as the “exploitation gap”. It may help understand the barriers to achieving the strategic
objective of assisting with exploitation on home grown innovation.
Notes:
(¹) Dr W Edwards Deming was one of the greatest management thinkers of the 20th century. The Japanese
credit him with providing the management approach that has enabled the dramatic and unprecedented success
of their industry since the Second World War.
(²) This quote is from the Deming Forum booklet “Managing Transformation actually means Transforming
Management” http://www.deming.org.uk/
APPENDIX
UK Government Stimulating Innovation;
The Relevance and Challenge
The UK has a good reputation for innovation creation BUT a poor record for commercial exploitation to
create home grown global companies. This applies in particular to the important business to business markets
where the US has been so successful. The Government is the largest buyer of goods and services and as such
has the ability to lead change to help remove the exploitation gap. The Procession story will aid understanding
the real challenges UK Government face to achieve better procurement outcomes and stimulating innovation.
Procession's new software technology has over 12 years of proven capability with early adopters such as
UK Sport and British Olympic Association. However new disruptive technologies face the “innovators
dilemma”. Add the fact that UK Government ICT fails to really understand has proven to be an insurmountable
challenge to see wider adoption. The proven savings in both build and efﬁciency suggest this “failure” by UK
Government ICT has been very costly. This brief note attempts to focus on” why” to help those with inﬂuence
can be comfortable in daring to question “IT” experts that speak a different “language”; a problem that also
exists in the commercial world.
What is Procession?
It is a complete new approach to building software applications that delivers on removal of coding and thus
the “language” interpretation gap between “IT and users. This was recently articulated by respected independent
analyst Naomi Bloom “Writing less code to achieve great business applications was my focus in that 1984
article, and it remains so today. Being able to do this is critical if we're going to realize the full potential of
information technology” Bill Gates in 2008 articulated this removal of code as the “holy grail of development
forever”, “the dream the quest…. but would be in a time frame of 5 to 8 years.” This is exactly what
Procession's R&D over 20 years has created and tested with early adopters with such capability described as
“Pointing to the technical foundation of future”. The key is being user centric with very fast build of complex
applications with in built adaptability to support constant change and dynamically support users working
with customers.
The Relevance Today
Procession was a decade or so ahead of its time facing too many vested interests. In 2003 UK Government
shut its own in house R&D capability in Norwich losing expertise to recognise and evaluate new technologies.
Thereafter the policy expected the ICT prime contractors “to do the best for taxpayers”; a quote from an
exchange with the then UK Government CIO, John Suffolk before the last election. But the world has changed
where cash is tight and efﬁciency is a priority with old ways being challenged. Procession's early adopters
were all business driven and UK Sport has been a good example by quickly reacting to users needs with a
result that it is the most efﬁcient UK Government grant body where costs at 4.4% of distribution with next
best 10.5%. It brings a simplicity and understanding that both politicians and business people can understand.
A UK Sport administrator recently said “It captures all my weird and wonderful ideas and all done without
telling me that I am expecting too much” and at a potential new customer the CEO and CFO said “why do it
any other way?”
The Challenge
Despite 10+ years dialogue with individuals in UK Government all with few exceptions thought interesting
and understood relevance but no one was able or willing to take responsibility or “risk” to challenge the “old
ways”. Despite numerous invitations to visit UK Sport to see how build takes place with high levels of
operational efﬁciency no one has responded. Any referrals to prime contractors failed as the innovator's
dilemma kicked in.
Contacts with DWP totally ignored this new adaptive customer centric approach which supports a current
industry new initiative called Adaptive Case Management (ACM). To spend approaching £500 million on
Universal Credit deﬁes belief compared with an ACM approach. We were shown the speciﬁcation for Child
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than £5 million with our technology. Despite raising our concerns on both projects no one challenged us or
investigated and that is the challenge?
No one is responsible for being the “intelligent customer” and understanding the importance of “It really
matters how your vendors build their software, not just what they build”. To this end research on Object Model
Driven Engineering to remove coding is now being promoted and seen as the future foundation of software.
As a UK pioneer in such an approach we have been invited to submit our “story” to be published in 2013 in
a research paper. This is in contrast to our own Government who ignore us. Why? Certainly not helped by the
current obsession with agile using open source which certainly have a place but not to build custom coded
transactional solutions.
The new alternative using Adaptive Software delivering ACM will transform Enterprise software a view
now being expressed by experienced experts. UK Government needs to understand and as a UK pioneer should
work with us—just as the Dutch Government does with one of their own innovative suppliers now looking to
build their Universal Credit.
UK Government needs to address the issues raised if there is any hope of seeing new UK global players
emerge in the particular challenging business to business markets.
January 2013
Written evidence submitted by TUC (PROC 7)
Introduction and Summary
1.1 The TUC is the voice of Britain at work. Representing more than six million workers in 54 different
unions, the TUC campaigns for economic and social policies that promote a better quality of working life, that
further equality for all and that support trade union values.
1.2 The TUC welcomes this inquiry by the Public Administration Select Committee (PASC) into public
procurement. We have taken a close interest in developments in procurement policy since the publication of
the current EU directives in 2004 and their subsequent transposition into UK law in 2006.
1.3 We do not intend to comment on every question listed in this inquiry, but we wish to make the
following points:
— At a strategic level, the UK has failed to make full use of the potential for procurement policy to
support both the quantity and quality of employment, to assist economic inclusion and to underpin
a modern industrial strategy. This failure to use procurement policy in a positive manner must be
addressed going forward;
— The procurement of new trains as part of the Thameslink contract, won by Siemens of Germany
rather than by Bombardier, which is based in Derby, had implications for industry and jobs in the
UK. This experience changed the debate on procurement policy and it is important that lessons
are learned;
— From a European perspective, new reformed EU procurement directives must continue to support
the use of social, employment and environmental clauses in public sector contracts.
1.4 In answering questions 1, 2 and 7 as set out in the “Procurement: Issues and Questions” paper published
by PASC as part of this inquiry, we will address those issues in detail.
1. How successful has the Cabinet Ofﬁce been at improving public procurement policy and practice?
2.1 In answering this question, it is ﬁrst important to consider what public procurement policy is and what
we believe it should be. Public procurement refers to the purchasing of goods and services by the public sector.
The public sector includes both central and local government, as well as agencies of government, which can
be very large and involve a high degree of spend, such as the Ministry of Defence and the National Health
Service. Public sector spend amounts to some £238 billion of taxpayers' money, a third of total public sector
expenditure. “No Stone Unturned in pursuit of growth”, The Rt Hon the Lord Heseltine, October 2012, p. 88
2.2 Clearly, then, care must be taken to ensure that this money is spent wisely. Efforts must be made to
minimise waste, and negotiations with suppliers, such as those to achieve economies of scale, should seek to
reduce the cost to government. However, procurement policy can achieve more than simply deliver goods and
services at lost cost. Thousands of private sector employees are in work as a result of contracts from the public
sector and the TUC strongly believes that the way in which contracts are designed can affect both the quantity
and quality of those jobs. A “Buy British” policy, apart from being undesirable, would be illegal under EU
rules, but this does not mean that procurement policy cannot be used creatively to support British industry.
These two issues have been central to the focus of TUC campaigning on procurement over many years.
2.3 The TUC was disappointed that the previous Labour Government failed to take the opportunity to use
procurement in support of jobs and industry. This was clearly legal under EU law. For example, Recital 33 ofcobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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the public sector directive said that contract performance conditions “may, in particular, be intended to favour
on-site vocational training, the employment of people experiencing particular difﬁculty in achieving integration,
the ﬁght against unemployment or the protection of the environment.” In other words, contracts could require
suppliers to introduce apprenticeships, or to stipulate that some under-represented workers, such as those with
disabilities or who endure long-term unemployment for other reasons, must be employed. Such actions may
have involved a short-term cost, but would have left a long term beneﬁt. Nevertheless, a primarily low-cost
agenda was pursued.
2.4 The election of the Coalition Government brought technical changes to procurement policy. An early
change was the abolition of the Ofﬁce of Government Commerce (OGC), which had been responsible for
procurement issues, and the placing of procurement policy in the Efﬁciency and Reform Group at the Cabinet
Ofﬁce. Whilst there is a logic to placing responsibility for public sector purchasing in the Cabinet Ofﬁce, the
OGC had been based in the Treasury. The TUC did not believe the link between procurement and economic
policy had been well-enough exploited, but the basing of the OGC in the Treasury at least allowed for the
potential for that to happen. Any institutional relationship between procurement issues and economic policy
was now broken.
2.5 There was no immediate change in the strategic nature of procurement policy until a political controversy
as a result of the Thameslink contract forced a rethink. In June 2011, Siemens plc and XL trains were awarded
preferred bidder status in relation to the procurement of new rolling stock for the Thameslink programme, a
through rail service from Bedford to Brighton, crossing London from north to south. Bombardier Transportation
were unsuccessful, but were named as reserve bidder. Bombardier owns the UK's last remaining train
manufacturing facility, in Derby, and the DfT's decision led to protests. 1,400 redundancies were announced
at Bombardier and unions raised concerns about the company's future in the UK, along with the sustainability
of the domestic supply chain. There was also a danger that the loss of a UK train design facility would have
long-term adverse consequences for the cost of the railway, because of the speciﬁc design requirements of
British trains.
2.6 Politically, the Coalition Government sought to blame its Labour predecessor for the controversy, arguing
that the latter had drawn up the Thameslink contract. However, in July 2011, clearly concerned to avoid such
a situation being repeated, the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, and the then Transport Secretary, Philip
Hammond, wrote a joint letter to the Prime Minister, expressing concern at the turn of events. The letter said:
“There is a perception that other EU countries appear to manage their public procurement processes with a
sharper focus on domestic supply than we have hitherto.” The letter suggested that the Government use the
second phase of the Growth Review to explore more fully the opportunities to take a strategic approach to
large scale public procurement.
2.7 This point about economic growth is important. Whilst, as noted above, the previous Labour Government
had a generally “low cost” approach to procurement policy, one notable exception was when it introduced the
“Policy through Procurement Action Plan”, in the aftermath of the economic downturn. This action plan
detailed how procurement policy could be used to drive economic growth.
2.8 “Policy through Procurement” set a number of key performance metrics for government. These included:
the value of contracts placed with SMEs; the number of apprenticeships supported through public procurement,
building towards the aim of securing 20,000 apprenticeships over a three year period; the number of young
unemployed people taken into the workforce; and the absolute number of key departmental suppliers that had
agreed to disclose their greenhouse gas emissions, with the aim that government would work with them to
support their carbon reduction programmes.
2.9 A similar change in procurement policy was duly contained in the Autumn Statement 2011. The Autumn
Statement said that, in order to help build capability in strong UK-based supply chains and support SMEs and
mid-sized businesses, the Government would introduce a package of measures to deliver better value for the
UK from public procurement.
2.10 Having already published procurement plans for construction, wider infrastructure, information and
communication technologies and facilities management, the Government would publish medium-term plans
setting out its procurement needs for other sectors by April 2012. This would give suppliers the conﬁdence to
invest for the future and compete on a level playing ﬁeld. The Government would also make better use of pre-
procurement dialogue with suppliers to ensure procurement processes were well designed and quickly carried
out. The Government would complete all but the very biggest and most complex procurement processes within
120 working days by introducing the lean sourcing process from January 2012.
2.11 In a speech in the week before the Autumn Statement, the Cabinet Ofﬁce Minister, Francis Maude,
said: “The way in which we've done business has militated against UK interests and it's militated against
growth and jobs in this country. In the same 12 month period while British companies won £432 million of
EU contracts, French ﬁrms won £911 million and German ﬁrms £3600 million. The UK awards 3% of public
procurement by value to foreign suppliers, compared to 1.9% in Germany and 1.5% in France.”
2.12 In conclusion, the UK has a history of using procurement passively, simply seeking to buy the lowest
cost solutions and failing to use the power of procurement to stimulate jobs, skills, inclusion and industry, as
well as delivering fair pay. After a political controversy and in the light of continuing low economic growth,cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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procurement policy has changed for the better. This is welcome, but it is too early to say how effective the
change is. This policy area must, therefore, be monitored in the coming months and years.
2. What should be the strategic aim of the Government's public procurement policy?
3.1 The Government's procurement policy must balance value for money for the taxpayer with the use of
procurement to underpin the long term strength of the British economy. Speciﬁcally, opportunities should be
sought to use procurement to stimulate skills, improve employment opportunities for all, including the most
disadvantaged, and to help public sector purchasers to provide “greener” goods and services. In doing so, it
can help to achieve the UK's carbon emissions targets and it can underpin a sustainable industrial strategy.
3.2 There is also a strong moral case for the government considering the use of living wage clauses in public
procurement to help to raise more low paid employees out of poverty. There is evidence that employers gain
personnel and reputational beneﬁts through paying the living wage. However, many employers who could
afford to pay higher wages still deliberately choose to pay rates close to the National Minimum Wage.
According to the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), one result is that HM Treasury currently spends
£3.6 billion on tax credits and in-work beneﬁts to workers who earn less than the living wage rates. When it
comes to public sector procurement, this means that the government effectively pays a hidden subsidy when it
sources from low-wage employers.
3.3 The Government has previously been somewhat sceptical about the legality of living wage clauses in
public procurement, yet other countries seem able to adopt such measures without difﬁculty, often citing Article
38 of the public procurement directive, which makes provision for the use of social clauses.
3.4 There is signiﬁcant cross-party support building up for the living wage, and indeed the Department of
Work and Pensions has itself recently become a certiﬁed Living Wage Employer. Now must be a propitious
time for the Government to consider again whether it can play a stronger role in ﬁghting in-work poverty
through its public procurement policy.
3.5 The TUC believes strongly in a more positive agenda for procurement, but we are not alone. In, “No
Stone Unturned”, a report for the Government in October 2012, the former Deputy Prime Minister, Lord
Heseltine, said the following:
“There is a tension in public procurement where it applies to sophisticated technologies and not for
commodities such as A4 paper. What is it for?
“The simple answer is to secure value for money for the public purse. Who can argue with that?
The problem is that it is often equated with short term, lowest cost procurement which ignores the
issue about the country's industrial base—the exploitation of R&D, the skills we need and the
creation of jobs. It also ignores international practice. No country of which I have any knowledge
takes so simple a view. Although crucial in major policy areas such as defence or aerospace, the
same issues are everyday challenges for ministers whether they are placing contracts for high speed
trains or new IT systems. We are concerned about the destiny of our manufacturing sector but we
do not spend enough time exploring the ways government can work to support it.”. “No Stone
Unturned in pursuit of growth”, The Rt Hon the Lord Heseltine, October 2012, p. 92–93
3.6 Lord Heseltine recommended that the long-term impact of technological advantage and the UK industrial
base are taken into account in the procurement of specialist technologies. The TUC agrees, but we would like
more detail of how the UK industrial base might be supported by procurement to be written into government
policy. In our view, as stated above, this should certainly include skills training and the development of
environmentally friendly manufacturing. We believe procurement could support inclusive employment policy
and fair wages as well.
3. How should government ensure that European directives on public procurement do not inhibit public
bodies' ability to procure effectively?
4.1 Key to this question, of course, is the deﬁnition of “effective” procurement. For some, low cost
procurement is the most effective form and those supporting this view will wish to see European directives
watered down as much as possible. For those of us who believe in a proactive role for procurement, the key
issue is to ensure that EU directives continue to support the pursuit of social, employment and environmental
objectives through procurement policy. As noted above, it is clear that the 2004 directives allowed the pursuit
of such objectives, but those directives are currently being reviewed and it is essential that the directives
replacing them do not pursue a low cost approach to procurement, on the basis of arguments about so-called
“burdens on business”.
4.2 There are reasons for encouragement that the new directive will indeed be positive. The explanatory
memorandum of the directive puts its objective in the context of the wider Europe 2020 strategy for smart,
sustainable and inclusive growth. This, according to the memorandum, “is based on three interlocking and
mutually reinforcing priorities: developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation; promoting a low-
carbon, resource-efﬁcient and competitive economy; and fostering a high-employment economy delivering
social and territorial cohesion.” The TUC believes much greater emphasis should be placed on knowledge andcobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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innovation, low carbon growth and high employment, rather than the current obsession, in the UK and in
Europe, with austerity. Moreover, it would be hard to understand how the new directive could support those
Europe 2020 objectives if it does not allow for positive procurement practices.
4.3 Recital 17 of the draft directive states:
“Research and innovation, including eco-innovation and social innovation, are among the main
drivers of future growth and have been put at the centre of the Europe 2020 strategy for smart,
sustainable and inclusive growth… This directive should contribute to facilitating public procurement
of innovation and help Member States in achieving Innovation Union targets. A speciﬁc procurement
procedure should therefore be provided for which allows contracting authorities to establish a long-
term innovation partnership for the development and subsequent purchase of a new, innovative
product, service or works provided it can be delivered to agreed performance levels and costs. The
partnership should be structured in such a way that it can provide the necessary “market-pull”,
incentivising the development of an innovative solution without foreclosing the market.”
4.4 Needless to say, the TUC strongly supports this recital.
4.5 Recital 43 is a similar, but slightly amended, version of the much quoted Recital 33 from the previous
directive, which this one replaces (ie 2004/18/EC). Recital 43 states:
“Contract performance conditions are compatible with this Directive provided that they are not
directly or indirectly discriminatory, are linked to the subject matter of the contract and are indicated
in the contract notice, the prior information notice used as a means of calling for competition in the
procurement documents. They may, in particular, be intended to favour on-site vocational training,
the employment of people experiencing difﬁculty in achieving integration, the ﬁght against
unemployment, protection of the environment or animal welfare. For instance, mention may be made,
amongst other things, of the requirements—applicable during the performance of the contract—to
recruit long-term jobseekers or to implement training measures for the unemployed or young persons,
to comply in substance with fundamental International Labour Organisation (ILO) Conventions,
even where such Conventions have not been implemented in national law, and to recruit more
disadvantaged persons than are required under national legislation.”
4.6 The TUC strongly supports Recital 43. However, we raise one concern, which is that there has been
some dispute in the past about the legal status of recitals. The articles of the directive are those that give it
legal force, while the recitals exist for explanatory purposes. This has led some to argue that recitals we have
quoted are of little legal interest. We disagree: if the recitals explain what the directive is supposed to be
achieving (they are written in less legalistic language) then surely they are of value. Nevertheless, for the
avoidance of this dispute in the future, we wish to see Recital 17 and the new Recital 43 codiﬁed into the legal
text of the directive when this is published.
4.7 Regarding progress, the revised directives have completed their committee stage in the European
Parliament and will be voted on at a plenary session of the Parliament in March 2013. They must also be
adopted by the European Council, so there is still time to strengthen them. Following their adoption into
European law, they must be transposed into UK law by June 2014.
January 2013
Written evidence submitted by IACCM (PROC 8)
This response is provided by Tim Cummins, Chief Executive of the International Association for Contract &
Commercial Management (IACCM), a worldwide non-proﬁt organisation dedicated to improving the quality
and results of trading relationships.
Summary
— IACCM research suggests that the failure rate in Government procurement is no greater than that
experienced in the private sector.22
— However, the costs associated with public procurement policy and skill deﬁciencies are far higher.23
— The core issue is therefore “value for money” and in this regard the Government procurement process
requires substantial overhaul.
— Some of the current initiatives appear likely to increase the problem.
22 IACCM member interviews 2012 regarding comparative rates of project failure, Government versus Private Sector.
23 Study conducted by IACCM in conjunction with Rand Corporation re: costs of EU Public Procurement Policy, 2008. This
indicated that the impact of rigid and risk-averse procurement process and contracts results in an average price premium of
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1. Introduction
1.1 While Cabinet Ofﬁce has consistently shown leadership and imagination with regard to the vision for
public procurement,24 there are signiﬁcant shortfalls in aspects of strategy and execution. Organisation and
skills throughout the service remain signiﬁcant inhibitors, but these are supplemented by an apparent
fragmentation of strategy and limited understanding or interest in supplier perspectives or “lessons learned”.
This leads to inconsistency of both message and practice, undermining the level of trust or the commitment
to performance.
1.2 As with all trading relationships, good performance depends on a degree of mutual understanding,
predictability and fairness. Within the private sector, procurement practices are tempered by the fact that
companies operate ﬁrst and foremost as sellers or suppliers of goods and services. They are to some extent
constrained in their buying behaviour by the need to maintain and manage broader market relationships.
Because it lacks paying customers for most of its services, Government does not have the beneﬁt of this same
market discipline. As a result, it tends to place burdensome terms on its suppliers which generate negative
behaviours. In particular, the contracting culture is one of mutual self-protection and a tendency to allocate
blame.
1.3 The situation is made worse when:
(a) Government contracting models are developed unilaterally and are frequently non-negotiable.
(b) Government advisors tend to advocate models of contracting similar to that of the retail sector, in
which all risk and responsibility for performance is placed on the supplier and all acquisitions are
treated as commodities.
(c) Procurement staff often appear to have little understanding of the role or purpose of contracts or
contract management. Lacking authority to explore alternative approaches, they are driven by a
lowest price mentality that frequently undermines longer-term value and increases cost.
2. General Observations
2.1 The topics raised within the Committee's “Issues & Questions Paper” are wide-ranging. Section 3,
“Recommendations”, brieﬂy answers each of those questions.
2.2 The Procurement Process within Government appears fragmented, varying between departments, and
with no apparent point of ownership or accountability for its effectiveness. This lack of deﬁnition inevitably
impacts the extent to which there is investment in skills, resources or the tools and systems that are necessary
to achieve maximum impact. It also results in little consolidation of results or data to support continuous
learning or improvement.
2.3 As a result, core questions related to capabilities appear to be unanswered. For example, what types of
performance measurement should be used to monitor and motivate the success of Procurement as an
organisation and at the level of individual practitioners?25 To what extent should contract management and
supplier relationship management be part of the Procurement role, or separate from it (the situation in private
industry is varied and often depends on the underlying complexity of the business)?
2.4 There seems to be an innate resistance to skills analysis and benchmarking, so while work to identify
required skills has been undertaken, it is not evident how gaps will be addressed. The level of skill and
knowledge varies signiﬁcantly within and between departments, depending on the relative complexity and type
of acquisitions to be made. However, most Procurement professionals appear to have been trained to deal with
commodity purchases and have little appreciation of the methods or techniques that are needed to effectively
gather requirements, evaluate supplier capabilities, develop relationships and oversee contract outputs or
outcomes. This is a serious deﬁciency in a world that has moved increasingly to services and solutions, where
outcomes matter far more than inputs.
2.5 Organisational fragmentation within Government Procurement is already a source of weakness which is
perhaps getting worse. The lack of central oversight and management creates tensions that undermine efﬁciency
and effectiveness. These problems are in some respects exacerbated by the creation of commissioning ofﬁcers
and the Major Projects Authority. While the development of specialists is to be welcomed, there is a very real
risk that they are rendered ineffective because they lack the underlying process, resources and systems to drive
improved commercial performance. These resources are likely to spend their time overcoming the system in
the interests of their speciﬁc project, rather than leveraging or developing the system to generate better results.
2.6 In the absence of coherent process, supported by appropriate measurements, efforts to hire-in skills or
outsource performance will be frustrated. This has been a repeated experience in the private sector—
outsourcing problems does not bring solutions, especially when the contracts and associated business practices
do not support or encourage collaboration.
24 The materials produced by OGC / Cabinet Ofﬁce and displayed on their web site are frequently referenced internationally and
considered to be leading examples of good practice.
25 Measures such as total cost of ownership, delivery of outcomes, contributions through continuous improvement or innovation
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3. Recommendations
3.1 In principle, the Procurement service should be centralised, if only to enable the required developments
set out above. Over time, it would be beneﬁcial to move to a centre-led operation, but only after the necessary
process, skills and systems have been deployed.
3.2 Framework agreements are essential to effective contracting and to the ability of the private sector to
engage with Government.26 However, these must be developed with a proper reference to the market and an
understanding of the economic impacts of terms and contracting models.
3.3 Required management information is lacking. There is little consolidated data relating to outcomes; there
is no apparent ability to monitor cost of ownership; the absence of central visibility into claims, disputes and
sources of failure results in repetitive issues undermining value delivery; there is no inventory of skills or skill
gaps to support capability development etc.
3.4 Investment in modern systems and techniques is either absent or inefﬁcient. For example, despite
legislation to enable electronic signature, there appears to have been no action to take advantage of this within
Government. Similarly, the use of contract management software is sporadic and isolated implementations
appear to have been undertaken at high cost. Priority has been given to areas such as spend management,
reﬂecting the unerring focus on product purchasing and commodity thinking. Service and solution acquisition—
the areas where value is achieved and where errors most often occur—has been left with little support or
training.
3.5 Government needs to provide more cogent and coherent advice to both Government agencies and
suppliers related to compliance with European Public Procurement directives. For example, it appears that the
interpretation to date has reinforced a view that lowest price is the primary driver, rather than examining
acquisitions on more appropriate value-based criteria. This reinforces a highly transactional, commodity-based
approach, at a time when the success and value of many procurements depend on collaborative, solution-
based relationships.
3.6 Risk must be assessed in the context of both probability and consequence. It must also be understood
that risk allocation has economic consequence, in terms of direct price and in terms of potential gain or loss
of opportunity. Government contracting today is mostly driven by a risk-averse policy that focuses exclusively
on shifting consequence to the supplier. This is probably the least effective approach to risk management that
could be taken; it serves no one except perhaps the legal advisers who can proﬁt from such an approach. An
immediate improvement could be made simply be understanding and addressing the probable causes of poor
performance and addressing those through revised terms and conditions.27
3.7 The allocations of risk should be adjusted to the nature of the procurement and also the conditions of
the market. There are intelligent criteria that enable a portfolio of contracting models to be used, based on the
levels of risk associated with the deal or the relationship.28
3.8 Prime contract decisions should be based on risk and opportunity criteria. These include factors such as
skill availability, performance history, extent of market competition, the importance of innovation and the
degree of supply chain transparency. The biggest problem for Government at this time is not whether prime
contract relationships will or will not work, but more whether Government has the skills available to manage
any complex relationship.
3.9 NAO reports have outlined many of the key lessons to be learned. Over 60% of their reports have
highlighted weaknesses in contract and commercial skills and systems, yet little appears to have been done to
address these. Over this 5 year period, Government has invested large amounts of money in professional
development training and in consulting reports; it continues to spend signiﬁcant sums on legal advisers. Yet
there is no evident improvement in outcomes.
3.10 Learning would also be enhanced by a less insular view. Policy appears driven by a domestic audience
and largely domestic advisory network that offers limited insights to new ideas or approaches. Best practice
and innovation are not determined by geographic or cultural boundaries. We live in an electronic age in which
ignorance should never be an excuse for sub-optimal results.
4. Conclusion
4.1 The world of procurement has changed dramatically in recent years. We operate in a global environment
where the speed of change and the complexity of business systems continue to multiply. Every organisation
struggles to keep pace with this demanding environment, which calls for unprecedented levels of agility and
adaptation, yet also demands far greater standards of governance.
26 This point was made strongly in a recent “Voice of the Supplier” roundtable with a cross-section of UK Government suppliers.
The lack of frameworks creates great difﬁculty in assessing or preparing for risk management and extends bid and negotiation
cycle times. It also appears to lead to extremes of risk-averse behaviour.
27 There is growing interest in Relational Contracting as an approach to a more balanced contract that addresses risk through
appropriate forms of governance and performance management. Agile contracts are another approach that can be effective in
balancing and reducing risk, yet also require a shift in current contracting policy and standards.
28 For example, IBM Corporation operates with 8 model “relationship types” linked to the nature of the risks involved and identiﬁes
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4.2 This has proven especially challenging for Government agencies which function under public scrutiny
and therefore must operate to unique standards of probity. Finding a balance between these competing
pressures, while also meeting the political agenda of the day, is extraordinarily taxing. It demands fresh
solutions, especially in the ﬁeld of Procurement, and at this time those solutions do not appear forthcoming.
Indeed, the Procurement agenda seems rather to be struggling with battles of the past rather than adequately
equipping for the needs of today and the future.
4.3 Government must be more open to research and an exploration of best practice. It must focus on methods
to build more collaborative supply relationships. It must expand the sources of information, innovation and
professional development. UK public administration has much to commend it; it is time to take a more radical
approach to establishing world-class procurement processes.
January 2013
Written evidence submitted by CIPS (The Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply) (PROC 9)
1. How successful has the Cabinet Ofﬁce been at improving public procurement policy and practice?
The transformation of the Government Procurement Service (GPS) has been an important part of practice
improvement. GPS now play a key role in the delivery of the centralised procurement strategy via the use of
centralised sourcing, category and data management.
The Procurement Centre of Excellence also moved from the Home Ofﬁce to the GPS in October 2012. This
important structural change will support the drive to increase spend through aggregated deals and help to
streamline procurement resource across Departments, so driving efﬁciency. One of the organisational priorities
for the GPS is to facilitate the development and retention of high quality professional staff and we welcome
the Civil Service Reform Plan (CSRP) that recognises the need for staff with commissioning and contracting
skills. To start to build this capability CIPS and the GPS have developed a lean sourcing programme that
provides an e-learning course followed by 3 days of face to face training. eEnablement of operations is another
priority for GPS and substantial progress has been made here with the move to Cloud Computing technologies
that support a procurement website, e-sourcing, government market places and Contracts Finder. Automation
(where applicable) should always be encouraged to support procurement efﬁciency.
The GPS Managed Service also provides project support for high value and/or complex projects and this
support includes pre-procurement market engagement (supplier industry days) and procurement strategy.
Improved supplier management is part of this project support and includes help for Departments and the wider
public sector, with better access to the procurement pipeline and live tendering opportunities via the website
and Contracts Finder. The focus on better management information, particularly spend analysis, will help to
improve government efﬁciency.
The introduction of the Crown Representatives in 2011 to help Government to act as a “single customer”
will encourage more efﬁcient practice. The Crown Representatives work with the existing commercial teams
across Departments to ensure a single and strategic view of the Government's needs is communicated to the
market so that cost savings can more easily be identiﬁed.
These practical steps all stem from the policy of making it easier to do business with Government and must
be applauded, as must the recognition at the highest Government levels of the importance of procurement and
the need for procurement reform. In the Coalition programme for Government the aspiration was set that 25%
of government business should go to SME's. The use of unnecessary procurement practices was identiﬁed as
a key concern for SME's and so Departments have eliminated the practice of using pre-qualiﬁcation
questionnaires for those contracts with a value of less than £100k. Also the encouragement of the use of the
Open Procedure which does not require supplier selection at the initial stage will facilitate the inclusion of
SME's. These reforms in concert with the simpliﬁcation of the EU Procurement Directives should greatly assist
the improvement of public procurement.
2. What should be the strategic aim of the Government's public procurement policy?
The strategic aim of the Government's public procurement policy should be to improve the delivery of
services to the citizen. The CSRP recognises the need for the Civil Service to improve the economic wellbeing,
security and prosperity of the country and these objectives should be embedded into any procurement policy.
Economic wellbeing does not just include ﬁscal measures, but must also encompass social wellbeing and public
procurement policy can make a difference here by building market capability and capacity and by market
shaping. The mantra of the Government is “getting more for less” but in times of austerity and economic
downturn that is challenging and will need new ways of thinking; re-designing services and involving
communities in their delivery are two ways of possible service improvement, but this needs leadership and
vision. Government is very good at developing policies (both good and bad) but actual implementation always
proves much harder because achieving the vision requires effective leadership, project/programme management,
change management and people management skills and whilst these exist in pockets they are inconsistent and
this results in poor or no dissemination. The changing political landscape also contributes to this ineffectiveness
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The public sector has always been focussed on demonstrable process and this has been underpinned by the
European Procurement Directives which have left UK procurement professionals process driven and risk
averse. Strict interpretation of the directives, process focus and the use of unnecessary procedures has often
strangled innovation in the public sector and this has left suppliers and procurement professionals alike
frustrated and trapped by prescription. However, we welcome the modernisation of the directives and trust that
the UK Government will encourage the European Commission to focus on outcomes rather than on process as
this will greatly assist policy implementation.
Policy development is also responsible for an increasing range of non-prioritised outcomes and targets, eg
cost reduction, more contracts awarded to SME's, sustainable construction etc. Political leaders and Permanent
Secretaries should always provide a priority list of outcomes/targets so that procurement professionals know
immediately what they should achieve most, especially in cases where not all the desired outcomes/targets can
actually be achieved.
3. Does the Government have the right skills and capabilities to procure effectively?
— Does the civil service have the skills and capabilities required to negotiate and manage contracts
effectively?
Opportunities exist to raise the overall standards of procurement skills and capability where less
emphasis is placed on process compliance and attention is shifted towards higher levels of
commercial skills, innovation and driving value. Raising negotiation, contract and supplier
performance management skills are essential to realising the beneﬁts of procurement involvement.
Contract management is often devolved in Departments and procurement skills tend to focus on the
call for competition to contract award rather than on the whole procurement cycle which includes
pre-procurement and contract/supplier management. There must also be an awareness of the skills
that are required to carry out these functions by top level civil servants and ministers.
— What skills do procurement authorities require in-house, what skills can be bought in and what skills
can be contracted out?
Procurement authorities should develop and retain the key procurement and commercial skills
necessary to deliver its key strategic and policy objectives. These skills would include:-
— Supply market analysis.
— Developing business models to creatively fulﬁl strategy and policy objectives.
— Developing outcome and performance based procurement speciﬁcations.
— Developing, negotiating and managing contracts for complex procurements.
— Senior stakeholder and supplier management.
— Systems thinking with strong ﬁnancial and programme management capability.
Each Procurement Authority should determine the core activity that requires in-house support and
contract out non-core activity to a centre of excellence either within the public sector (ie the GPS)
or to the private or third sector where the service can be delivered more effectively. Consideration
should also be given to contracting with the private sector for core activity where the scarcity of
skills and infrequent procurement cycles make it unrealistic to develop in-house capability.
Where a procurement authority wants skilled people to run in-house procurement then the team
should be professionally qualiﬁed to the MCIPS standard. Procurement skills can be bought in or
contracted out, but it is vital that if external procurement people are used, the contracts that they let
and manage are carefully considered and the results/outcomes they achieve are capable of
performance and beneﬁt measurement for the public body concerned. Externally provided skilled
practitioners should also be professionally qualiﬁed and experienced.
The Civil Service should identify creative ways to partner with its peer groups within the private
sector to systematically examine best practice and routinely “import” this practice via knowledge
transfer and/or secondments for the beneﬁt of speciﬁc procurement authorities or the Civil Service
as a whole.
— What lessons can central government learn from local government on procurement?
Lessons that central government can learn from local government is the use of collaboration and
framework arrangements for commonly bought goods and services. Whilst we accept that Sir Philip
Green's report highlighted the need for some centralisation, this is not always the complete answer
and the use of consortia, shared services and commissioning are other procurement models that can
and should be considered. Cross-Department working can be very effective where the right skills are
in place and this should be considered more, as centralisation of disparate entities' requirements
generally only works best for commonly bought goods. Budget cuts in local government have also
triggered the complete re-design of many local services and central government can beneﬁt from the
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— How successful are government departments and their agencies at communicating their needs to
potential suppliers?
CIPS is not qualiﬁed to comment on this question, however databases such as Contracts Finder
make it easier for suppliers to search for information on government contracts currently in the
procurement pipeline.
4. How should the civil service ensure it recruits and retains staff with the right skills to run procurements, to
negotiate and manage contracts and to deliver major projects effectively?
The Civil Service should always recruit MCIPS or studying members depending on the level of the
appointment. Recruited staff should all be given the opportunity to refresh and keep current their skills through
continuing professional development (supported by CIPS) and job development opportunities. Process
management and compliance, whilst important, should not give way to broader commercial skills, leadership
and stakeholder management when recruiting for key roles.
The GPS Strategic Procurement Team supports the delivery of high value and/or complex projects. This
pooling of talent at the centre should enable these skilled staff to be deployed across departments so enabling
the transfer of skills to the resident procurement teams.
The civil services should identify creative ways to partner with its peer groups within the private sector to
systematically examine best practice and routinely “import” this practice via knowledge transfer and/or
secondments for the beneﬁt of speciﬁc procurement authorities or the Civil Service as a whole.
5. Does the Government have the organisational structures in place to enable it to procure effectively? (For
example, how far should the Government centralise responsibility for public procurement? Do central
government procurement “framework agreements” enable more effective public procurement?)
Also refer to answer to question 3 (ﬁrst and third bullet points).
Commonly bought goods and services can be purchased effectively through central agreements providing it
can be proved that the central agreements themselves provide best value for money. Whilst the volume of
common goods and services spend ﬂowing through frameworks negotiated by central organisations such as the
GPS has increased signiﬁcantly over the past 2 years, it is estimated they are still only managing a third of the
total spend for these categories so procurement authorities continue to “opt out” resulting in duplication of
effort and resources on a large scale.
Where framework agreements are used it is important to ensure that suppliers have some pre-committed
volumes to work with or the framework may fail to deliver results proportionate to the opportunity presented
by Government spend. All too often frameworks are used simply to speed up the procurement process so these
agreements are often no more than a pre-approved supplier list with a set of indicatives terms from which each
transaction can be discretely negotiated. Under such circumstances it is unlikely that all frameworks are
delivering optimum value.
As regards centralisation beyond common goods and services (see also second bullet under question 3) the
signiﬁcant volumes of specialist procurement within departments such as the MoD and DfT may not make it
possible to yield spend efﬁciency savings, but the notion of a centrally managed professional procurement
capability could deliver other direct and indirect beneﬁts such as:-
— A common approach to professionalisation through qualiﬁcations, learning and development, talent
management, apprenticeships, recruitment, objective setting and performance management.
— Improved resource management with the ability to develop shared services, centres of procurement
excellence and reduction in duplication of effort.
— Alignment on common processes, contracting methodologies, tools and Improved data management.
6. Does the Government collect the management information it needs to understand how public procurement
is working?
Quality management information, including spend data, has traditionally been poor in the public sector. This
is for a number of reasons but accountability has often been implemented via hierarchy policy, process,
regulation and inspection rather than the collection of good management information. Where information
systems have been implemented, often they have high initial and maintenance costs that are difﬁcult for the
authority to justify. Spend within departments is recorded via systems designed for ﬁnance rather than
procurement functions and so do not usually provide the management information that is needed to understand
the effectiveness or efﬁciency of public procurement. However, as indicated in the answer to question 1, the
GPS has an organisational priority of operational and ﬁnancial efﬁciency and the technology that enables
this spend analysis capability will improve the Government's ability to understand how public procurement
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7. How should Government ensure that European directives on public procurement do not inhibit public
bodies' ability to procure effectively?
The European procurement directives are process orientated and a good process will not necessarily give a
good outcome. The Directives must be modernised with more focus on simpliﬁed processes and better
outcomes for public authorities. The guiding principles of EU public procurement are transparency, equal
treatment and proportionality, but do the directives achieve that? CIPS' members in the public sector often
express that they feel inhibited by the rules and interpretation is often inconsistent not only between Member
States but also between different public bodies. This needs addressing and hopefully the modernisation of the
EU Procurement Directives will assist rather than inhibit public bodies in the future.
The Remedies Directive has also contributed to the inhibitions of procurement teams as the combination of
the standstill period and the ability of rejected bidders to start a review procedure during this period has made
procurement teams more conscious of the risk of challenge and therefore more anxious about following the
process precisely. Although the directives are being modernised, there does not seem to be any mechanism
for the review of the Remedies Directive and CIPS believes that this step is necessary to lessen the fear
of challenge.
8. How should Government assess and manage risk when negotiating procurement contracts? (For example,
how much risk should Government be prepared to accept and what are the limits on the transfer of risk to
the private sector?)
Risk is a complex area and often multi-layered. Risk management is the identiﬁcation, assessment,
prioritisation and management of internal and external risks. Managing risks can include transferring the risk
to another party, reducing the probability of the risk, insuring for the risk and accepting some or all of the
consequences of the identiﬁed risk. The UK Government has always been associated with the transference of
risk to the private sector but this is not necessarily the best outcome and can, in fact, produce a poor outcome
if the supplier has to take all the risk (eg West Coast rail franchise). Dissemination of successful programmes,
eg LOCOG and ODA can be very useful in helping procurement teams to learn about success and to translate
it to their own environments.
International Standard ISO 31000:2009—Risk Management Principles and Guidelines, provides principles,
framework and a process for managing risks and this can be used with ISO Guide 73:2009 to help manage
risk effectively. Risk management standards and guides can be effective tools but as each procurement exercise
will have many risks associated with it, it is as important to make sure that the stakeholders responsible for
the procurement have the necessary skills to effectively manage risk as has been identiﬁed above.
The other area that is often sadly neglected in contract negotiations is the identiﬁcation of assumptions made
by the parties to the contract. Each party will have made a number of assumptions in both preparing the tender
documentation and responding to it. These need to be identiﬁed at the outset of the negotiation process so that
all parties are aware of all the assumptions that have been made. This will improve the overall quality of the
contracting process.
An overall assessment of procurement capability against a recognised standard should be implemented to
ensure each procurement authority has the required processes, procedures and levels of performance necessary
to manage the end-to-end procurement cycle.
9. What is the best role for “prime contractors” and what are the advantages and disadvantages of relying
on “prime contractors”?
Prime contractors often fulﬁl the role of project managers (eg construction contracts) although they may also
complete the performance of at least a part of the contract. If they are to fulﬁl this role then it is important to
ensure that they have the skills to manage the contract and third parties successfully. Prime contractors play
an important role where projects/programs require a complex level of integration and/or multi-vendor
coordination before the ﬁnal product or service can be put to use. Prime contractors are often able to deliver a
level of programme management and/or IT systems integration that is difﬁcult to replicate within the Civil
Service. Advantages are that you have one contract to manage, so areas of failure in terms of cost, risk and
timelines are more straightforward to manage. The prime contractor may also bring innovation where they
have market expertise, access to SME's and a demonstrable track record of successful delivery.
Disadvantages may include loss of control and cost escalation unless these are dealt with clearly in the
master agreement. Prime contractor fee structures can be complex and expensive so this additional cost needs
to be offset by a risk analysis and business case. A badly performed contract may attract media attention
and a loss of reputation so the contracting authority must have the skilled resources necessary to manage a
prime contractor.
The Major Projects Authority (MPA) is a new collaboration between the Cabinet Ofﬁce and HM Treasury
and Departments with the aim of improving the delivery success rate of major projects across central
government. The MPA has a clear and enforceable mandate that requires strong governance to be implemented
for all major projects and the Authority will work with Departments to build capability in project andcobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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programme management. This is welcomed by CIPS as robust governance and skilled people are essential for
the success of complex projects.
10. What are the key lessons to be learned from the experience of cost overruns, delays and project failures
in central Government procurement over the past ﬁve years or so?
The key lessons to be learnt are:
— One size does not ﬁt all. Differing procurement models should be used according to the parameters
of the requirements sought.
— Market analysis and understanding are key elements of specifying requirements and where the
contracting authority does not have expertise, or the requirement is not fully known then a feasibility
study or similar must be carried out to examine market capability and capacity. The requirements
speciﬁcation is of vital importance also as it will be a determinant in the outcome of the whole
process.
— Planning and governance are key to any successful programme or project, but if you do not have the
right people with the right skills then success will be limited.
— Dissemination of good procurement practice is also important. The close relationship between
LOCOG and the ODA is a good example of a successful relationship that worked well in delivering
the London 2012 Games. Many lessons can be learned from this successful programme and
Government should disseminate this success not only in terms of how a series of procurements can
be successfully run under the European Procurement Directives, but also in terms of successfully
managing relationships and outcomes.
— Higher levels of accountability can be achieved through continuity of staff engaged on longer term
programmes. Multiple handovers between SRO's and their staff over the project lifecycle disperses
corporate knowledge and often prevents effective management and delivery of outcomes.
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Written evidence submitted by Social Research Association (PROC 10)
Summary of Key Points
— The aims of purchasers and suppliers of social research services are not contradictory: they share a
common interest in ensuring the success of the procurement process.
— People providing professional services, including research, need to exercise their judgement. Such
services need to be procured in a different, and more ﬂexible, way than does procurement of a
standard product.
— An early dialogue between research managers, procurement staff, and potential suppliers is needed
to make research outputs useful to government and the wider community.
— Successful procurement relates more to the decisions taken ﬂexibly within the rules and guidelines,
rather than the structure of the organisation.
— There are advantages and disadvantages to all methods of procurement. Framework Agreements can
bring efﬁciencies but are time consuming and expensive to set up. Open competition, with a two
stage process, offers opportunities to a wider range of suppliers.
— Effective and efﬁcient procurement of research demands expertise in the techniques of procurement,
sound understanding of the policy area, and knowledge of the research process.
— The government model for research procurement has traditionally applied a combination of research
and policy subject skills and expertise in procurement. This in-house model has been largely
successful.
— Procurement beneﬁts from procurement staff working closely with research managers especially
where procurement staff specialise in research procurement.
— Consortia, led by a prime contractor, are common in social research because of the structure of the
industry. They enable a range of skills to be brought together and generally work well.
The Social Research Association (SRA)
The SRA was founded in 1978 to advance the conduct, development and application of social research. The
SRA is a charity (1123940) and limited liability company (6407985), run by and for its members, of which
there are currently over 600 in the UK and Republic of Ireland. It is primarily an association of individual
members drawn from people involved in social research across the academic, public and private sectors. The
SRA's interest in how research is commissioned dates back 25 years and is embodied in a series of publications.
It believes that two core principles of good commissioning/procurement are:
— clarity about what is being sought from the research—the concerns and questions to be addressed;
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— the importance of developing a constructive dialogue between commissioner and commissioned.
The SRA’s Perspective on Procurement
In 2010, the SRA, supported by a grant from the Nufﬁeld Foundation, examined how social research is
commissioned by national statutory bodies in the UK. This study focussed on how procurement procedures,
particularly framework agreements, operated and what effect the mode of commissioning had on the way
research was conducted. The report on this work (Carol Goldstone Associates with Janet Lewis and Ceridwen
Roberts, Effective procurement of social research in government: ﬁndings and recommendations. SRA 2011),
concluded that no one mode of procurement—through different types of Framework Agreement or Open
Competition—was preferred; different Departments found different routes most appropriate in providing best
value and the opportunity to use the most suitable suppliers.
General Comments on the Procurement Process
The three stages of procurement—pre-procurement, the tender and the contract award, are standard for the
procurement of all goods and services but they need to be handled differently depending on whether the
project is:
— highly complex, technical and expensive (railways, IT, defence);
— purchasing of a standard item used by many government departments (paper, ofﬁce equipment); or
— seeking to address a particular problem or provide a service which requires the collation of evidence,
making judgements and an element of creativity, as is the case with all knowledge-based professional
services, including social research.
The SRA's view is that research cannot be treated in the same way as purchasing objects. A one size ﬁts all
approach to procurement is inappropriate and will not produce the best outcomes. Procurement needs to be
guided by rules and guidelines to ensure the process is fair, but it is important particularly for professional
services, that staff are also able to exercise their judgement.
Response to speciﬁc questions in the Issues and Questions Paper
1. How successful has the Cabinet Ofﬁce been at improving public procurement policy and practice?
1.1 It is too early to give an answer on how successful the work of the Cabinet Ofﬁce has been in relation
to social research as there has been little direct effect so far. The changes being introduced by the Cabinet
Ofﬁce have usefully led to various issues being examined and debated.
1.2 Contract Finder has been welcomed, particularly by smaller organisations.
1.3 Proposals to reduce bureaucracy on low value (under £100k) projects are welcome. Investment in the
tender process must be commensurate with the value and timeliness of the expected outputs.
What should be the strategic aim of the Government's public procurement policy?
2.1 Good procurement should be underpinned by clear principles and processes. It is important that a balance
is achieved between ensuring fair competition and consistency in the tendering process with the recognition
that not all procurement exercises are the same. Some ﬂexibility is needed to deliver a successful outcome.
2.2 In relation to social research, the aims of the procurement process, common to both purchasers and
suppliers, should be:
2.2.1 To ensure that it delivers high quality research that fully addresses the policy issues; is good
value for money; is robust, resilient and defensible; is open about methods, data, limitations
etc; and that the process itself does not militate against these objectives.
2.2.2 To buy “intelligently” by being clear what is wanted: that the staff are knowledgeable about
the topic being addressed; and are able to enter into a dialogue with suppliers.
2.2.3 Transparent; fair; and provide opportunities for SMEs as well as large companies.
3. Does the Government have the right skills and capabilities to procure effectively?
3.1 Does the civil service have the skills and capabilities required to negotiate and manage contracts
effectively?
3.1.1 Civil servants are just as capable of achieving effective procurement as anyone else, provided
they have had appropriate training and are allowed to use their skills and judgement on how
best to proceed within agreed rules and procedures. Progress has been made in recognising the
skills involved and in training staff, but there are areas of weakness, which need addressing.
Procurement training needs to give more attention to good contract management throughout the
life of the project. In research the contract manager must have a sound grasp of the service the
contract is delivering. This signiﬁcantly reduces the risk of a poor outcome.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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3.1.2 A balance needs to be achieved between ensuring fair competition and consistency in the
tendering process and recognising that not all procurement exercises are the same. Some
ﬂexibility is needed to deliver a successful outcome.
3.1.3 There are some excellent social researchers working in government. Likewise there are those
with ﬁrst class knowledge of procurement matters. The procurement process works best when
these two aspects are brought together effectively.
3.2 What skills do procurement authorities require in-house, what skills can be bought in and what skills can
be contracted out?
3.2.1 Good research procurement demands expertise in procurement techniques, together with a
sound knowledge of the methods of research and analysis and an understanding of the policy
or delivery area, where research is to be conducted. Without specialist research knowledge, it
is not possible to identify the research speciﬁc risks to the project or make a realistic assessment
of value for money. The government model for research procurement has traditionally applied
a combination of research and policy subject skills with expertise in procurement, and this in-
house model has been largely successful.
3.2.2 Detailed knowledge about research results and their implications is often best bought in. Where
particular skills reside—in-house or contracted out—relates more to speciﬁc situations and
availability of staff than to a general rule. What distinguishes the public from the private sector,
as far as research is concerned, is the context in which the staff work rather than a difference
in skill.
3.3 What lessons can central government learn from local government on procurement?
3.3.1 The
SRA has insufﬁcient knowledge to be able to answer this question.
3.4 How successful are government departments and their agencies at communicating their needs to potential
suppliers?
3.4.1 Successful communication depends to a large extent on how knowledgeable the staff are about
the topic to be researched and how the work might be done. Experience suggests that the
procurement process beneﬁts if procurement staff work closely with research managers. It is
particularly good where procurement staff specialise in research procurement rather than
purchasing research like standard items such as ofﬁce supplies. Where the latter is the case
procurement practices can impede and worsen communication between purchasers and
providers and make the procurement less effective than it could be.
3.4.2 Technology has improved the procurement process for both suppliers and commissioners but
technology should never be the sole means of communication between parties. If it is used to
keep suppliers at arms-length it is detrimental to good relationships and ultimately to the quality
of the product delivered.
3.4.3 Involving the end user or “customer”, as well as the supplier, in the procurement process helps
to ensure the ﬁnal product or service is ﬁt for purpose. This does not always happen.
4. How should the civil service ensure it recruits and retains staff with the right skills to run procurements, to
negotiate and manage contracts and to deliver major projects effectively?
4.1 Effective and efﬁcient procurement demands both expertise in the techniques of procurement and a
sound understanding of the business area, where goods and services are being procured. The skills of managing
procurement are not so special that civil servants cannot develop them with appropriate training and experience.
5. Does the Government have the organisational structures in place to enable it to procure effectively? (For
example, how far should the Government centralise responsibility for public procurement? Do central
government procurement “framework agreements” enable more effective public procurement?)
5.1 It is the judgements made and actions taken by individuals, rather than the organisational structures
within which they work, that are often the key to successful outcomes. In the SRA's experience the things that
can go wrong are due to:
— a lack of initial clarity about what is actually being sought;
— changes to requirements mid-way through the project;
— lack of regard for, or ability to use, the expertise that the commissioner could bring to the
identiﬁcation of the problem and how to address it;
— aspects of the tender such as inadequate time for the proper preparation of the bid; and
— setting an unrealistic cost ceiling.
Whatever the structures, a dialogue between research managers in Government, procurement staff, and
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and the wider community. Rigid procurement processes can stiﬂe innovation by forcing bidders to frame their
tender in a way that deters or prevents them from proposing innovative approaches.
5.2 Framework agreements are increasingly a feature of government bodies' procurement of social research.
The SRA's study referred to earlier compared three different Government Departments using different
procurement methods (an OJEU Framework, a non-OJEU Framework and a form of Open Competition,
involving a two-stage process of getting short expressions of interest from interested parties and detailed
proposals from a short list).
5.3 The SRA's study found that there were pros and cons for all modes of procurement. No one mode of
procurement was more effective in all circumstances than any other.
5.4 Setting up a Framework is very time consuming and expensive for both parties but, once set up, can
bring efﬁciencies, by reducing the effort on both sides. Finding a supplier through a Framework is quicker than
going to open competition but the ﬁxed pool of contractors on a Framework can become restrictive if the
requirements of the Department change. Frameworks also tend to favour larger organisations which are able to
offer a wider range of work than SMEs or niche suppliers. How the lots within a framework are organised can
greatly affect how the framework operates. Suppliers who were successful at getting onto a Framework
generally found they worked well, provided the Framework had been well constructed. (The study heard of
cases of poorly designed Frameworks which resulted in cumbersome and expensive procurement
arrangements). But equally, both the Department concerned and suppliers felt the two-stage form of open
competition to be effective.
5.5 In research, an important element of the expertise required of contractors is department-speciﬁc; for
example a policy or programme evaluation can require the contractor to have a good understanding of the
policy area, knowledge of the policy delivery mechanisms and access to departmental administrative records
(to be able to draw a sample). Government research is typically managed by a “subject expert”, either alone
or in combination with a technical expert. Departmental Frameworks have successfully facilitated this process.
5.6 A single pan-government Research Framework Agreement could result in a loss of detailed departmental
knowledge in the procurement process and a reduction in opportunities for SMEs and subject specialists to be
involved, as they are even less likely to be successful if there is only one Framework. But where Departments
commission very little social research there would be advantages in their being able to use a central Framework,
to provide greater consistency, provided it was set up to cover a sufﬁciently broad range of subjects and
specialisms.
6. Does the Government collect the management information it needs to understand how public procurement
is working?
6.1 The SRA is unable to answer this question.
7. How should Government ensure that European directives on public procurement do not inhibit public
bodies' ability to procure effectively?
7.1 The European directives pertaining to social and market research and to policy evaluation are confusing
and reﬂect a lack of a clear understanding about deﬁnitions and how the different elements work together. The
effect is that different departments interpret the same directives in different ways, causing confusion for
contractors and working against a level playing ﬁeld in research procurement. Time spent devising
“workarounds” for badly drafted legislation could be avoided with some simple redrafting of the relevant
directives.
7.2 The SRA submitted evidence to the EU consultation on public procurement in April 2011 and, in
particular, argued strongly that it is necessary to distinguish services that have an important element of
consultancy, design, creativity or intellectual property from supplies of material products or even services that
can be tightly pre-speciﬁed and the outputs measured, such as hotel services, transport services or personal
care services. Following the consultation, the Commission is proposing reforms to simplify rules and
procedures, which will be very welcome.
8. How should Government assess and manage risk when negotiating procurement contracts? (For example,
how much risk should Government be prepared to accept and what are the limits on the transfer of risk to
the private sector?)
8.1 It is important to recognise that the majority of social research organisations are SMEs and also that the
ﬁnancial risks in social research are low in most contracts. The key outcome requirements for a contract should
take this into account. This is facilitated when the supply side is able to contribute to target setting.
9. What is the best role for “prime contractors” and what are the advantages and disadvantages of relying
on “prime contractors”?
9.1 The social and market research sector consists of a small number of large organisations, a large number
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knowledge to the ability to organise and manage large data collection exercises. Consortia made up of a number
of partners under the leadership of one organisation, as prime contractor, can work well, for both suppliers and
commissioners, by ensuring that the necessary range of skills are available. They are a way of combining the
subject knowledge present in the academic sector and among other specialists, with the management and
logistical capability of commercial organisations, to deliver large and challenging projects. In some cases
relationships between contractors have been formed that have endured for many years, leading to very effective
ways of working. Consortia bids of this kind are common and felt to be successful.
An alternative model of having a prime contractor who takes responsibility for managing a ﬁxed supply
chain covering the technical, operational and ﬁnancial performance of sub-contractors has the advantage for
the commissioner of avoiding the need to contract with more than one entity. But to suppliers it can be less
transparent and fair. It may therefore provide worse value for money for the client.
10. What are the key lessons to be learned from the experience of cost overruns, delays and project failures
in central Government procurement over the past ﬁve years or so?
10.1 The SRA has no detailed knowledge about the large-scale project failures in the last few years.
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Written evidence submitted by Future Purchasing Consulting Ltd. & Henley Business School,
University of Reading (PROC 11)
Government Procurement: Time to Invest in Capacity, Capability & Competence
Summary of our Submission
— Transformation of procurement is under way, with an increasing number of signiﬁcant success
stories.
— The majority of procurement, both centrally and across the whole public sector, remains unreformed.
— Less than 15% of external expenditure has received the attention it requires.
— The scale of ambition for efﬁciency savings could be increased by a factor of at least three.
— Top-down leadership from ministers, permanent secretaries and senior executives is crucial.
— Procurement must be elevated from a minor, transactional function to a much more strategic one.
— Procurement has suffered from neglect and under-investment. This has not really changed yet.
— Procurement should not be outsourced to prime contractors, but strengthened internally.
— The focus on procurement should not just be at the functional level, but include all major budget-
holders, commissioners, programme and project managers, and those who lead them.
— Procurement skills have been hollowed out over the past decade. There is inadequate capacity.
— Signiﬁcant investment is now required to rebuild a strong public sector procurement capability with
modern competencies to deploy best-in-class processes that will make a major contribution to the
policy goals of deﬁcit reduction, economic growth, front line service delivery, social value and
environmental impact.
— That will not occur without procurement improvement becoming a sufﬁciently serious policy goal
of government to merit a cabinet minister overseeing it, permanent secretaries being required to
incorporate procurement reform plans into their forward strategies, departmental chief procurement
ofﬁcers reporting directly to those permanent secretaries, and modern talent management being
deployed to recruit, retain and renew a highly motivated cadre of top quality procurement leaders.
Reinforcing the Government’s Policy Goals and Elevating Procurement as Central to their
Delivery
1. The public sector spends approximately £700 billion per year. Public procurement, in all its different
forms, represents 40% of this expenditure and 20% of UK GDP. This equates to £250 billion+. Whitehall,
central government procurement is £60 billion. Cabinet Ofﬁce inﬂuence, through the Government Procurement
Service, impacts less than £13 billion, which is around 5% of the total. The prism for the analysis of
procurement productivity, effectiveness and capability should be far more than this minimal amount of
overall inﬂuence.
2. Signiﬁcant initiatives in public procurement have been launched, particularly under the leadership of
Francis Maude at the Cabinet Ofﬁce. They are beginning to reshape the way procurement is done and services
delivered. That is to be welcomed and encouraged. However there is considerable scope for far more innovation
and greater UK-wide impact across four government policy goals:
(i) Deﬁcit reduction: we believe that procurement-led efﬁciency savings across the total public sector,
at the lower end of aspiration (which is in line with best-in-class practice in the private sector) should
be a minimum of 15%. This would deliver at least £37 billion. A more aggressive, but realistic,cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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higher-end target (in line with recommendations such as those of Sir Roy McNulty in the rail sector)
would be 30%, or £75 billion. Therefore we estimate that achievable Whitehall/central government
procurement reform should generate between £5 billion and £10 billion of savings (as a minimum)
by the end of this Parliament. This would be a sizeable contribution that can be directly reinvested
in service delivery and future growth-orientated infrastructure of the UK.
(ii) Economic growth: efﬁciency cost savings should be a minimum expectation for professional
procurement. Economic reform should be triggered by developing new models of sustainable growth
for the UK, in conjunction with third party suppliers. The size of spend is a powerful lever that can
be applied directly across the UK's industrial and services sector. That leverage remains considerably
under-acknowledged and under-utilised. Opening up public services to greater choice and
competition, pressing for more innovative and localised services, spend aggregation on targeted
areas across central government and much more tightly managed supplier relationships with prime
contractors in large private sector companies should be central to public sector procurement's
ambitions.
(iii) Front line service delivery: this is deﬁnitely not just about more of the same, at lower cost. Across
the public sector, 20%+ cuts in departmental spending are driving reassessment of service delivery
frameworks and fundamental re-evaluation of the balance between in-house and external supply.
Despite the pain, all the initial evidence is that there is a correlation between substantial budgetary
cutbacks and a readiness to encourage procurement innovation.
(iv) Societal and environmental impact: public procurement is a powerful tool for innovation,
infrastructure development, support for the SME community, encouragement of local enterprise
partnerships and mutual organisations.
3. Procurement should be securing considerable cost savings; economic reform through new models of
sustainable growth for the UK; encouraging greater use of competition; pushing for more innovative and
localised services and driving productivity and spend aggregation on common categories of expenditure. Our
evaluation is that a good start has been made, but there is a long way to go.
Assessing Progress to Date
4. We believe that there has been greater progress made in the early years of this Government than in any
previous administration. Signiﬁcant steps includes: centralising Whitehall procurement initiatives through the
work of the Government Procurement Service; a strong focus on efﬁciency savings via robust demand
management and aggregation; signiﬁcant steps forward on spend analysis covering £60 billion and half a
million suppliers across 17 central departments, with visibility on 80% of procurement spend in central
government; positive action on SMEs with a clear aspiration of 25% of business routed to them; excellent
leadership through Francis Maude; simpliﬁcation of bid documents, standardised processes and the active
encouragement of cheaper, faster, lean procurement (with more procurements being completed in 120 days);
opening up of more markets to competition; some ﬂagship reforms, such as DWP and welfare-to-work; a more
open-door policy with regard to supplier engagement; and claimed savings of £3.75 billion 2010–11 and £5
billion 2011–12.
5. Not surprisingly, there have been setbacks and disappointments as well: highly public disasters such as
West Coast rail franchising, A4e, G4S and the Olympics contract; a continuing absence of an all-encompassing
vision, strategy and change model for total public sector-wide procurement; unresolved tensions between central
government control vs. localism and the use of large prime contractors vs. SME deployment; lack of clarity
and integration between commissioning, major projects and procurement processes; an almost complete absence
of post-contract supplier management; weak transparency in the deﬁnition and auditing of savings particularly
between those attributable to demand management (cutting of services) and application of best procurement
practice (step down in the cost base and recurring savings).
6. The NHS Standards of Procurement, Department of Health, May 2012 made an important distinction
between three levels of improvement (a. Building, ie awareness and putting the building blocks in place, b.
Achieving, ie making good progress, and c. Excelling, ie outstanding procurement performance). We ﬁnd this
a helpful framework, and have extended it as follows as an assessment framework for public procurement.
(i) Transformational maturity: our experience with private sector organisations is that they go through
at least three phases of change, with capability development at the heart of their sustainability. The
public sector is no different. (a) Launching phase: expense control, demand management, quick
wins, rapid cutbacks, yet invariably under-resourced, with minimal top leadership support and few
changes to the way in which a service is delivered. 2010–12 in the public sector. (b) Accelerating
phase: strong appetite for more savings and performance improvement, volume aggregation and
spend management, greater price transparency, supplier rationalisation and introduction of more
modern processes such as category and supplier management. Under way, 2013–14. (c)
Transformational phase: evidence of considerable changes in service delivery models, major
infrastructure/project management innovation, adoption of new performance pricing and risk models,
and executive-level endorsement with much greater accountability. Barely started within the public
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(ii) Professional procurement leadership: a common mistake is to assess procurement capability and
competence only as being relevant to the procurement function. What really matters is a clear focus
on boosting these at three levels. (a) Procurement as a transactional discipline: investing in the
core procurement teams as a back-ofﬁce function. Private sector equivalent: cost efﬁciency and
effectiveness. (b) Procurement as an operational and commissioning discipline: investing in a
disciplined approach to category, supplier, contract, risk and programme management. This requires
properly embedded and well deﬁned processes. Private sector equivalent: achieving operational
excellence and lean ways of working. (c) Procurement as a driver of service transformation and
public sector innovation: driving new service delivery models and embracing change levers such
as shared services, outsourcing, risk-sharing reward structures, payment by results mechanisms and
markedly different organisational conﬁguration. Private sector equivalent: securing and sustaining
competitive advantage.
(iii) Organisational sponsorship, ownership and accountability: this is a precondition and enabler of the
other two. (a) Focused on procurement leaders and the professional procurement community: there
is a huge requirement for capability and competence building across the whole of the function.
Substantial investment is required throughout this decade. (b) Focused on major budget-holders and
programme managers: they inﬂuence all of the most signiﬁcant decisions with regard to procurement
activity. (c) Focused on permanent secretaries, ministers, senior stakeholders and non-executives:
their role is pivotal in providing the necessary elevation of procurement from a narrow, tactical,
functional discipline to one that is central to the modernisation of government and the attainment of
the Government's major policy goals.
7. Using this framework, our views are:
(i) Transformational maturity: good progress under way, but we are barely out of the launch phase.
(ii) Professional procurement leadership: little real progress has been made; indeed the focus appears
to have shifted more on to commissioning than procurement.
(iii) Organisational sponsorship, ownership and accountability: procurement is still seen as a
necessary evil, rather than a key enabler of service transformation. Huge gaps in understanding. Very
few public sector leaders have ever experienced or seen best-in-class procurement.
8. We also have clear views on progress elsewhere in public sector procurement:
(i) Public Finance Initiative: 650+ projects lasting up to twenty years, £267 billion of off balance-
sheet liabilities. A national disgrace, and an industry that should not be exempt from reform and
clawback of unacceptably high proﬁtability. The wool was well and truly pulled over the public
sector's eyes.
(ii) Defence: the £36 billion of procurement black holes and cost overruns are ﬁnally being addressed.
Attempts are being made to restructure and rebuild procurement. There is a need to embrace
innovative solutions to achieve that. We agree with The Economist when they described MoD
procurement as “dysfunctional”.
(iii) Health: has persistently suffered from chronic under-performance, and a lamentable and totally
inadequate focus from DH central and Trust leadership. £40 billion+ of non-pay spend. Remains in
need of radical transformation.
(iv) Local government: £50 billion+ of procurement in a sector that has had substantial front-loaded
budget reductions. This is now driving real innovation in shared services and cross-council provision.
Addressing the Challenges & Obstacles of Achieving World-Class Procurement: a Nine-Point
Plan
9. Top quality procurement is vitally important, so why isn't it being done? Evidence from both the private
and public sector is that it is surprisingly difﬁcult to do. Procurement is poorly understood; teams are weak
and under-resourced; and there is inadequate top-down executive focus and scrutiny.
(i) Elevate the transformation of public procurement as a policy goal of government: the scale of
expenditure, its potential impact on the British economy and its contribution towards deﬁcit reduction
and growth at a time of austerity remain a relatively untapped lever of competitiveness.
Transformation may have begun in central government in Whitehall, but the Cabinet Ofﬁce's
inﬂuence and jurisdiction covers less than a ﬁfth of total procurement expenditure (with less than
5% currently under managed control through the Government Procurement Service. There needs to
be a signiﬁcant raising of the game in the second half of this Parliament and throughout the next.
The vision should be procurement transformation by 2020.
(ii) Dramatically change the ministerial and leadership model: we fully endorse the views of the
House of Lords Science & Technology Committee in their pronouncements on Public Procurement
as a Tool to Stimulate Innovation. Indeed we would extend the principles that they outlined. There
should be a minister, represented in Cabinet, at the centre of government with full responsibility for
total UK public sector-wide procurement. In turn, each government department should have a
minister responsible for procurement. These ministers, together with permanent secretaries and chief
procurement ofﬁcers, should be held accountable for public procurement reform with their strategiescobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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and deliverables reviewed by a Public Procurement Reform Board. All major departmental plans
should include explicit procurement improvement goals and requirements. Chief procurement
ofﬁcers, recruited and assessed against a more demanding speciﬁcation, should report directly to
permanent secretaries. This approach should be launched immediately and become fully operational
through a three-year programme concluded by 2015.
(iii) Invest in a high-proﬁle, professional procurement function: quality and depth of procurement
talent really matters. Procurement remains a “Cinderella” function which is invariably overlooked
and under-invested. Traditional calibre staff do not have the skills, attitude and capacity to provide
the service needed. The transformation that is required cannot be devolved and deployed through the
current structures. This has been tried on numerous occasions with procurement consistently under-
performing. All major purchase points (across categories of expenditure, in major projects,
infrastructure programmes, public ﬁnance initiative type deals, outsourcing ventures, and with all
large prime contractors) need high-quality procurement professionals. High-quality commissioners,
commercial directors, procurement managers, programme leaders, category directors and supplier
managers with unavoidable mandates are the greatest lever for change. Procurement capability
development currently evolves by accident in central government, with the notable exception of
pockets of excellence such as the Government Procurement Service where their 0.5% supplier
commission generates almost £6 million a year for the Procurement Investment Fund. This fund
should be boosted considerably, with money channelled into fast-track capability building.
(iv) Build a permanent and motivated procurement cadre of professionals: the current procurement
execution scenario of government, particularly in Whitehall and inside the M25, is highly dependent
on interim managers and subcontractors who are paid on short-term contracts or a per diem basis.
We estimate that 50% of all senior procurement staff are temporary and not permanent employees
of government. This has arisen partly because of the embargo on the use of consulting companies,
and partly as a mechanism for increasing remuneration in order to attract experienced staff. However,
notwithstanding the signiﬁcant cost of this approach, the real disbeneﬁt is the lack of permanence as
contracts end and interims depart. There is no sustainability and little knowledge transfer. However,
we do not believe that one of the alternative mechanisms (insourcing expertise from consultancy
companies) should be the default position either. Rather, there should be a step change in investment
in high-quality, full-time procurement leaders, with a well-resourced talent management strategy
created to underpin it.
(v) Extend the concept of the Commissioning Academy into a Procurement & Commissioning
Academy. We wholeheartedly endorse, in the Civil Service Reform Plan, the intention to establish a
Commissioning Academy to develop high-level skills in managing markets, negotiating and agreeing
contracts, and contract management. A similar approach has already been adopted with the
investment in the Said Business School's Major Project Leadership Academy. But why has
procurement been neglected? Good procurement is not an isolated function. Everyone working in
commissioning, major projects and infrastructure and procurement operations has a duty to optimise
the way in which taxpayers' money is spent, and to apply the most modern tools of governance,
programme management, lean process and value maximisation. Highlighting commissioning and
project management at the expense of procurement is a very retrograde step, which should be
quickly remedied.
(vi) Invest in ﬁt-for-purpose, best-in-class procurement processes and operating models capable of
delivering: there are at least seven core processes (drawing on both private and public sector case
studies of excellence) that need to be properly embedded and applied with skill, diligence, rigour
and governance. They cover category management, lean procurement, post-contract supplier
management, outsourcing, shared services aggregation, risk management and major programme
management. The Government Procurement Service has made a good start with its leveraging of
£11.3 billion of common spend categories, making it the largest buying organisation in the UK. They
have invested in modern category management tools and also spend analysis covering £60 billion
and half a million suppliers across 17 central departments, with 80% visibility of procurement spend
in central government. It is this type of endeavour that needs to be built into all departmental business
plans, and with the outcomes reviewed regularly by a Procurement Reform Board.
(vii) Create a procurement team identity that people want to sign up for: several recent reports have
argued that the key to talent management success is to double or triple remuneration, which will
naturally attract the best staff from the private sector. We do not necessarily share that view. The
best private sector companies value procurement individuals highly, select them carefully, offer
market-competitive remuneration, incentivise them to drive through the necessary internal and
external changes, and continually invest in their personal and professional development through
mentoring, coaching, training and performance management. This is the way to address systemic
and long-term skill deﬁciencies. Talent and skill acquisition requires a properly resourced, well-
codiﬁed and holistic approach if it is to succeed. All permanent secretaries and CPOs should be held
accountable for implementing that approach.
(viii) Adopt breakthrough strategies for cost management, value maximisation and economic growth:
senior leadership needs to look beyond the traditional techniques of price negotiation, framework
agreements and compliance to EU procurement rules and regulations. Modern strategic procurementcobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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is about supplier-led breakthroughs in innovation, service delivery, operational excellence and whole
life-cycle costing. All who interact with major suppliers should be exposed to such breakthrough
strategies via the Commissioning & Procurement Academy.
(ix) Push for greater speed and simpliﬁcation in reform of EU procurement rules: this is already
under way, with the European Commission having committed to making changes by 2014. However
it is not just the rules that need changing, but the interpretation and application of them. All too
frequently, procurement adopts overly risk-averse approaches and hides behind the rules. This calls
for a major change in both mind-sets and operating procedures.
January 2013
Written evidence submitted by Mediareach (PROC 12)
I am writing to comment about the Cabinet Ofﬁce procurement effectiveness as requested:
1. Cabinet Ofﬁce was handed the procurement exercise and was asked to select agencies too quickly. The
ofﬁce did not have enough qualiﬁed staff to undertake such a large exercise (selecting advertising agencies is
not in any way like buying paper clips or computers so you can choose based on price or specs), this has led
Cabinet Ofﬁce to offer jobs to ex-COI staff who had more experience to join them. I still think the process in
part was good as it eliminated quite a number of suppliers but it lacked in other parts (eg looking at the ONS
ﬁgures and the rise of ethnic communities in Britain who were targeted in the past, we see that the procurement
staff failed to select any specialist multicultural agency on the roster).
2. The strategic aim of the government would be to select relevant quality suppliers who will deliver cost
effective solutions across all government departments.
3. In part the government does have some skills but it lacks on negotiation skills as it could still negotiate
better deals than what it does now (Our agency have always been allowed by the COI to buy media for the
government as our rates is always cheaper than all other agencies, a fact that the new procurement process
neglected in favour of few large agencies).
4. Take on some staff from the commercial sector on project basis to help government negotiate and buy
better.
5. It is being developed but need to do more.
6. The government collects some information but I am not sure if the information is used to improve
effectiveness.
7. Prime contractors could work if they subcontract 75%+ of the contract to smaller suppliers and do not
just keep the contract themselves as it transpired by the companies that managed the Olympic bidding.
If you need further information do let me know.
January 2013
Written evidence submitted by Stonewall (PROC 13)
Summary
1. Stonewall believes that, as part of the public procurement process, suppliers should be encouraged to
improve their workplaces and services for lesbian, gay and bisexual people. This will:
— improve the quality of goods and services;
— lead to long-term cost savings; and
— ensure compliance with equalities legislation.
Response
2. Stonewall is pleased to respond to the Select Committee's inquiry into public procurement.
3. Stonewall is the leading organisation campaigning and lobbying for lesbian, gay and bisexual equality
in Britain.
4. Stonewall's work with over 600 employers, including many government departments, has demonstrated
that embedding equality and diversity in the procurement process not only ensures compliance with the Equality
Act 2010 but also leads to better and more cost-effective goods and services. Ensuring that services are
outsourced to gay-friendly suppliers who understand the diversity of their customer base improves the quality
of services. At the same time encouraging suppliers to make their own workplaces more gay-friendly means
their own staff perform better and ultimately deliver more competitive and cost-effective goods and services.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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5. Our work in this area has identiﬁed a number of proven practical methods of using the procurement
process to advance equality for lesbian, gay and bisexual people. This includes asking questions about
suppliers' performance on equality and diversity at the tendering stage, providing guidance or training for
suppliers on how to meet the equality requirements of tenders, and monitoring performance on equality and
diversity commitments throughout the duration of contracts.
6. Stonewall recognises that requirements placed on suppliers should be proportionate to their size, since
many small businesses may not have done any work to date on improving workplaces and services for lesbian,
gay and bisexual people. All suppliers should however be able to demonstrate that they meet their legal
requirement not to discriminate on the grounds of sexual orientation in employment and in the provision of
goods and services.
7. Our guide for employers Procurement: embedding lesbian, gay and bisexual equality in the supply chain
features practical recommendations and case studies from organisations that have demonstrated good practice
in this area, including a number of central government departments and local authorities. The guide also
features a number of case studies from the private sector. Rather than ﬁnding the process burdensome, these
organisations are increasingly recognising the business beneﬁts of incorporating equality considerations into
the procurement process.
8. For further information regarding this response please contact:
The publication cited in this response is available to download free from
http://www.stonewall.org.uk/at_work/research_and_guides/4907.asp.
January 2013
Written evidence submitted by Callcredit (PROC 14)
Summary
— Callcredit Group believes that the government drive to standardising procurement is not working
well when complex, specialised considerations need to be taken into account.
— The emphasis on standardisation as a means to procure effectively is being brought into conﬂict with
the ambition for government to secure optimal value for money through becoming an “Intelligent
Customer”.
— Framework agreements can prove very effective, if the underlying terms and conditions are mutually
appropriate. Our recent attempts to contract into the DAPA framework found that many were not.
— Imposing contract terms and operational restrictions which aim to transfer the maximum possible
risk to the private sector will reduce choice for government.
— Innovation, both in solutions and prospective suppliers, is supported through procurement processes
which focus on value for money and accept appropriate levels of risk. Excessive risk aversion works
against the introduction of new suppliers and processes.
— Pursuing a procurement strategy which fails to take into account speciﬁc features of a relevant
marketplace will undermine the ability of many key Government initiatives to achieve their ambitions
in value and savings.
— The level of detail in this response is necessarily limited by conﬁdentiality concerns, as discussed in
paragraph 20. In addition, we have responded only to questions where we believe our evidence will
be of assistance to the Committee's deliberations.
How successful has the Cabinet Ofﬁce been at improving public procurement policy and practice?
1. Changes in public procurement over the last few years have coincided with a stage in Callcredit Group's
expansion where we have been looking to increase the work performed on behalf of central and local
government.
2. Efforts made to attain a more co-ordinated approach to driving efﬁciency across government are clear. In
addition to centralising procurement, we have noted the drive to standardised terms and conditions in an attempt
to deliver savings. Yet in some cases we are concerned that this approach is being taken too far. Applying it
to unique and specialised areas may result in signiﬁcant unintended consequences. In Callcredit Group's
experience this appears to be already happening in some cases, as we will outline.
What should be the strategic aim of the Government's public procurement policy?
3. The strategic aim of public procurement policy should be to maximise the return on investment to the
public purse. Pursuing standardisation can work very well when procuring commodity goods and services such
as hardware. However different criteria are required in cases where more complex considerations need to
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4. In his speech at “The Crown and suppliers: a new way of working” event in November 2011, Francis
Maude said:
“Far too many procurements feature absurdly over-prescriptive requirements. We should be
procuring on the basis of the outcomes and outputs we seek, not the detailed inputs. We should be
focusing on the `what', not the `how'.
This kind of procurement drives out innovative and competitive suppliers. So we will ensure that in
future we focus on outputs and outcomes.”29
5. The overly prescriptive requirements we have encountered focus on risk allocation and unnecessary
operational restrictions. As a result of such criteria, Callcredit Group has been unable to offer a full range of
possible services to government. The restrictions demanded do not match industry norms. Nor do they appear
necessary to protect the interests of the government in real terms.
6. When purchasing has a strategic end goal of making savings to the public purse, such as the drive to
reduce fraud and error, the test must be value for money and not the ability to meet onerous terms and
conditions. In non standard purchasing for strategic projects, even at relatively low cost bandings, we agree
the emphasis should be very much on the “what”. In our experience however it is still very much about
the “how”.
7. We also note the report of the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, “Public procurement
as a tool to stimulate innovation”. Here at Callcredit, we are proud of our hard won reputation as a successful
innovator. Innovation demands both commitment and resources. There is no incentive to investigate new
solutions to achieve the best possible outcome if they will simply be excluded on the basis of standardised
criteria. By reducing the options available to central government, this approach therefore makes it less likely
that optimal value for money will be achieved.
Does the civil service have the skills and capabilities required to negotiate and manage contracts effectively?
8. It is not lack of capability in negotiating and managing contracts which necessarily creates issues, but
technical knowledge and understanding. Improved technical skills and capabilities would greatly assist the civil
service to procure in our speciﬁc commercial area. Private sector entities, such as ﬁnancial services companies,
have years of experience to draw on when procuring analytical services. Central government is still developing
these skills. Increased collaboration with suppliers is key to narrowing the gap.
What lessons can central government learn from local government on procurement?
9. We have had a number of positive experiences contracting with local government, particularly when a
more specialised approach to procurement has been taken. We would like to see this methodology extended
into central government.
Does the Government have the organisational structures in place to enable it to procure effectively? (For
example, how far should the Government centralise responsibility for public procurement? Do central
government procurement “framework agreements” enable more effective public procurement?)
10. The extent to which public procurement is centralised should be deﬁned according to the nature of the
goods and services to be procured. A central team of procurement experts can concentrate effectively on
straightforward requirements. However, centralisation should not dislocate the procurement function from
subject matter experts who can give an authoritative view on determining quality standards in difﬁcult and
complex areas, or about the feasibility of business cases that explore new ground.
11. It is unlikely to be fair for a centralised procurement team to be held responsible for the overall value
for money achieved by a departmental project. Consequently efforts to draw up appropriate performance
objectives for centralised teams will tend to be based on easily measurable standards such as terms imposed
and initial price—detracting from the achievement of return on investment.
12. It is vital that any team performing procurement has the necessary subject expertise. Expertise in our
subject area is continually developing. To ensure this continues, procurement methodologies should be designed
more ﬂexibly, to allow a more collaborative approach. Constructive pre-procurement discussions should be
held. As Francis Maude also stated:30
“It is not illegal for public sector procurers to talk to suppliers. Not only is it not illegal it's plain
common sense and good commercial practice.”
13. Research into effective models in other jurisdictions and in industry should also be conducted to reinforce
a strong, joined up system with inbuilt contingency for change.
29 Speech at “The Crown and suppliers: a new way of working” event, November 2011;
http://www.cabinetofﬁce.gov.uk/news/crown-and-suppliers-new-way-working#Maude
30 Speech at “The Crown and suppliers: a new way of working” event, November 2011;
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14. Framework agreements can, in our experience, be both appropriate and effective provided a balance is
struck on their underlying terms and conditions. For example, Callcredit Group was involved in a successful
framework agreement drawn up in 2006/7 for DWP. However our most recent experience of creation of a
framework agreement—the Data Access Processing and Analytics Framework (DAPA) has proved very
different and problematic.
15. We would like to see a working group formed with representatives from both relevant Government
departments and the analytics and data industry to establish key terms for procurement in this area. A similar
approach could equally be extended in other specialist areas. This would ensure framework agreements are
created which robustly uphold the genuine needs and requirements of Government, without inadvertently
blocking worthy potential suppliers from inclusion.
How should Government assess and manage risk when negotiating procurement contracts? (For example,
how much risk should Government be prepared to accept and what are the limits on the transfer of risk to
the private sector?)
16. Callcredit Group has encountered substantial problems in trying to contract with central government due
to presentation of unfair, inappropriate and unrealistic contract terms including transfer of risk. Confronted
with this situation, suppliers face a stark choice: either they sign up but then limit their risk in the solution
design to such an extent that all innovation is driven out, or conversely they may be forced to walk away. In
either case, only exhaustively “tried and tested” solutions will prove acceptable to both parties. At a time when
Government is attempting to harness technology to achieve its ambitions in so many key strategic areas, driving
out originality and innovation—and hence return on investment—is clearly counterproductive.
17. Procuring analytical IT solutions is central to many current Government initiatives. The nature of these
services involves fundamentally different issues than when procuring “commodity” items. There is a need for
example to address complex considerations of risk and liability in data processing, rather than taking the
“sledgehammer” approach. Prescribing unnecessarily harsh and demanding conditions around supply creates a
new risk: that a non-risky, but highly sub-optimal solution will be identiﬁed and will go on to produce only
limited results.
18. We are increasingly encountering similar problems with some local government contracts. Rather than
drawing up appropriate terms and conditions which will best meet the actual needs of local government, there
is a shift towards “copy and paste” of standard terms from other sources. This produces short term gains as it
is cheap and easy to do, and may well be appropriate for buying hardware or stationery. It will not result in
optimal procurement for specialised goods and services.
19. We provide speciﬁc examples below of unrealistic terms which have recently affected Callcredit Group's
ability to contract:
— Liability: Demands for no cap on liability (or even liability on an indemnity basis) or for high
value liability amounts in excess of value of contract.
— Intellectual property: The drafting of the intellectual property provisions in the DAPA
framework, even following further clariﬁcation, was not sufﬁciently clear. The implication of
the clause was to require a transfer of intellectual property rights in Callcredit's services.
— Unseen Policies: Requirements are being made to comply with unseen policies on subjects such
as security and staff vetting, and/or rights reserved to amend these policies without consent.
— Termination and suspension: Many terms seek to restrict the ability of the contracting company
to terminate or suspend services.
— Version Control: The framework does not permit modiﬁcation of services without consent.
— Penetration testing: Demand for blanket consent to carry out penetration testing without further
approval or notiﬁcation.
— Subcontractors: Terms around control over appointment of subcontractors and ﬂow down of
terms in respect of generic services.
— Free trials: We increasingly see demands for extended trial periods to be made available free
of charge, placing all risk with the supplier.
20. We would be happy to discuss the speciﬁc conﬁdential detail relating to these general terms. However,
we would request that take place in closed session, or with other measures in place to protect the interests of
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What are the key lessons to be learned from the experience of cost overruns, delays and project failures in
central Government procurement over the past ﬁve years or so?
21. Further action is clearly needed. Our experience within the private sector indicates that adopting a
bespoke approach to procurement based on speciﬁc industry knowledge and expertise should lead to fewer
issues, delays and project failures. We therefore urge the Committee to recommend such an approach.
January 2013
Written evidence submitted by NAFP, ICHA and NASS (PROC 15)
Background to Submission
The Nationwide Association of Fostering Providers (NAFP), Independent Children's Home Association
(ICHA) and the National Association of Independent Schools and Non-Maintained Special Schools (NASS)
represent over 400 providers of children's services, meeting the needs of over 17,500 children. Fostering,
special education and children's residential child care are distinct services and our organisations have received
reports from members on the increasing time being spent on procurement-related activity. We are, therefore,
delighted that the Public Administration Select Committee is investigating the issue of public procurement and
would like to make a joint submission outlining concerns that members of our three organisations have
received.
Procurement Survey
In May 2012 our three organisations jointly undertook a survey to explore experiences of local authority
procurement. The responses we received from members were relatively evenly split between fostering
providers, children's homes providers and special schools. The organisations who responded to the survey are
collectively responsible for over 4,000 placements for children and young people in England and Wales. Over
half work with 22 or more local authorities and over three-quarters work with more than 10.
We have held discussions with senior ofﬁcials from the Cabinet Ofﬁce and Department for Education and
have been encouraged by the initiatives announced by the Government including the Commissioning Academy
and the Mystery Shopper Scheme. However, we would suggest more needs to be done to create real and lasting
change on the ground for providers if they are to operate in an environment which does not create unnecessary
red-tape.
Our members have reported signiﬁcant procurement problems which they are experiencing at Local
Authority level. The ﬁndings from our survey have led us to believe that the Government should create a
national procurement framework that could be followed by all Local Authorities. This would reduce paperwork
for providers and would be particularly helpful for those who work with multiple authorities, as well as
supporting innovation to develop new services where a greater degree of business risk is necessary.
Our survey also included a number of suggestions on how Local Authorities could do to make the
procurement process easier for providers and more effective in meeting the needs for children and young
people. We would like to work with the Government and the Local Government Association to promote best
practice guidance to support Local Authorities make the procurement process more effective.
Does the Government have the right skills and capabilities required to procure effectively?
What skills do procurement authorities require in-house, what skills can be bought in and what skills can be
contracted out?
Our members have reported that procurement authorities often lack the appropriate skills when undertaking
procurement. We would like to see more effort in developing the procurement skills. For example, our members
have called for all local authority procurement ofﬁcers to be trained in understanding the needs of children and
young people and are supported by children's professionals. We feel if this was to happen the quality of
procurement would improve considerably and the outcomes for children and young people would be better.
In addition it has been identiﬁed that procurement activity is too focused on cost rather than the needs of
the child and is too bureaucratic. In our experience key personnel are frequently diverted from deploying their
accumulated knowledge and experience to completing imposed non-child directed tasks. This has signiﬁcant
ﬁnancial costs in a climate with little scope for increasing fees and a commitment to high quality children's
services.
The key to both of the issues identiﬁed above is an understanding of the crucial role that relationships play.
Good commissioning of children's services should see the commissioner/procurer taken on a role akin to that
of being a parent. Given that many young people for whom services are procured have Looked After status,
we would see this as a logical extension of the “corporate parent” role. Similarly, we would assert that good
relationships between purchasers and providers are the key to successful procurement outcomes. A greater
understanding of pre-procurement cooperation and a commitment to co-production, in the context of legislative
requirements, would, we believe, deliver procurement speciﬁcations and better value for money.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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What lessons can central government learn from local government on procurement?
While in some cases local authorities are performing well, our members' experience is that there are
signiﬁcant faults in local authority procurement of their services. We would like to see central government
work with local government to drive up standards. Our members would speciﬁcally like to see the Government
create a national procurement framework for all local authorities.
In order to support the role of local authorities in future, we asked our members how the procurement
process for providers could be made more effective in meeting the needs of children and young people.
Suggestions included:
— Be open and transparent about the process and assessment criteria.
— Build and maintain relationships with providers—this enables us to better understand your
needs and ensure that we meet the needs of the children and young people that you place
with us.
— Ensure that local authority procurement ofﬁcers are trained in understanding the needs of
children and young people and are supported by children's professionals.
— Try to develop, rather than control, the market by focusing on issues such as the needs of
children and young people, innovation and price ﬂexibility rather than price ﬁxing.
— Simplify and reduce the amount of requested information both at initial procurement and in
later quality monitoring.
— Develop two tier processes with minimal information provided at stage 1. Providers which meet
the selection criteria can then be asked for more detail at stage 2. This would ensure that
unsuccessful providers need not invest the same amount as time as in a single stage process.
— Create more opportunities to meet providers regularly, with a commitment to problem-solving
and relationship building. This helps develop trusting relationships. Involve your in-house
providers in these events to create a “level playing ﬁeld”.
How successful are government departments and their agencies at communicating their needs to potential
suppliers?
One of the key faults our members have identiﬁed is lack of face-to-face contact with commissioners.
Providers often struggle to build up a relationship with commissioners and this causes a negative impact on
the procurement process. Our survey noted that where there were opportunities to meet providers regularly it
was easier to develop a trusting relationship which improved the procurement experience, though this could
sometimes be presented as purely information sharing, losing the beneﬁts of potential collaboration. It has also
been reported that there is often a lack of information or poor quality information provided by the local
authority. There have also been concerns about the lack of feedback from local authorities on the outcomes of
tenders. We think that central Government could learn lessons from these experiences.
How should Government ensure that European directives on public procurement do not inhibit public bodies'
ability to procure effectively?
Over the past four years, recession and reduced local authority funding have brought cost and price into
sharper focus. Additionally, as local authorities become commissioners rather than direct providers of services,
there has been an increased focus on commissioning and procurement activity. Our survey found that European
Union Procurement Rules increasingly drive the purchasing of children's services from the voluntary and
private sectors. In light of this we would like to see the Government do more to ensure that European directives,
or a poor understanding of how to implement them, do not hinder public bodies' ability to procure effectively.
For example, European Union Procurement Rules indicate that public bodies purchasing services whose
overall value exceeds 200,000 Euros should go to open tender. However, education and social care services
are listed as Part B services and authorities are not obliged to follow the full tendering process for such
contracts. Despite this, and perhaps because of a culture of risk averseness, local authorities often behave as if
these activities were Part A services. Current plans to revise the EU Procurement rules include removing the
category of Part B services and raising the threshold to 500,000 Euros.
We have been asking the Government to oppose reforms to European Union Procurement Rules including
plans to remove the category of Part B services, which will leave placements for vulnerable children and young
people open to the tendering process. Many placements for children with high needs will exceed the proposed
new threshold of 500,000 Euros and will fall under full EU Procurement rules.
About us
The National Association of Independent Schools and Non-Maintained Special Schools (NASS) is a
membership organisation catering for approximately 6,000 very vulnerable children and young people in over
210 schools and organisations. It provides information, support and training to its members to advance the
education of children and young people with SEN.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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The Nationwide Association of Fostering Providers is the voice of the independent and voluntary fostering
sector for children and young people. It promotes high standards of professional and business practice. There
are 61 IFPs currently in membership, caring for approximately. 10,000 young people (about 75% of young
people in the independent fostering sector).
The Independent Children's Homes Association (ICHA) is the voice of independent providers of child care
services and resources for children and young people. We are a not for proﬁt Association, representing
professionals who have chosen to work in the independent sector. Membership is rapidly expanding standing
currently at 92 member organisations, 469 children's homes and more than 1,500 placements.
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Written evidence submitted by Social Enterprise UK (PROC 16)
About Social Enterprise UK
Social Enterprise UK was established in 2002 as the national body for social enterprise in the UK. We are
a membership organisation. We conduct research; develop policy; campaign; build networks; support individual
social enterprises; share knowledge and understanding; support private business to become more socially
enterprising; and raise awareness of social enterprise and what it can achieve.
Social enterprises are businesses driven by social or environmental objectives whose surpluses are reinvested
for that purpose in the business or in the community. They operate across a wide range of industries and sectors
from health and social care, to renewable energy, recycling and fair trade and at all scales, from small businesses
to large international companies. They take a range of organisational forms from co-operatives and mutuals, to
employee owned structures and charitable models.
Our members come from across the social enterprise movement, from local grassroots organisations to multi-
million pound businesses that operate across the UK. With them we are:
— creating a better environment for social enterprises to do business;
— helping the social enterprise movement to grow and become stronger; and
— building networks to share, learn and create business opportunities.
The UK social enterprise movement is recognised as a world leader and our members are united in their
commitment to changing the world through business. The current climate presents the social enterprise
movement with a unique opportunity. We know it can solve some of the UK's most pressing problems, promote
social justice and help to bring about the more diverse, bottom-up economic growth that we urgently need. In
particular, social enterprises are well placed to deliver on the Government's three priorities for civil society:
empowering communities, opening up public services and promoting social action.
This Submission
Social Enterprise UK welcomes the opportunity to submit evidence to the Public Accounts Select
Committee's inquiry into public procurement, and this paper is informed by the many contributions we have
received from our members working in public service delivery. Social enterprises are based on the principles
of mutualism, co-production and participation. They offer a model where people, be it staff, service users or
community members, are given a direct voice in running their organisation; where public assets can be locked
into community ownership; and where people are empowered to transform their lives and the lives of those
around them. As such, they are well placed to play a key role in the future of public services.
As an organisation we have been highly involved in shaping public service policy—we sit on the Cabinet
Ofﬁce's SME panel, we are a strategic partner of the Ofﬁce for Civil Society, we were a delivery partner in
the National Programme for Third Sector Commissioning and were instrumental in the design of the Public
Services (Social Value) Act 2012.
1. How successful has the Cabinet Ofﬁce been at improving public procurement policy and practice?
The Government has consistently encouraged the “creation and expansion of mutuals, co-operatives, charities
and social enterprises” and called for “these groups to have a much greater involvement in the running of
public services”. Social Enterprise UK has welcomed this support along with the Government's commitment
to ensuring a “truly level playing ﬁeld between the public, private and voluntary sectors”, and we believe that
the creation of a mixed market with a level playing ﬁeld will ensure that the public have a greater choice
between diverse, quality providers.
Alongside this, the Government has made strong commitments to develop a broad package of reforms
designed to signiﬁcantly open-up the public sector marketplace to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs),
which are also relevant to social enterprises.
In order to support these commitments, a number of initiatives have been pursued by Government including
improving public procurement transparency and accountability through the contracts ﬁnder and mysterycobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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shopper service; improving procurement processes by cutting red tape and bureaucracy on smaller contracts;
the requirement to develop departmental strategies on SME involvement; supporting the practice of embedding
social value in procurement through the Public Services (Social Value) Act; and developing training for
commissioners including elements on working with voluntary and community organisations and social
enterprises (VCSEs) through the Commissioning Academy and prior to this the National Programme on Third
Sector Commissioning (NPTSC).
Whilst these developments are welcome and are designed to address barriers to effective procurement, and
anecdotal reports suggest they have raised awareness of social enterprise, we do not believe that they do not
yet go far enough.
In many public service areas (where social enterprises tend to operate) we are still seeing the increasing
trend towards the aggregation of contracts is precluding more and more VCSEs from bidding. Similarly, the
Government's support for the Social Value Act has not been accompanied by sufﬁcient awareness raising
and capacity building for commissioners and procurement ofﬁcials—coupled with the risk-averse culture of
procurement, this has left many unaware and under-equipped to implement the Act effectively.
Indeed, there are some very contradictory messages between the Government's commitment to Localism
and SME participation and even the most recent announcement from the Ministry of Justice that offender
rehabilitation contracts are likely to be separated into only 16 contract package areas, which would preclude
the vast majority of smaller organisations from competing.
Social Enterprise UK has publically highlighted the barriers that social enterprises continue to encounter in
procurement, in documents such as our consultation response to the government's consultation on the Open
Public Services White Paper and well as our recent report on the public services industry, the Shadow State.
Crucially, we believe that if the government wishes to realise its ambitions for a mixed market of providers, it
is essential to support commissioning that is cognisant of commissioners' role as market shapers and stimulators
to support market entry for diverse providers.
Our data suggests that failing to implement these recommendations will see social enterprises turning away
from the public sector. Indeed, our report Fightback Britain highlighted that:
— Social enterprises whose main source of income is from the public sector view the coming
years with signiﬁcant gloom, with markedly lower business conﬁdence than their social
enterprise peers in other sectors.
— Of those social enterprises who trade mainly with the public sector and anticipate growth in
the future, 64% anticipate that their growth will come from diversiﬁcation away from working
with the public sector.
2. What should be the strategic aim of the Government's public procurement policy?
We believe that the explicit strategic aim of public procurement policy should be to maximise the beneﬁt
that is delivered to the public through spending from the public purse. At a time when there are considerable
constraints on public spending, it is more important than ever that public spending is recognised not just as a
purchasing tool but also as a public policy lever and that we address the needs of the public intelligently and
in the whole to maximise efﬁciencies and outcomes. As such we believe that embedding a culture of social or
best value should be the priority.
The Public Services (Social Value) Act currently requires commissioners to consider social value at the
pre-procurement phase for public service contracts. We believe that the Act should be strengthened in the
following ways:
— public bodies should be obliged to include social value in its commissioning and procurement
and account for how this is generated;
— the Act should be extended to apply to the purchasing of goods and works and the management
of assets as well as services; and
— the Act should be supported with statutory guidance.
The current public service reform programme being undertaken by the Government is focussed on opening
up public services market and achieving efﬁciencies. Behind the drive to open up public service markets has
been a desire to see a mixed market of providers including VCSEs, in the belief that this plurality will lead to
efﬁciency savings whilst driving up choice and quality.
We are not unsupportive of these aims—we share with the Government a desire to create opportunities for
VCSEs to compete on a level playing ﬁeld and to seek a culture of intelligent commissioning that is truly
backed by the culture, policies and programmes, processes and capacity needed to deliver.
However, we believe that these should be supporting rather than strategic aims of public procurement. We
also believe that at present, these aims have not been accompanied by sufﬁcient changes to procurement policy
and practice to create the conditions for success. Opening up markets is not in itself sufﬁcient to create a mixed
market of providers or indeed necessarily the route to achieving the greatest value. The structure and operation
of public service markets must be conducive to organisations of different types and sizes in order to realisecobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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this ambition. Government and commissioners have a role as market makers in this regard, and must ensure
that market conditions do not prohibit entry from certain kinds of providers.
3. Does the Government have the right skills and capabilities to procure effectively?
— Does the civil service have the skills and capabilities required to negotiate and manage contracts
effectively?
— What skills do procurement authorities require in-house, what skills can be bought in and what skills
can be contracted out?
— What lessons can central government learn from local government on procurement?
— How successful are government departments and their agencies at communicating their needs to
potential suppliers?
Social Enterprise UK's members report enormous variation in the quality of public bodies' contract
management and the communication of their requirements from existing or potential contractors. Where
examples of good practice exist and where public bodies are engaging well with social enterprises as deliverers
or potential deliverers of services, there are a number of common factors involved.
Often the quality of engagement will be dependent on high level buy-in for working with VCSEs as well as
sector champions in commissioning and procurement positions. Given the risk-averse culture that dominates
public sector procurement, such high level buy-in can be vital for giving ofﬁcials the conﬁdence to seek
innovative solutions to public needs and engage with a broad and diverse supplier base.
Some of our members also report that they have more success in engaging with public bodies and
departments where there is a history of procurement. On the other hand, where there have been rapid and large
scale transformations, instances of immature commissioning and procurement are more common and
knowledge, relationships and understanding of providers within geographies are at risk of being lost.
Similarly there are some signiﬁcant gaps in knowledge when it comes to more complex processes such as
open book accounting and advanced risk sharing. These skills are essential if we are to ensure that public
procurement is both accountable to the public sector and transparent when it comes to fair ﬁnancial rewards.
Tackling these issues requires clear leadership and improved training to give all commissioning and
procurement ofﬁcials the opportunity to access best practice examples and the conﬁdence to engage in
intelligent commissioning.
4. How should the civil service ensure it recruits and retains staff with the right skills to run procurements, to
negotiate and manage contracts and to deliver major projects effectively?
With wide-ranging reforms a high-paced changes being implemented across public services, recruitment is
only one part of the picture. Whether staff are new, have transferred across departments or organisations, or
have been in place for signiﬁcant periods of time, government must ensure that all staff are adequately and
appropriately trained and supported to commission and procure effectively.
Many of the current reforms and new initiatives have not been accompanied by support to commissioning
and procurement ofﬁcials which is sufﬁcient for them to effectively implement these new practices and
contracts. For example, the Government's support for the Social Value Act has not been accompanied by
sufﬁcient awareness raising and capacity building for commissioners and procurement ofﬁcials—coupled with
the risk-averse culture of procurement, this has left many unaware and under-equipped to implement the Act
effectively. Similarly, skills in areas such as open book accounting and shared risk are lacking.
In order to ensure that commissioners and procurement ofﬁcials are able to fulﬁl their responsibilities as
market makers with conﬁdence in order to deliver the Government's vision for public service reforms and meet
the needs of the public, investment in high quality professional training is essential across all service areas.
5. Does the Government have the organisational structures in place to enable it to procure effectively? (For
example, how far should the Government centralise responsibility for public procurement? Do central
government procurement “framework agreements” enable more effective public procurement?)
A consistent barrier to entry reported by social enterprises, which are often small, community-based
organisations, is that the trend towards the aggregation of contracts precludes market entry for small and
medium sized organisations. This is a concern shared by the voluntary sector as well as traditional SMEs.
At the procurement stage, small organisations are often disadvantaged by the level of resources required to
participate in the processes surrounding large contracts. For example, one social enterprise with a £1million
turnover reported that each tender they complete costs £50,000, which proportionally to their turnover creates
an unsustainable burden.
In addition, many contracts are just too large for most VCSEs to compete for. Consortia-building initiatives
have been developed in some areas and prime/sub-contracting models have been explored by others—for
example, in the North West the sector has been making efforts to build consortia and engage with larger
contracts through Converge, which enables medium sized local organisations to deliver collectively or ﬁndcobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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partners for collaborative bidding. However, such developments require investment and at present are unable
to keep pace with the speed at which they are need due to small contracts disappearing.
Social Enterprise UK would therefore caution against any centralisation of procurement that results in further
aggregation, as this runs entirely counter to the aim of fostering a plural market of providers that includes
VCSEs.
However, central government retains responsibility for direction-setting across public services as an industry
and in many public service markets in particular. Here, the Government's desire for localism and devolving
decision-making must be balanced against the need for guidance in relation to new initiatives and directives.
As highlighted above, the Social Value Act provides a valuable example of where Government support has not
been accompanied by sufﬁcient awareness raising and capacity building for commissioners and procurement
ofﬁcials.
6. Does the Government collect the management information it needs to understand how public procurement
is working?
Social Enterprise UK recently conducted signiﬁcant research into the public services industry in the UK, the
ﬁndings of which were reported in the . The report found that neither the government nor the public had access
to sufﬁcient information about public procurement to hold practices and processes to account and, crucially, to
ensure that at a macro level there is sufﬁcient oversight of public procurement to prevent the development of
oligopoly providers that are too big to fail.
In order to address this, Social Enterprise UK recommends that the following proposals are implemented:
— A public right to information: The Freedom of Information (FOI) Act and the powers that
support transparency urgently need reviewing. As outsourcing of public services expands, the
public's right to information is shrinking. The Act only applies to information that a public
authority holds about a contract or which it can compel a contractor to supply to it, rendering
the powers of the Act no longer ﬁt for purpose. FOI powers should be extended to companies
delivering public services, but these should be revised to take account of proportional cost
burdens on smaller providers, appropriate timeframes for independent contractors, and clear
guidelines on information that contractors are required to provide under FOI.
— Preventing unfair competition: An independent contracting oversight body should be established
to scrutinise contracting decisions and prevent unfair competition. It should be overseen by the
National Audit Ofﬁce but have sufﬁcient weight and power to challenge and overturn
departmental decisions. It should have the powers to issue penalties when organisations fail to
deliver outcomes and these result in cost to the public purse.
— Rolling out open book accounting: Open book accounting should be rolled out with supportive
guidance for all public sector contracts worth more than £250,000. When adopted effectively,
open book accounting can mitigate against excessive proﬁteering, increase transparency,
improve the sharing of risk and promote more effective partnerships where all partners are
motivated to ﬁnd the most effective solutions.
— Taking past performance into account: Performance under previous contracts should be
explicitly weighed up as part of the decision-making process in procurement decisions. At
present, when evaluating tenders public authorities rarely have information on whether bidders
have previously breached their commitments in other tenders with other public authorities.
Public authorities should be allowed to take into account relevant information “a priori” (during
the selection phase) on bidders, including bidders' prior track record both positive and negative.
Consideration should be given to the development on “quality of work” indicators that would
help public authorities in this process.
7. How should Government ensure that European directives on public procurement do not inhibit public
bodies' ability to procure effectively?
Across the UK, many public bodies follow the full EU procurement rules where it is not necessary to do so.
Applying the full set of EU rules adds complexity and cost for organisations competing for contracts, which is
both unnecessary and disadvantageous to small organisations.
Clear guidance on situations in which the full EU procurement rules apply exists—for example, Social
Enterprise UK has produced a myth-busting guide to procurement which has been highly valued. Such guidance
needs to be promoted to all public bodies in order to promote best practice procurement that does not
disadvantage small organisations unnecessarily.
8. How should Government assess and manage risk when negotiating procurement contracts? (For example,
how much risk should Government be prepared to accept and what are the limits on the transfer of risk to
the private sector?)
There are a number of existing challenges when it comes to the Government's assessment and transfer of
risk. As the government remains the accountable body, it can never fully transfer risk as it will inevitably bearcobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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ultimate responsibility in cases where organisations fail to deliver adequate results or fail ﬁnancially. Because
of this, it is essential that procurement ofﬁcials exert caution when faced with offers from providers to take on
more risk in return for higher reward, as there is a limit to the extent to which this can truly happen.
In addition, there is disproportionate emphasis placed on ﬁnancial risk by procurement professionals rather
than the risk of delivering poor outcomes. Often this ﬁnancial risk is disproportionate to the size of the contracts
therefore penalising smaller organisations and often under-capitalised social enterprises. This results in public
service markets being dominated by a small number of highly capitalised providers, thereby considerably
reducing rather than enhancing competition. As previously stated, social enterprises have difﬁculty accessing
capital and due to their social mission and legal and governance structures are unable to take the high levels
of risk this payment system requires.
Further, when the government is contracting by results, the balance of interest should be aligned through
joint governance arrangements, such as the creation of a community interest joint venture or the inclusion of
community-appointed, non-executive directors. This allows for the protection of public funds through
appropriate governance, which aligns incentives between taxpayer, providers and service users, thereby
reducing complexity, transaction cost and perverse incentives.
Additionally, past failure to deliver results is currently not considered in risk assessments. We support the
idea that performance under previous contracts should be explicitly weighed up as part of the decision-making
process in procurement decisions. At present, when evaluating tenders public authorities rarely have
information on whether bidders have previously breached their commitments in other tenders with other public
authorities. We ﬁrmly believe that public authorities should be allowed and supported to take into account
relevant information “a priori” (during the selection phase) on bidders, including bidders' prior track record,
both positive and negative. Consideration should also be given to the development on “quality of work”
indicators that would help public authorities in this process.
Similarly, there is little oversight of risk across different public bodies. For example, Serco operates public
transport services such as the Docklands Light Railway and Barclays Cycle Hire Scheme. It manages
laboratories including the National Nuclear Laboratory. It runs prisons and young offenders institutions,
provides a range of security services to the National Borders Agency and other clients, such as accommodation
and detention services for asylum seekers; it also supplies electronic tagging systems. It provides maintenance
services for missile defence systems and military bases; it provides air trafﬁc control services, facilities and
management for hospitals, as well as pathology services. It manages leisure services, administers government
websites including Business Link, provides a range of IT services, and operates waste collection services for
local councils. It also manages education authorities on behalf of local governments. Its failure would cause
extreme turbulence in public services.
Additionally, we see very little in the way of innovative commissioning where services providers, service
users and commissioners are able to co-design and procure services. Service providers and frontline
professionals are specialists in understanding the services they deliver, their clients' needs and the communities
in which they work, and are therefore well placed to offer innovative solutions to entrenched public service
issues. However, immature commissioning capabilities often result in very risk-averse commissioning
behaviour and an over-reliance on the procurement process, rather than intelligent commissioning, to protect
against risk.
In order to utilise the knowledge and expertise that professional service deliverers have and foster innovation,
government must counter unconﬁdent commissioners resorting to what is perceived as “safe commissioning”
rather than commissioning for outcomes that can truly transform people's lives, to ensure that new entrants
with innovative solutions are able to enter the market.
Best practice commissioning should be sufﬁciently ﬂexible within service speciﬁcations to allow for
innovation and should develop mechanisms to share risk rather than rely on heavy procurement. It should
further engage with social enterprises and civil society organisations at the service design stage to access their
specialist knowledge of local communities and service users, as well as incorporating service users' feedback
in evaluation processes.
In line with this, a culture change is required which moves public procurement beyond viewing risk as a
purely ﬁnancial matter. Risk calculations must be broadened to take delivery outcomes and market plurality
issues into account in order to ensure that maximum beneﬁts are delivered to the public.
9. What is the best role for “prime contractors” and what are the advantages and disadvantages of relying
on “prime contractors”?
Social Enterprise UK's members have reported mixed experiences of the prime and sub-contracting model
across different service areas. Examples of good practice have included primes supporting their VCSE
subcontractors to build their capacity, and in some area where prime contracts are suitably sized, social
enterprises have succeeded in winning prime contracts which have enabled them to draw on their in-depth
local knowledge to ensure a diverse VCSE delivery network that meets the needs of local people.
The diversity of experiences with the prime contracting model has been attributed in part to differences in
the scale of the contract and the geography it covers, which can determine whether social enterprises or acobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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diversity of providers participate. For example, one organisation reported that “primes covering large areas
often don't have the local knowledge of providers in a particular geography and so don't procure a diverse
range of services”.
In other areas, members have reported strategic issues with the Work Programme as a prime model, including
restrictions on transparency and the reporting of outcomes and performance data. For example, sub-contractors
can ﬁnd themselves operating without knowledge of their prime's targets, which makes managing their own
performance far more complex.
Often these contracts work best where the prime is responsible for contract management but is not a front
line delivery organisation themselves. This allows for greater transparency in how cases are aligned, and more
equal partnerships between primes and subs. Tensions and unfairness arise when both the prime and sub-
contractors deliver the services as in these situations the prime prioritise their own service delivery functions
only passing through complex and costly cases to the sub-contractors.
More structurally, the concern raised by many and highlighted in our report the Shadow State, is that in
some service areas such as the Work Programme, prime contracts are so large that only a few organisations
are large enough to compete for contracts. In addition, mergers are taking place between some of the prime
contractors, resulting in even fewer organisations managing these contracts. As a result, we are in danger of
creating an oligopoly market where a handful of providers become too big to fail.
Social Enterprise UK therefore believes that prime contractor models are most suitable when operated at a
level where contracts are small and local enough to attract competition from a wide and diverse pool of
potential providers.
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Written evidence submitted by MSQ Partners (PROC 17)
This document relates to the experience of responding to the tender for Communications—Creative Service
Delivery RM988. OJEU Ref 2012/s 156–260800.
This evidence is speciﬁcally in response to the question “Does the Government have the right skills and
capabilities to procure effectively?”
This document is written jointly by Roger Parry and Peter Reid, Chairman and Chief Executive of MSQ
Partners, respectively. Both of the respondents have considerable experience of procurement, both within and
outside the marketing communications sector, and Peter Reid conducted a number of procurement-related
projects during his time as a consultant at McKinsey & Company, prior to joining MSQ Partners.
MSQ Partners [MSQ] is a UK-based marketing communications group which operates eight specialist
agencies each with speciﬁc communications skills including design, digital marketing, advertising and public
relations. MSQ applied for selection to be one of 10 agencies to be selected to undertake integrated
communication campaigns (called “Lot 1” in the tender) on behalf of Government bodies. The tender process
is due to be completed in February 2013 (after several delays). A number of MSQ agencies are still being
considered. The holding company itself, MSQ Partners, was eliminated on a technicality on the basis of a
“pass/fail” question on the subject of relevant case studies. MSQ Partners comments on the process are laid
out below.
(1) MSQ Partners is a UK based marketing communications group which is owned by its own
employees. It has ofﬁces in London, Birmingham, Glasgow, Leeds, Manchester and Belfast. It
employs some 600 people and has a turnover of some £100 million. MSQ would be regarded
as a classic British SME and is, in theory, exactly the type of company the Government want
to see selected for procurement of Government work.
(2) The MSQ approach is to own specialist agencies which are leaders in their own ﬁelds and then
offer integrated campaigns by combining the skills of the proven specialists which are under
common ownership and where all senior staff are shareholders. This structure encourages the
maximum degree of inter-agency co-operation.
(3) Various individual MSQ agencies have done work for the Government for many years and
several of the eight MSQ agencies were on the old COI roster (and several are still in
consideration for appointment under the new Communications tender process). As a new entity
(MSQ Partners was created in December 2011) has not been on the COI roster in its own right.
(4) The abolition of the old COI obviously presented a challenge for the Government Procurement
Service (GPS) as the COI has built up considerable experience of the communications sector
and had enjoyed many years of managing tender processes for professional services in the area
of communication. Although the generic aspects of all tender processes are similar, signiﬁcant
sector-speciﬁc skills are required in designing a relevant questionnaire particularly for the
procurement of professional services.
(5) The experience of MSQ is that, in the design of the tender process, the GPS went out of its
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transparent and fair. However, the overall approach and speciﬁc content was not sufﬁciently
tailored to the requirements of procuring marketing communications services (vs. procuring
tangible “goods” or the delivery of “outsourced processes”). Moreover, this lack of a tailored
approach meant that the tender process contained certain ﬂaws from the outset, which ultimately
made the outcome of, at least Lot 1, less than transparent or fair in some areas.
(6) As a result, it is our combined view that, despite a signiﬁcant and diligent up-front investment,
it is highly unlikely that the tender process will ultimately deliver value for money to either the
government or the tax payer.
(7) The tender process seeks to appoint 10 agencies in a framework structure so that these 10
agencies (and no others) would then be eligible for consideration by a wide range of
Government departments and bodies. Thus the key objective for an agency competing in the
tender was being picked as one of the 10.
(8) The tender document contained a large number of questions some of which had a pass/fail
structure and some which invited the writing of detailed proposals which would then be scored
on the basis of the degree to which they met the tender's objectives. The implication was that
it was the detailed proposals that carried all the marks and that the “pass/fail” questions were
simply a screening process. In practice, it turned out that some of the pass/fail questions were
in fact judged on complex, subjective criteria not simple pass/fail. This was not made clear.
(9) Speciﬁcally, one of the “screening” questions asked respondents to provide three case studies
which provided examples of where the Group had delivered certain of the services listed within
the Lot Requirements. A number of apparently well qualiﬁed agencies/groups (including MSQ)
subsequently failed to progress beyond the screening stage since it was deemed that they had
not demonstrated experience of the full range of services being procured within the Lot. It was
neither made clear that demonstrating the “full range of services” was a requirement, nor, in
our opinion, would it have been possible to do so, given the breadth of services speciﬁed.
Equally, had this been clear in the question we would have obviously provided different case
examples, which focused on more multi-disciplinary campaigns and sought to demonstrate as
far as possible the breadth of our capabilities.
(10) MSQ (like other agencies) invested hundreds of hours in the submission process—the vast
amount of which time was spent on the detailed questions about the approach to integrated
communication which we were led to believe would be the main criteria for selection. None of
these detailed and carefully considered answers would have been even read because of the
“fail” on the ambiguous pass/fail case study question which was presented in the tender as a
relatively unimportant hygiene factor, rather than a key aspect of making the selection.
(11) It is, moreover, ironic that UK based and owned groups like MSQ which have been created
speciﬁcally to do integrated work by combining the skills of specialist agencies have been
excluded from the process, whilst foreign-owned consortia, that in some cases have no common
ownership and no track record of integrated work, are being considered by an accident of the
process. It would appear that the Government objective of favouring domestic SMEs is not
being served by the procurement process.
(12) The tender also requested pricing information which, in simple terms, was based on hourly
rates for speciﬁed roles the GPS assumed existed in communications agencies such as “Account
Director”. This approach will have led many agencies to “game” the system by putting down
unrealistically low hourly rates for the speciﬁed roles (to gain maximum tender points) in the
expectation that, if selected and appointed, they would bulk up their fees by putting in more
hours, or by agreeing with the actual client extra work from individuals not on the speciﬁed
role list—ie, the pricing matrix screen in the tender would be meaningless in terms of what the
ultimate client actually paid (not least since ultimately projects will probably be awarded based
on the total estimate supplied by the agency for a given project and not with reference to hourly
rates submitted in the tender).
(13) In practice, therefore, the ﬁnal selection of the 10 agencies is likely to exclude some of the best
qualiﬁed candidates either because they did not realise the pass/fail questions would be
subjected to subjective assessment and/or because they submitted realistic hourly charging plans
which made them look expensive.
(14) The language used in many of the detailed questions was ambiguous and in some cases
repetitive and mutually inconsistent. It is likely this happened as the individuals writing the
questionnaire had limited experience of the way communications agencies operate and the
questions were modiﬁed from other tender processes. The result is that some of the questions
ask the same thing in different ways which will make them very difﬁcult to score effectively.
This will lead to even more weight assigned to the scores of the pricing matrix mentioned
above which will further, potentially, exclude agencies which would have made ideal partners
for various Government campaigns.
(15) Additionally, the detailed questions failed to focus on the key skills or areas that truly
differentiate between marketing communications agencies and their suitability for a public
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capabilities of the respondent group, nor did they rigorously test the expertise and experience
of agencies in delivering public sector work. Instead, the bulk of the questions were either
related to “process management” or focused on how groups would theoretically address
conceptual marketing problems, such as the generation of a “Big Idea”.
(16) The practical suggestions that ﬂow from our experience are listed in the paragraphs below.
These are obviously speciﬁc to the communications tender, but are probably relevant to other
tender processes.
(17) A draft of the application document with all questions should be pretested with several of the
types of agency that are likely to apply. This would instantly have shown up those questions
which were ambiguous.
(18) The pricing matrix question should be removed and replaced with a question about actual
operating costs of the agencies submitting—ie, salaries paid, rent paid etc. This would allow
assessors to select a range of high cost and low cost operators. The ﬁnal choice of which agency
to pick from the 10 (the choice made by the actual Government client) will always be based
on the real price quoted for the work and the creative ideas suggested. The pricing matrix of
the tender would be irrelevant and will only have served to exclude agencies which did not
“game” the process. To have excluded an agency from the chosen 10 on the basis of a theoretical
pricing matrix makes no sense at all when selecting professional service ﬁrms. Equally, “value
for money” is often better delivered in these circumstances by negotiating a “volume discount”
or incorporating an element of “performance related remuneration” into the contracts of
successful applicants rather than focusing on “hourly rates” as a key tender criteria.
(19) Because appointments are made for three years the ﬂawed process shuts the door to Government
work on many agencies which might actually be very well qualiﬁed for particular campaigns
but which have been excluded because of the ambiguity of the questions. To address this it
might make sense to appoint two extra agencies each year to the integrated framework to allow
Government clients maximum choice.
(20) An alternative approach may be to have a larger number of agencies pre-qualiﬁed but to select
them with a much simpler, quicker process. For example you would keep in all the questions
about ﬁnancial stability; lack of criminal records, having the relevant insurance policies etc.
which are obviously valid for pre-qualiﬁcation. The pricing matrix would be dropped and
replaced by a statement of costs. The numerous and repetitive questions about approach to
integrated communication could be replaced by a single 1,000 answer (perhaps focused on the
challenges of delivering value for money in public sector communications and the respondent's
experience in this area) which could be assessed by a panel.
(21) If a larger amount of resources were available, a further alternative would be to ask agencies,
in the screening phase, to submit their credentials in the relevant areas of expertise, provide
details of some relevant case studies and answer 1/2 questions linked to the speciﬁcities of
doing public sector work and the group's suitability to be included on the Government roster.
Following this screening stage, approximately 25 agencies might be invited to deliver an in-
person presentation to a GPS team (including marketing professionals from key departments)
exploring the topics in more detail and providing the team with a potentially richer ﬂavour of
the quality and the positioning of the individual agencies, following which the roster agencies
would be appointed.
January 2013
Written evidence submitted by Baroness Greengross's Transport Forum and the International
Longevity Centre (PROC 18)
Summary
A Public Procurement contract is required to be effectively managed to ensure full delivery. In order to bring
these ideals to a fruitful solution several key interlocking domains have to be in place. These are:
(a) Scope, negotiation, length and enforcement of the Contract.
(b) Transparency.
(c) Risk Allocation.
(d) An Independent Supervisory Board and an Independent audit.
This approach was clariﬁed in our work on Railway Franchising but we see these steps as a blueprint for
the successful management and outcomes of Public Procurement exercises in other domains such as Healthcare
and education.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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Background
In 2010 Baroness Greengross's Transport Forum produced a paper entitled “Public Procurement-the lessons
of Rail Privatisation(i) [submitted as supplementary material]. The primary aim of that paper was to seek if
any wider lessons could be learned, or any general principles be derived from, the railways” experience which
could be applied to the outsourcing of user-facing functions in other areas of public provision.
In summary while there have been numerous beneﬁts from the privatisation of railways, we believed that
the franchising model has proved to be ﬂawed in several ways. The issue is just how, rather than being simply
put down to experience, are these valuable lessons going to be put to good use in other sectors, such as
healthcare, so that the hard work and learnings from this past and ongoing example of “privatisation” are
incorporated in the methodologies of public procurement going forward. Into other transport issues, such as
franchising motorways or in other sectors, such as procuring contracts for the provision of social care, both at
home and in residential settings and potentially Healthcare and other domains of public procurement.
The outcomes from the Forum's work in terms of ways if improving the efﬁcacy of Public Procurement are
detailed in our response to Q.10 from the Committee's Procurement Issues and Questions Paper.
Response to the Committee’s Questions
The Committee expressed the wish to receive answers to the following questions from its Procurement:
Issues and Questions Paper.
1. How successful has the Cabinet Ofﬁce been at improving public procurement policy and practice?
I. It has been reasonably successful but recent events, including some poor NHS and Railways
experiences, suggest that much remains to be done. The 2010 Green review(ii) of government
efﬁciency highlighted the need for action to reform and centralise.
II. Government procurement and found that the Government was failing to leverage both its credit
rating and its scale and that there is inefﬁcient buying by individual departments, with signiﬁcant
price variations across departments for common items. It also found that there are signiﬁcant
deﬁciencies in the management information available to civil servants to show where and how
Government spends its money.
III. The establishment in 2010 of the Efﬁciency and Reform Group (ERG), with the aim of taking a new
more coordinated approach to driving efﬁciency across Government, is to be welcomed, as are its
initiatives to reform and centralise public procurement and achieve efﬁciency savings. The
announcement earlier in August 2012 that efﬁciency savings worth over £5.5 billion had been
achieved in 2011–12, of which £422 million were attributed to centralising government procurement
shows that some success is being achieved in this regard. We particularly welcome the focus on
supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and the aspiration that at least 25% of
government procurement spending will ﬂow to SMEs by the end of the parliament in 2015. The fact
that proportion of government spending going to SMEs has risen to 13.7% in 2011–12, is a welcome
sign of progress in that regard. Factors such as making it faster and simpler to do business with
Government, for example by abolishing pre-qualiﬁcation questionnaires for procurements under
£100,000 and committing to reduce the length of time taken to complete the procurement processes,
have been a key part of that success.
2. What should be the strategic aim of the Government's public procurement policy?
I. In its recently published seventh report “Rail 2020”,(iii) the Transport Select committee recommends
that “in developing a new framework for rail franchising the Government [should] focus more on
wider policy objectives, such as the promotion of sustainable end-to-end journeys, the quality of the
passenger experience, or economic or social development, alongside the premium payments offered
by train operating ﬁrms.” We fully endorse such a contingent approach to the setting of strategic
aims for public procurement of whatever sort, with the aims being agreed and signed up to before
being transparently published as part of the desired contractual outcome.
3. Does the Government have the right skills and capabilities to procure effectively?
Does the civil service have the skills and capabilities required to negotiate and manage contracts effectively?
What skills do procurement authorities require in-house, what skills can be bought in and what skills can be
contracted out?
What lessons can central government learn from local government on procurement?
How successful are government departments and their agencies at communicating their needs to potential
suppliers?
I. Regarding Rail Franchising, in its seventh report the Transport Select Committee is not convinced
that DfT as currently structured is best placed and resourced both to set rail policy and do the
detailed work necessary to run each franchise competition. They believe that franchises should be
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what it wished to be delivered under the franchise and the new franchising body, employing staff
with appropriate specialist, commercial skills, would let and manage the contract.
II. We endorse the view that a new arms-length franchising body could employ staff with the appropriate
specialist and commercial skills required to let and manage effective franchise contracts. However,
ministers must remain fully accountable to Parliament for the railway.
4. How should the civil service ensure it recruits and retains staff with the right skills to run procurements, to
negotiate and manage contracts and to deliver major projects effectively?
(See above.)
5. Does the Government have the organisational structures in place to enable it to procure effectively? (For
example, how far should the Government centralise responsibility for public procurement? Do central
government procurement “framework agreements” enable more effective public procurement?)
I. Far from centralising further, in terms of rail franchising the Transport Select Committee believes
that “there is scope to devolve control over some rail franchises to local or regional bodies' and
supports the Government in looking at how to achieve this”. We fully support decision making in
this regard being delegated to the appropriate authority depending on the contingent balance between
local needs and aspirations and national strategic demands.
6. Does the Government collect the management information it needs to understand how public procurement
is working?
I. Collecting information for information's sake would be yet another bureaucratic burden that would
both slow down the procurement management process and cloud the prone motive for collecting
such information ie assessment as to success in achieving the main objectives of the procurement,
such as improved consumer outcomes. However in speciﬁc circumstances better management
information, rather than just becoming obscuring background “noise” could have wider implications
beyond the primary procurement objectives.
II. For example Government procurement has an important role to play in nudging the private and
public sector to adapt to an ageing society. For example, during the process of Digital Switchover,
the Government introduced a procurement process (worth £600 million) which speciﬁed certain
disability access requirements for the digital set top box to be provided as part of the help scheme.
This process heavily inﬂuenced the whole industry, which previously had been reluctant to provide
certain access functions (such as audio description). Subsequent to procurement even the cheapest
set top boxes took became more accessible and usable for people with disabilities. Government
should recognise the potential to use its own procurement to inﬂuence the design of goods and
services being sold in the private sector and collect relevant management information accordingly.
7. How should Government ensure that European directives on public procurement do not inhibit public
bodies' ability to procure effectively?
I. No one would argue that there is anything wrong with the spirit of EU procurement rules, requiring
as they do, the equal and non-discriminatory treatment of bidders and transparency in the
procurement process. In practice though, particularly for SME's they can become rather bureaucratic
and unwieldy. It was welcome therefore that in 2011 the European Commission launched a review
of the EU's public procurement rules in 2011 and, following consultation, published proposals for
revised public procurement.
II. These proposals, which are currently being considered by the European Council and the European
Parliament for negotiation and adoption, include measures intended to simplify existing public
procurement rules, aim to facilitate the participation of SME's in bidding for public contracts and
allow authorities to make better use of public procurement in support of common societal goals.
8. How should Government assess and manage risk when negotiating procurement contracts? (For example,
how much risk should Government be prepared to accept and what are the limits on the transfer of risk to
the private sector?)
I. As we highlight above, the government needs to be absolutely clear as to what risks it wants to
allocate to the operator, why and how. People who take the risk should be the people best able to
manage that risk. The problem is that if a company cannot manage a risk it insures against it and
the cost of this has to be added into the charge the operator makes. Because of this it is often more
costly than the government taking the risk directly and pooling it. There might be some merit is
taking away the risk for operators of changes in the economic climate (the recent recession), in GDP
or in employment patterns. (Areas in which Rail franchisees have recently been seen to be seeking
government protection on the basis that they are risks that could not be foreseen.)
II. The best way of achieving such protection would be to link the contract to changes in the GDP and
changes in London Employment or some similar Index. It might, however, proﬁtably be borne in
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private sector. In between those risks that are clearly for government to accept and those that should
fall to the operator there might be some that fall between the two. On balance, it is probably better
for the government to accept these as well and factor their cost into any contract; however, any
proposal to link the contract to changes in GDP would require some analysis to ensure it did not
create perversities.
9. What is the best role for “prime contractors” and what are the advantages and disadvantages of relying
on “prime contractors”?
I. The best role for a prime contractor is to undertake to perform the complete contract, while
employing and managing one or more sub-prime subcontractors to carry out speciﬁc parts of the
contract. In 2010, the Pentagon Partnership(iv) looked at the experiences of third sector
organisations' experiences of the sub/prime contractor model in the delivery of DWP/Jobcentre Plus
contracts in the Tyne & Wear Region. Reasons given by organisations as to why they had not been
subcontractors in the delivery of DWP/Jobcentre Plus contracts range from a lack of transparency/
communication from prime contractors, overly-bureaucratic procedures, and a lack of understanding
of (and a willingness to exploit) the third sector. Those respondents who had delivered subcontracted
work cited communication, personality and culture clashes as negative aspects of the experience.
Some of the Contractors even instances of bad practice that contravened the DWP's own Code of
Conduct for providers such as, Contract awards that are highly geared to achievement (and end-
loading of payments); Problems with the credible pricing of work and payment issues.
II. Smaller contractors may have stafﬁng or technology issue relating to their small size and niche
service nature. This is a problem if they are unable to deliver to service standards and cannot be
quickly replaced. Similarly, they may have cash ﬂow problems if the prime contractor is slow in
paying invoices or some sort of payment-by-results situation exists with a long lead-time between
service delivery, veriﬁcation and payment.
III. A 2012 Ofsted report, Ensuring Quality in Apprenticeships(v) highlights how subcontractors felt
they were getting “poor value for money” from management fees and reveals many lead contractors
were overcharging according to Skills Funding Agency (SFA) guidance. The most effective
subcontracting arrangements seen in the survey were between subcontractors and other like-minded
independent learning providers working as part of a consortium or training group. In these
circumstances, the arrangements had improved their offer and added value to the experience of their
apprentices. A true delivery partnership existed, with savings on shared services and a common
vision of offering high-quality apprenticeship training.
IV. However, Ofsted reported that although some lead contractors legitimately regarded subcontracting
as a way of meeting the needs of employers or expanding their training offer where they did not
have the expertise themselves, others clearly saw it as a way of generating income for doing little
work. Subcontractors who were not part of a training group or consortium were unhappy at what
they perceived as poor value for money for the management fees charged by lead contractors. The
introduction of the minimum contract value has forced often very good smaller providers to either
work together or become a subcontractor of a larger provider. In several cases this has diluted
accountability and has placed a greater distance between the learner and those responsible for
learning. Most of the employers interviewed were actively involved in some aspects of the training
and assessment of their apprentices and three quarters had some previous knowledge of the
training provider.
V. However, neither the employers nor the apprentices interviewed had a clear understanding of the
role of lead contractors and their responsibility for ensuring the quality of the learning programme.
Importantly, where provider staff, learners or employers are dissatisﬁed with an aspect of training
there was no obvious point of contact to report concerns to. One lead contractor described approaches
from dubious parties wanting to act as subcontractors, but said there was no obvious body to refer
their concerns to. Ofsted has recommended the government and other agencies look at an
independent whistleblowing hotline and called for guidance on who can act as a lead contractor
linked to performance rather than contract value.
10. What are the key lessons to be learned from the experience of cost overruns, delays and project failures
in central Government procurement over the past ﬁve years or so?
I. A major lesson from our Railways Paper was that it is important for procurement and contract
management to be recognised as a core public sector activity and to be organised and resourced
appropriately. Processes and policies aimed at guaranteeing exemplary propriety should be
established, in the context of the need to exploit effective commercial approaches.
II. Further, a naive and simplistic reliance on the market to provide often arises from either ideology or
a failure to understand thoroughly how markets will react to a given set of circumstances. An
example of this was the decision to change the London bus contracts to move the fares revenue risk
from London Transport to the operators. The theory was that this would drive innovation and improve
quality and customer service. The reality was, an outcome accurately predicted by the professionals,
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of their competitors and, crucially, of the integrity and performance of the network. They acted
consistently with the realities of the market and not the theory. There was also a notable move
to market concentration, with dominance by a small number of large operators and a reduction
in competition.
III. The key lesson here is to exercise a level of control or ownership consistent with the assured delivery
of the required outcomes. The public sector's role should be to set policy and ﬁnance and specify
what is required, and then to assure provision in the most cost effective way. It is essential to
establish a clear categorisation of those outcomes government wishes to secure and to conduct a
robust and comprehensive analysis of the intervention options. This analysis should be based on
sound economic, ﬁnancial and commercial principles. If political or ideological goals are involved,
they should be made explicit and overlaid after completion of the analysis.
IV. In the view of our Forum the most effective method of achieving value for money is to:
— deﬁne the requirement accurately and clearly;
— specify how delivery is to be measured and monitored;
— pay due regard to the capacity of the market to deliver what is required;
— assign risk appropriately to those best placed to manage it;
— seek genuinely competitive bids;
— evaluate these against the right criteria;
— award on the basis of best value;
— make explicit the expectation that all parties will honour all of their obligations;
— adopt a commercial (rather than legalistic and confrontational) approach to contract
management; and
— apply high quality scrutiny and audit arrangements to all procurement and related activity to
avoid, in particular, the possibility of inappropriate political inﬂuence.
V. The bidding process will deﬁne the “efﬁcient” price and if it is unaffordable then the speciﬁcation
needs review. The resulting contract requires to be effectively managed to ensure full delivery.
VI. In order to bring these ideals to a fruitful solution several key interlocking domains have to be in
place. These are:
A. Scoping the Contract
(a) In any public procurement exercise the reasons and objectives for the process need to be
clearly and explicitly laid out. Only in this way can the delivery be monitored, success or
failure assessed, and alterations or amendments be attempted if changes are found
necessary at any time. Many failures can be attributed to a lack of clarity about what
procurement was trying to achieve.
B. Negotiating the Contract
(a) It is essential that there is a realistic and workable alternative method of operation in place
before negotiations are begun. A government without a credible fall-back situation is not
in a strong position either with regard to the negotiating of the original contract or in its
subsequent enforcement. If the whole basis of rail franchising or public procurement is to
engage the beneﬁts of competition it is worth making the obvious point that there must
also be competition in the bidding process.
(b) Mounting a franchise bid can be extremely costly (many millions of Pounds both for the
bidder and for the government. There might be merit in drafting some sort of summary
contract, a Memorandum of Understanding when the preferred bidders are established and
before a situation is reached where it is judged too costly to withdraw. Contracts must be
open and honest, but they must also be realistic.
C. Transparency
(a) Greater transparency is fundamental. Too much vital information by which the public
can judge the value of Public Procurement is hidden behind the curtain of commercial
conﬁdentiality. Whilst this might be sustainable during the negotiations themselves, once
a Contract is let there is an overwhelming case for as much detail as possible to be
revealed. In the same way, past performance should, and does, inform government choice.
It should be seen to do so and reasons for the ﬁnal choice of provider should be clearly
stated at the time of the Contract itself.
D. Risk Allocation
(a) The government needs to be absolutely clear as to what risks it wants to allocate to the
operator, why and how. Risk that arises from changes in public policy should not, for
obvious reasons, be risks that are undertaken, or underwritten, by an operator. Since those
changes are made by Government it is right that government bears the cost. Any contract
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(b) People who take the risk should be the people best able to manage that risk. The problem
is that if a company cannot manage a risk it insures against it and the cost of this has to
be added into the charge the operator makes. Because of this it is often more costly than
the government taking the risk directly and pooling it.
E. Length of Contract
(a) There seems to be no real evidence that merely having a longer term contract has resulted
in signiﬁcantly greater investment. The argument that major investments are unattractive
in a short term contract, because of the difﬁculty of getting ones investment back, has
always been addressed through the “Designated Franchise Asset” provisions in franchise
agreements. At the end of a franchise previously identiﬁed improvements are valued and
the franchisee is paid accordingly. This principle can be extended to cover any initiative
that is desirable to the government and which can only recoup its costs over a long term
without the franchise itself having to be for that same long period. Moreover, the rarely
mentioned reality is that locking up large parts of the total public spending for long periods
can be unattractive to governments who, as a result, are then faced with considerable
spending constraints overall.
(b) It would seem that ﬁve years or so would be a reasonable initial period for both sides.
There is, however, some understandable misgiving within the operating community about
the difﬁculty of long term planning based on such a comparatively short period and, in
particular, about the very considerable costs that are now involved in the franchise process.
Because of this we believe it would be better to have an initial 5year contract that is
automatically extended, 5 years at a time, perhaps up to a total of 15 years, if—and only
if—“all the right boxes can be ticked” at the end of each period. The original contract
must clearly state what these boxes are and what constitutes a “tick” and should also state
clearly such things as might or would need to be renegotiated for succeeding terms. This
would give both parties the opportunity to address both changed ﬁnancial circumstances
and changed political imperatives. If agreement could not be reached, an open bidding
process would then be put in place.
F. Contract Enforcement
(a) Any Contract should incorporate an adequately sized Bond to be forfeited if the contractor
or franchisee walks away from the Contract. Future Bonds should not only be of proper
size to serve their purpose, but should also be accompanied by pre-deﬁned penalties to be
levied for non-delivery at the end of, and possibly even during, the Contract period. It is
also important to ensure that where franchisees are wholly owned subsidiaries, the parent
Company should guarantee such Bonds and Undertakings and not be able to isolate
themselves from such risks. By the same token, if a franchisee is, for any reason, debarred
from other future franchises, such a ban should extend to the parent company as well.
G. An Independent Supervisory Board
(a) This would act as a buffer between the day-to-day operations and the government
imperatives—to the beneﬁt of both. There should be passenger representation. The role of
such a body is to represent each side to the other, attempt to broker a deal and attempt to
act as referee. It clearly is not to make government policy.
H. Independent Audit
(a) Whatever mechanism is used for procurement, contract management and related activity
it is absolutely essential that it be subject to independent and credible audit to avoid,
amongst other things, the possibility of inappropriate political inﬂuence.
We are pleased to see that the Transport Committee in its recent Rail 2020 report endorses many of these
points and sees them as a valuable blueprint for moving forward. We would go further and see these steps as
a blueprint for the successful management and outcomes of Public Procurement exercises in other domains
such as Healthcare and education.
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Written evidence submitted by Community Matters (PROC 19)
Community Matters welcomes to opportunity to respond to this consultation. Our response focuses on the need
for public procurement policy to offer a level playing ﬁeld for small/local and large/national delivery bodies
across sectors.
1. How successful has the Cabinet Ofﬁce been at improving public procurement policy and practice?
2. Community Matters welcomes attempts by the Cabinet Ofﬁce to clarify policy and practice in relation to
procurement. It is important that this guidance is both wide ranging (ie applicable to a range of different
circumstances and suppliers) and standardised (to allow commissioners to identify and apply common practices
across different types of procurement exercise); and in many ways these criteria have been met. The promotion
of outcome-focused speciﬁcations rather than prescription of process has also been a very positive move.
However, there are still a number of key issues which impact upon procurement practice, particularly within
the Civil Service and Local Authorities:
3. Continued need for clarity where it relates to legal requirements:
(a) Continued fear at central government and local authority level of requirements of EU
procurement rules—need further clarity on levels at which these apply.
(b) Similarly, clarity on state aid.
(c) Some guidance has been vague with little indication of how to apply it practically—ie
“Authorities should also incorporate social issues into procurements where they are relevant
and proportionate to the subject matter of the contract.”31—this leaves local authorities tasked
with determining what the terms “relevant” and “proportionate” mean an applying judgements
as to when it is appropriate to consider “social issues” during the procurement process. We
would argue that the cabinet ofﬁce needs to lead with a clear concept of all issues to be
considered during a procurement process and offer deﬁnitions of when any speciﬁcs may apply.
Additionally, we would argue that “social issues” should form an intrinsic part of any
procurement consideration.
4. There are also some areas in which the Cabinet Ofﬁce guidance risks promoting an approach to
procurement which disadvantages smaller and local organisations, and particularly those from the third sector:
(a) Over-focused on Value for Money requirements set out by the Cabinet Ofﬁce.
(b) Still a varied range of procurement policies, many of which are biased towards delivery by
national, private organisations.
(c) Procurement still not viewed as a ﬂexible procedure—local authorities tend to adopt a “one
size ﬁts all” mentality despite CO guidance that they offer a “relevant and appropriate”32
approach for each purchase.
(d) “An Introduction to Public Procurement” states that: “At one end of the spectrum, a low value,
low risk, non-repeatable purchase requires little process, governance or expertise. It is therefore
probably best handled through the use of a Government Procurement Card (GPC).” While it is
important that Local Authorities are supported to develop efﬁcient procurement practices that
do not unnecessarily complicate or bureaucratise lower value exercises, it is key that process
and expertise are established to ensure a consistent and well thought out approach to
commissioning these services. This is particularly relevant for local voluntary and community
sector groups for whom one-off, low vale contracts may represent their primary experience
of procurement.
5. What should be the strategic aim of the Government's public procurement policy?
6. Public procurement should aim not only to secure goods and services required by the general population,
but also to do so in a way which supports the sustenance of a diverse marketplace and a range of providers
able to evidence clear additional beneﬁts to relevant communities. Hence the strategic aim of Government
procurement policy should focus on leveraging social value of beneﬁt to local and regional communities,
alongside value for money, as far as possible. This aim is supported in a recent draft resolution in the European
Parliament (in response to a public procurement Green Paper), which stated: “In order to develop the full
potential of public procurement, the criterion of lowest price should no longer be the determining one for the
award of contracts, and it should, in general, be replaced by the criterion of most economically advantageous
tender, in terms of economic, social and environmental beneﬁts—taking into account the entire life-cycle costs
of the relevant goods, services or works.”33 We would advocate the mandatory application of the Social Value
Act at all levels of procurement, not only where procurement practices exceed EU procurement thresholds, to
support this aim.
31 “A guide to Public Procurement”, Cabinet Ofﬁce
32 “A guide to Public Procurement”, Cabinet Ofﬁce
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7. Does the Government have the right skills and capabilities to procure effectively?
8. The Cabinet Ofﬁce Guide “An Introduction to Public Procurement” states that: “Contracting authorities
need to deploy strong personal and organisational commercial leadership, and, in most cases, procurement
activities need to be led by professionally trained staff.” However, we have identiﬁed a continued lack of
professional training for commissioners, particularly as Local Authority level. It is doubtful that this will be
solved through the Commissioning Academy due to the high costs of training a rolling/changing workforce,
and the expectation that specialist expertise (ie from the VCSE sector) will be willing to engage with this
process on an on-going basis without ﬁnancial compensation, in order to ensure that commissioners understand
the needs of their sectors.
9. Does the civil service have the skills and capabilities required to negotiate and manage contracts
effectively?
10. As above.
11. What skills do procurement authorities require in-house, what skills can be bought in and what skills can
be contracted out?
12. As a minimum, commissioners must be skilled in project management and procurement processes, and
have a clear understanding of relevant law and ﬁnance. Associated skills—for example HR—should be
available in-house, although not necessarily within the commissioning team. Where any skills or understanding
speciﬁc to a particular procurement exercise are required, the ﬁrst port of call for additional knowledge should
be engagement of and collaboration with existing specialists from across sectors, or a competitive dialogue
procedure. The use of external consultants should be a last-resort measure as they represent a high cost solution
resulting in little, if any, transfer of knowledge to the public sector and a corresponding failure to build the
capacity of existing commissioning bodies.
13. However, a caveat to the above is in the use of market engagement as a method of stimulating supplier
capacity. A number of national and regional voluntary sector bodies have produced guidance to support
procurement authorities in stimulating the local market across sectors—for instance by offering smaller
contracts or supporting the development of local delivery consortia. However, this does not equate to
encouraging organisations to move away from existing specialisms in order to win contracts. The Introduction
to Public Procurement does not differentiate, stating that bringing in “the right approach can help, for example,
in creating capacity where previously none had existed—perhaps by encouraging suppliers in an associated
sector to develop the new capabilities required.” This approach is concerning, as the VCSE sector has less
capability to develop and diversify into new areas without ﬁnancial support. Engaging representatives of the
private sector (who do not currently deliver similar services) in establishing requirements or capacity for
procurement, without the opportunity for additional support, may offer an unfair advantage in that this may
encourage private providers to move into previously untapped areas while VCSE representatives are unable to.
14. What lessons can central government learn from local government on procurement?
15. VCSE organisations have reported evidence of a risk-averse culture amongst local authorities, where
fear of legal challenges have in many cases led to unnecessarily complex and bureaucratic procurement
procedures. We would suggest that this extends to a reluctance to commission from the local voluntary sector
where private, often national, providers appear to offer expertise in dealing with procurement requirements.
16. Some examples of positive practice exist—for example, Lambeth Council have stripped the
commissioning process down to its ﬁrst principles, and remade it to reﬂect the requirements of the people who
live in the area. Norfolk have adopted a novel approach to the procurement of youth services based on local
priorities and with the engagement of the VCS and young people themselves through a number of locally
based commissioning boards. More information on Norfolk can be found in our recent report “A Return to
Ancient Truths” available at www.communitymatters.org.uk/returntoancienttruths .
17. The recent Social Enterprise UK “Shadow State” report lists an additional example of good practice on
a local level, in addition to one of good practice already existing at a national level, which we would urge
further exploration of. These are:
18. National Citizen Service:
19. Management fee for all lead organisations capped at 5%.
20. 75% of payment made in advance, so that smaller social enterprises and charities without large capital
reserves could afford to bid (23% of the groups had an annual turnover of less than £1 million).
21. 90% of organisations involved locally-based.
22. Liverpool City Council:
(a) Awarding contracts on the basis of local value, a pay-spine multiplier (that is, the difference
between salary at the top and at the bottom) and social interest (companies that reinvest their
proﬁts and are, preferably, asset locked—such as social enterprises).cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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23. How successful are government departments and their agencies at communicating their needs to potential
suppliers?
24. Local voluntary and community sector organisations experience a range of issues in accessing and
understanding the needs of public sector commissioners. Experiences differ across local authorities, but the
overall picture is one of badly-publicised procurement portals, short timescales on procurement processes and
ill-communicated commissioning cycles. Risk aversion has led to contracts of under the EU threshold being
presented with unnecessary complexity and contracts not subject to procurement regulations at all being
haphazardly included within or omitted from portals—thus giving an unclear and uneven impression of possible
opportunities for local organisations.
25. Where needs are delineated, the assumptions underlying these are sometimes poorly explained or based
on inadequate assumptions which do not take into account community requirements. For example, Norfolk
CC's decision to commission drug support services exclusively on a countywide basis led to Community
Matters' member the Iceni Partnership, a hugely well regarded and successful organisation operating across
Norwich, losing funding and services.
26. How should the civil service ensure it recruits and retains staff with the right skills to run procurements,
to negotiate and manage contracts and to deliver major projects effectively?
27. n/a.
28. Does the Government have the organisational structures in place to enable it to procure effectively? (For
example, how far should the Government centralise responsibility for public procurement? Do central
government procurement “framework agreements” enable more effective public procurement?)
29. As noted in the issues and questions paper, issues may arise where institutions set up in response to the
Localism agenda—such as free schools—are subject to procurement regulations they lack the skills or capacity
to fully comprehend. These organisations may beneﬁt from central government structures to allow for
centralised procurement of large scale goods and services or support for individual organisations to get to grips
with regulations. However, we would highlight that many of the goods and services required by an organisation
such as a free school would fall underneath current EU procurement thresholds, and therefore a key role for
central Government would be in clarifying these thresholds and reassuring commissioners where regulations
do not apply.
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Written evidence submitted by Urology Trade Association (PROC 20)
Summary
— The Urology Trade Association is the leading urology membership organisation, representing 95%
of urology manufacturers and suppliers.
— We are keen to see that public procurement policy, including skills and capabilities, looks beyond
short-term approaches when procuring medical devices such as catheters, and considers the long-
term impact of decisions made.
— Short-term approaches are likely to result in increased demands by patients on the health service—
including unnecessary emergency admissions—if cheaper, but less appropriate, medical devices are
procured for patients.
— The Government must engender a culture of long-term planning amongst procurement staff, in which
staff look at the long-term implications of procurement and are fully aware of the differences between
products available.
Background to the Urology Trade Association and Vision of Procurement
1. The Urology Trade Association (UTA) welcomes the opportunity to comment on the Public Administration
Select Committee's inquiry on public procurement, particularly in regards to the procurement of urology
appliances within the health system. In our response, we particularly focus on the following two questions:
(a) What should be the strategic aim of the Government's public procurement policy?
(b) Does the Government have the right skills and capabilities to procure effectively?
2. The UTA is the leading urology membership organisation representing 95% of urology product
manufacturers and suppliers to the urology appliance market.
3. While we are aware that this inquiry will focus on central government procurement, we do have some
concerns about NHS procurement which have implications for overall government ﬁnances. In addition, some
of the principles which we advocate would be beneﬁcial if applied across government.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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4. In particular, we are concerned about the arrangements made by some Primary Care Trusts (some of
which look likely to be continued by Clinical Commissioning Groups) which restrict patient and prescriber
choice of urology appliances. Such arrangements have signiﬁcant impacts on patients, the NHS, and public
funds. Not only are urology devices hugely important to many people in ensuring their quality of life and
independence are maintained and their dignity is preserved but patients who receive less suitable products may
have costly adverse reactions. The result can be greater wastage of products, an increased tendency towards
infection, and increased reliance on health and social care services rather than independence and self-care—all
with increased costs to health and social care services. It is worth noting that the average cost for the admission
of emergency urethral catheterisation resulting from infection is estimated in the region of £1,500 per patient,
per visit.
5. In the UK, an estimated six million people are affected by continence problems and many rely on urology
appliances on a daily basis. High quality urology appliances allow uses to manage their conditions, and avoid
repeated medical consultations, to the beneﬁt of both the individual and the wider NHS.
6. The new arrangements under Part IX of the Drug Tariff for the provision of stoma and urology
appliances—and related services—in primary care were published in April 2009 and came into force in April
2010. These provide a list of all the products for stoma care and urology and determine the prices that the
NHS should pay for each of the products. This list provides a reference for safe, clinical effective, and fairly
priced products for patients, clinicians and NHS staff to refer to.
7. These arrangements have a number of beneﬁts. For instance, when properly implemented they prevent
the formation of a postcode lottery by ensuring that any patient in any part of the country is able to access any
product prescribed by their GP, Nurse Independent Prescriber or Pharmacist Independent Prescriber. By setting
out an agreed and fair price for each product, the arrangements also have beneﬁts in terms of providing
transparency in pricing across the NHS and reducing price variation.
Procurement Staff and “Silo Budgeting”
8. The UTA believes that procurement staff working in the health ﬁeld should be encouraged to consider the
overall impact of their work on health outcomes, and of the health and social care budget, rather than simply
the immediate impact on their own area or budget. This principle of looking beyond immediate money-saving
concerns is one which would work well across the entirety of government procurement.
9. In addition, we recommend that procurement staff are well informed about the different kinds of products
they buy and the differences between them. For example, it is important for staff to be informed regarding the
differences between medical products such as catheters. Two different forms of catheter may appear to be very
similar, and indeed substitutable, to non-medical procurement staff, or indeed to a non-specialist clinician, but
small differences can make a real difference to patients and their ability to use the product. The impact of
procurement ofﬁcials' work on patients, and on overall budgets, is signiﬁcant and they should be aware of this.
10. It is widely recognised that reforms to the NHS over many years have failed to address so-called “silo
budgeting”, where staff look at the impact in their own small area or budget, without fully considering what
wider impacts this can have. We welcome a high-level political focus on more integrated commissioning and
procurement but this must be followed through and implemented by those who carry out the procurement
process.
11. As an example of silo budgeting, there is often a tendency in urology to steer patients towards cheaper
products through the use of tenders or formularies, which fail to take into account the wider costs and
implications that inappropriately short-term and narrow procurement will have. Ultimately, this will work
against the necessary commitment to save sums of money in the NHS, if patients receive less suitable products.
As previously mentioned, the costs of these are not only borne by the patient in discomfort and loss of dignity,
but also by the health and social care systems due to increased reliance on the health and social care service,
including unnecessary emergency admissions.
Conclusion and Recommendations
12. The UTA has several recommendations regarding public procurement which will be of beneﬁt to urology
manufacturers. We recommend that procurement staff are well informed about the different kinds of products
they buy and the differences between them. Similarly, procurement staff working in the health ﬁeld should be
encouraged to consider the overall impact of their work on health outcomes and the entire health and social
care budget, not simply their immediate area.
13. Speciﬁc to urology care, we believe that the Drug Tariff system needs to remain in place and to be
respected by local NHS organisations. This system supports innovation by providing a straightforward route to
market for new products while ensuring, for the health service and for patients, that products are both of a
high quality and good value for money, and that pricing is transparent and consistent. We also believe that
arrangements made by some PCTs that restrict patient and prescriber choice should be ended, given theircobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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negative impact on patients, the NHS and the Exchequer through the increased likelihood of costly adverse
reactions.
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Written evidence submitted by ASLEF (PROC 21)
1. The Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF) is the UK's largest train drivers'
union representing approximately 18,000 members in train operating companies and freight companies as well
as London Underground and light rail systems.
2. ASLEF welcomes the opportunity to comment on public procurement and in particular, the procurement
of services and goods in relation to rail franchising and rolling stock. Procurement within the rail industry
accounts for some of the larger contracts that the Government tenders. The Government subsidises the rail
industry by about £4 billion a year. These services are almost entirely undertaken by the private sector. Due to
the complicated and fragmented nature of the privatised railway, it is possible for things to go very wrong.
This was clearly demonstrated by the Intercity West Coast franchise debacle.
3. Procurement in terms of rolling stock has also been shown to fail the British economy, as demonstrated
by the Government's decision to award the Thameslink contract to Siemens rather than Bombardier who would
have built the new trains in the UK.
4. ASLEF deeply regrets the manner in which British Rail's rolling stock was virtually given away at the
time of privatisation following which very large fortunes were made as rolling stock companies (ROSCOs)
changed hands. We would contend that one of the greatest tragedies of rail privatisation is that it has precipitated
the terminal decline of the UK's near 200 year old rolling stock manufacturing capability while the value of
the ROSCOs themselves has risen so exponentially.
5. ASLEF would also point out that prior to the abolition of the Strategic Rail Authority in 2004, all rolling
stock orders were awarded to companies with a UK manufacturing base.
6. Subsequent procurements administered by the Department for Transport (DfT) have seen awards go to a
succession of foreign ﬁrms including Javelins for HS1 (Hitachi—Japan), the Intercity Express Programme
(Hitachi) and now Thameslink (Siemens—Germany). Contrastingly all rolling stock procurements conducted
by Transport for London (TfL) for the same period have gone to companies with a UK manufacturing
capability.
7. The union recognises that rolling stock is procured within frameworks set by European and international
law. Nevertheless, ASLEF's policy is that such regulations can only be seen to work fairly if the UK retains a
strong domestic manufacturer to compete with foreign companies. In the case of Thameslink the union also
believes that the Department for Transport should have taken into account the impact on the UK economy of
which country the trains were built in before it awarded the work.
8. We would contrast the DfT's approach to procurement with TfL's which encompasses the Greater London
Authority (GLA)'s Responsible Procurement Policy (RPP) which, among other things, encourages a diverse
base of suppliers, the promotion of fair employment practices, the promotion of workplace welfare (which
includes working with suppliers who do not discourage trade union membership among employees), meeting
strategic labour needs and community beneﬁts. We would point out that Siemens does not recognise trade
unions in its UK rail businesses.
9. It's worth considering that in France Bombardier's Crespin factory has a long term eight billion euro
order for 800 regional trains from SNCF which allows the company to invest heavily in the necessary
equipment conﬁdent that there will be the work to justify the investment. The very opposite scenario exists in
Derby where the incentive is to minimise investment without knowing when the next order is likely to arrive.
10. ASLEF has long argued that a domestic rolling stock manufacturing capability is vital to the integrity of
the UK rail industry. That's why the union supported Bombardier's bid for the Thameslink rolling stock
contract. Our senior representatives visited the factory in December 2009 and were hugely impressed by the
quality of design and manufacturing in Derby.
11. The union would also draw attention to the work of a number of organisations who have pointed out
that the reduction in tax revenues from the work being done outside the UK is more than the gap between the
two suppliers' bids.
12. We believe history shows that fast track procurement can be conducted efﬁciently and effectively. For
example, the procurement of the new Stansted express rolling stock in 2008 was conducted in seven and a half
months while in the same year the tendering process for the new London Overground rolling stock lasted 12
and a half months.
13. ASLEF very much regrets that since the DfT took responsibility for rolling stock procurement in 2004
that no contract has been awarded to a company with a UK manufacturing capability.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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14. The union urges the Committee to call on the Government to develop a strategy to encourage high-
technology manufacturing, using public procurement sensibly and creatively to ensure that wherever possible
UK taxpayers' money is spent supporting the UK economy.
15. The franchising process in the rail industry in extremely long, expensive and inefﬁcient. This was clearly
demonstrated by the West Coast Mainline debacle.
16. Firstly, the contracts that are offered leave all the risk with the taxpayer. Most rail franchises have
revenue protection clauses. These mean that if revenue falls below the ﬁgure predicted in the franchise bid,
the taxpayer tops up most of the shortfall. In effect this means that Train Operating Companies can enjoy the
proﬁts they make by providing the service, but very often will not have to suffer losses should they not perform
as they had predicted commercially. This means that Companies can be overly optimistic in their bids to assist
their likelihood of winning a service but also to ensure a minimum level of protection from reduced revenue
from the taxpayer at a higher level.
17. The current franchising system has created a situation where genuine competition is non-existent and
proﬁt is guaranteed at the cost of the taxpayer. This is demonstrated by the East Coast Mainline. Two companies
have handed the keys in simply due to them making less revenue than expected. GNER returned the keys on
9 December 2007. They did this following a period of ﬁnancial difﬁculty for their parent company. This was
in part due to GNER's poor proﬁtability, which had been linked to the company's overbidding for the ECML
franchise coupled with what proved to be crippling subsidy repayments to the Government.
18. After the tendering process, the national transport operator National Express Group was awarded the
franchise on 14 August 2007. In winning the franchise, National Express had agreed to pay the Department of
Transport £1.4 billion for the right to run the service until 2015. At the time rail analysts had speculated that
the Group had paid too much for the franchise. The National Express went on to default on these payments
thus giving up the franchise. The subsequent bail out by the taxpayer cost about £700 million.
19. The Government's policy is to have longer franchise periods. The theory behind this is that the longer
the franchise is, the more incentive there is for private investment by the TOCs who may well see returns for
their initial outlay. ASLEF are unsure whether this will provide any beneﬁt to the traveling public. Transport
Scotland's recent publication “Rail 2014” stated, “there is no conclusive evidence that longer contracts will
increase the level of investment from train operating companies.”
20. ASLEF notes research on franchises by KPMG which found that “our comparative analysis of UK train
operating companies (TOCs) has provided no conclusive evidence of the impact of contract length on
performance across the sample of operators that were studied”. It also suggests that longer term franchises
might lead to “increased ﬁnancial risk” affecting the agreement because bidders cannot foresee changes in
economic circumstances. In the current climate, it is difﬁcult enough to predict the economic situation we will
ﬁnd ourselves in next year. To try and predict circumstances in 10 to 15 years' time is entirely unrealistic.
21. The bidding process is also extremely expensive and leads to huge amounts of money leaving the
industry. Virgin clariﬁed that their bid for the West Coast Mainline cost £14 million and it is believed that the
total cost for the four bids will have been £50 million. This money is spent on lawyers, accountants and
consultants with each company having about 30 people working solely on the bid. This money should be spent
on improving services and keeping fares at a reasonable level.
22. It is the complicated, fragmented and the presumptuous nature of the franchising process that lead to the
West Coast Mainline ﬁasco. Whilst the union notes that the Brown Review considered the franchising process,
albeit within an extremely narrow remit. Brown's review called for small amendments to franchising whereas
wholesale change is needed.
23. For too long we have had a procurement system in rail, whether for rolling stock or the franchising
system, that has focussed on assisting companies make large proﬁts at very little risk. This has been to the
detriment of the wider British economy. Therefore both elements of rail procurement need to be examined and
completely reconsidered to ensure value for money for both taxpayers and passengers alike.
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Written evidence submitted by Colin Cram (PROC 22)
Summary
— The fundamentals of ﬁrst class procurement are:
— An agreed set of aims and objectives.
— A comprehensive understanding of procurement spend.
— The right organisational structure, with the right terms of reference, the necessary authority,
staffed with sufﬁcient staff of the right calibre and the training and accountability for delivering
the agreed aims.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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Taken overall, these are absent.
— The history of UK government attempts over the past 25 years can be summarised as desperate
attempts to patch up a seriously ﬂawed design. Successive governments have invested in trying to
improve the quality and coherence of central government and public sector procurement, but without
addressing the fundamental ﬂaws. The results have been disappointing overall, but there are some
very good procurement teams and the capability of procurement has generally increased.
— There now appears to be a greater determination in the Cabinet Ofﬁce to tackle the more fundamental
issues in government procurement. There seems evidence of resistance to this by other “Whitehall”
departments.
— Public procurement aims, as stated by HM Treasury, have changed little over the past 25 years. They
can be summarised as delivering value for money and supporting UK economic growth. They remain
largely valid.
— Despite improvements, including several very good procurement organisations and initiatives, the
aims have not been delivered overall. There has been limited buy-in by departments and other public
sector bodies.
— The investments by the Ofﬁce of Government Commerce (1999–2010), in improving the capability
of individual government departments, have increased the fragmentation of management of
procurement. This has been accentuated by big and uncoordinated investments in procurement by
government departments and other public sector bodies.
— The cost to the economy and to taxpayers of this failure to address the fundamental issues of public
sector procurement (some £200 billion a year expenditure, of which central government's share is
about £60 billion) has been huge. Just a 5% overall value for money improvement for the past 25
years would have been worth over £200 billion. More effective investment of just 5% of this
procurement spend in innovation and economic growth would also have been worth £200 billion.
— There is huge commonality in product and service categories procured by different parts of the public
sector and in the skills and capabilities required for contracting.
— The beneﬁts of rationalising civil government and wider public sector procurement through creating
a single “Crown” procurement organisation would be many and immense—22 are listed at
paragraph 14.
— This could be built organically on the Government Procurement Service.
— This would be consistent with the proposed central government shared services initiative
announced recently.
— Within 5 years it could embrace much of the wider public sector.
— It would need to be organised centrally with regional and specialist/functional hubs.
— This would provide a solution to projects issues identiﬁed in paragraph 40 of the House of
Lords 6th Report of 2012–13, The accountability of civil servants')
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldselect/ldconst/61/61.pdf
— It should prevent contracting ﬁascos such as that of the West Coast Line from recurring.
— It will reduce risks of corruption and favouritism—which the national Fraud Authority estimates
to be worth some 2% of procurement spend.
— A purchase spend analysis throughout the public sector should be done annually. It is possible to do
this despite the diverse ﬁnance systems.
— The skills and expertise required mostly exist. The fragmentation of public sector procurement
management means that overall they are not used effectively. A coherent procurement structure
would enable a gap analysis to be undertaken and any gaps ﬁlled.
— Local government procurement remains, despite some excellent initiatives, collaborations and several
procurement agencies, chaotic overall. The cost of this lack of coherence is immense, both in terms
of money and services to the most vulnerable.
— Framework agreements are normally less than ideal, but will remain necessary for as long public
sector procurement remains fragmented.
— Blaming EU Procurement Directives is often a cover for incompetence.
— The EU procurement directives have been responsible for increased procurement
professionalism in much of the public sector.
— There is some room for improvement, but overall they do not inhibit the application of best
practice.
— Most public sector procurement organisations fail to take advantage of useful provisions in
the Directives.
— Without the Directives, it is doubtful if Virgin could have appealed successfully against the
award of the West Coast Main Line contract to First Group.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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— The government's initiatives to increase expenditure with SMEs are generally to be supported. There
is more that could be done. The “aspiration” should be re-deﬁned and more targeted to link it more
clearly with supporting innovation and economic growth.
— The proposed “Crown” procurement should provide a service to “free schools”. They are most
unlikely to have the specialist skills to do the contracting and should not attempt it. The EU
Procurement Directives are a side issue.
Response to Public Administration Committee’s “Procurement: Issues and Questions Paper”
Government Procurement Policies: A Historic Perspective.
1. Government procurement policies have changed little in the past 25 years. In essence, they are about
securing value for money and supporting economic growth. Appendix A illustrates this with a copy of the
government's purchasing policies from the 1989 edition of HM Treasury's Government Accounting. (See also
Note 1). They were devised in the early days of the Central Unit on Procurement, set up in 1985 as a catalyst
to improve central government procurement, largely as a response to my reviews. Apart from myself, all the
procurement professionals were on loan from the private sector. So the policies were developed by private
sector personnel who were used to having to deliver a variety of competing objectives in order to ensure the
short, medium and long term competitiveness of their organisations.
2. Successive governments have exhorted public sector organisations and procurement personnel to deliver
these policies. However, the vast majority of government departments and public sector organisations have
focused on the immediate interests of their own organisations, rather than the broader public interest.
Government and the rather chaotic wider public sector procurement (eg local government, the NHS, education)
are not structured in a way that enables coherent implementation. The immense scale of central government
procurement spend (excluding the NHS), at around £60 billion a year, and a further £125 billion+ in the wider
public sector, means that this policy failure matters. Just a 5% value for money beneﬁt over the past 25 years
could have saved £200 billion. Investing an extra 5% of public sector procurement spend into achieving UK
economic growth would have been worth £200 billion.
Strategic Aims for Government Procurement?
3. There should be ﬁve aims:
(1) Secure value for money for the taxpayer;
(2) Support economic growth;
(3) Support departmental and organisational objectives;
(4) Provide expert, independent and impartial advice on the best commercial strategies to deliver
departmental and organisational objectives;
(5) Provide assurance of probity and that best practice has been followed within the department and
departmental families, including local government, education and the NHS.
All the above aims have national and departmental dimensions.
4. Deﬁning value for money is complex, but Government Accounting in 1989 provides a good explanation
(See Appendix). Measuring value for money is open to distortion. When assessing purchasing performance,
the most common measure is price However, reduced prices do not necessarily mean reduced cost. If ﬁnance
directors are unable to recycle “savings” either to use in other parts of the business or to enable the business
to be run with a reduced budget, price reductions may be swallowed up in inefﬁciencies. This means that the
objectives of procurement personnel are often out of line with those of ﬁnance directors, which can explain a
reluctance to invest in procurement. A focus on price reductions risks distorting procurement strategies towards
commodities rather than developing strategies that are much more closely aligned with organisational objectives
and may be able to deliver much bigger beneﬁts (See Note 2).
Note 1: Colin Cram, Fuelling the Public Sector Procurement Engine
http://blog.supplymanagement.com/2012/08/fuelling-the-public-sector-procurement-engine/
Analysing Public Sector Procurement Expenditure
5. Understanding how the public sector spends its money is fundamental to its effective management. (See
Note 3). Despite the multitude of disparate ﬁnance systems, it can be done. I have demonstrated three times in
very different environments (as Director of the North Western Universities Purchasing Consortium, Director
of the Research Councils Procurement Organisation and Director of the North West Centre of Excellence,
which covered 47 local authorities) that it is possible to download raw transactional spend data from any
ﬁnance system, merge it with data from those of other organisations, run the combined data against Companies
House databases and thus build a comprehensive picture of procurement spend by participating organisations.
This includes total spend, spend by procuring organisation, joint spend by with each supplier (including an
understanding of spend with common suppliers), spend into each post code area (hence an understanding of
the impact on different local economies), spend with SMEs and spend by commodity/service. The Local
Government Association, a couple of years ago, sponsored a purchase spend analysis in which many (thoughcobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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not the majority) of local authorities took part. The Government Procurement Service is attempting to get a
greater grip on this for central government. However, the information would appear to be less than
comprehensive.
6. Given the importance of the £200 billion public sector procurement spend, one would expect such an
analysis to be done at least once a year throughout the public sector. Imagine the consequences to “Tesco”, for
example, of not having such data. There is great commonality of types of spend and suppliers throughout the
public sector. The lack of a comprehensive database is a fundamental failure.
Addressing the Structure of Government Procurement.
7. There has been a long term failure by successive governments and senior managers in the public sector
to address the fundamental ﬂaws in public sector procurement. Instead large sums of money have been invested
in patching up procurement. Despite improvements, this investment has not delivered the hoped for results.
8. Part of this investment was to encourage collaborative procurement between government departments.
The continuation of HM Treasury's Central Unit of Purchasing (paragraph 1 refers) beyond its original 3 year
life resulted in only limited collaboration. Following a review by Lord Gershon in 1999, the Ofﬁce of
Government Commerce replaced it with a much larger budget of 10s of £million . Despite some very good
initiatives, such as the “Gateway”, too much of its resources were spent trying to improve the procurement
professionalism within individual government departments; this increased the fragmentation of central
government procurement, but produced an excellent income for consultants. The result was big and
uncoordinated investments in procurement organisations by most central government departments, the creation
of tens—possibly hundreds of heads/directors of procurement positions, a big increase in training and big
increases in salaries and grading. Many will have a vested interest in arguing for minimal change.
Note 2: Colin Cram, Procurement can help public managers boost economy
http://www.guardian.co.uk/public-leaders-network/2011/dec/16/public-sector-procurement-boost-economy
Note 3: Colin Cram, What happens to our £220 billion annual procurement spend?
http://www.guardian.co.uk/public-leaders-network/blog/2011/apr/15/what-happens-200bn-annual-procurement-
spend
9. The questionable nature of this investment was clear when the present government came to power in
2010. The value of central government procurement spend was not known, the percentage of procurement
spend with SMEs was not known and Francis Maude was able to negotiate savings, “cash-backs”, of £800m
with government suppliers, that had hitherto been dealt with separately by each department. The downside of
this negotiation is that a senior person who works for one of those companies indicated recently to me that
they hoped to recoup this money from the rest of the public sector, where the procurement spend is managed
even less coherently. It is worth noting that the expenditure with these suppliers is frequently greater in the
wider public sector than it is in central government, hence an argument for a public sector wide approach.
10. The present government, through the Cabinet Ofﬁce, has more vigorously tried to pull things together
and greater joint procurement is beginning to take place, for example through the Government Procurement
Service taking over the Home Ofﬁce Procurement Centre of Excellence and its partnership with research
councils procurement to provide support to departments with the delivery of high value and more complex
procurements. DWP is providing a procurement service to several smaller departments.
Beneﬁts of a Single “Crown Commercial” Organisation.
11. Creating a single “Crown Commercial” or “Crown Procurement” organisation would address the
weaknesses. The model would be a central procurement hub, serving the whole of central government and,
ideally, the wider public sector. To serve the wider public sector would also require regionally based ofﬁces
and specialist category teams. The rationale and how this could work is described in more detail in “Towards
Tesco”, commissioned by the Institute of Directors in 2010. (See Note 4) This has attracted attention
internationally. (See Note 5)
12. There is plenty of evidence to support this proposal from my experience of creating joint and
collaborative procurement organisations. For example, the procurement savings from my creation of a single
procurement organisation for the Beneﬁts Agency in the early mid 1990s worked out at around 15–20% overall
(£50m) against an annual spend (excluding major one off contracts) of around £300m. This saving was largely
against previously tendered contracts. Two years after I left the research councils, having created a joint
procurement organisation serving 5 of them, the management board for the joint organisation minuted that the
initiative would save £170m in 10 years. This would be achieved without the introduction of new IT.
Note 4: Colin Cram, Towards Tesco:
https://www.iod.com/MainWebSite/Resources/Document/policy_article_towards_tesco.pdf
Note 5: Colin Cram, Hands on approach to procurement
http://www.guardian.co.uk/public-leaders-network/blogcobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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13. In 1996, the then Director of Procurement at Inland Revenue, John Cavell, and I (as Director of Contracts
at the Beneﬁts Agency—covering the Department of Social Security as a whole) assessed that given the
commonality of procurement—commodities, services, suppliers, together with the common expertise
requirements of the teams, there could be merit in creating a joint procurement organisation to cover both
departments. A study was commissioned and undertaken by Dr Brian Farrington, formerly head of St Helens
Business School. He concluded that there was an overwhelming case for the proposal. However, internal
politics prevented it from going ahead. Had it done so and proved successful, other central government
departments would almost certainly have joined and the creation of a single powerful and effective procurement
organisation for central civil government would have occurred naturally. Total potential beneﬁts since then
would have been £billions—possibly £10s of billions—a great opportunity missed and a huge waste of
taxpayers' money.
14. Beneﬁts of a “Crown Procurement” organisation would be immense and should include
— Consistent standards, processes, procedures and contracts documentation.
— Consistent interpretation of the law and EU procurement directives.
— The costs of procurement and the numbers engaged in it would be known (which they are not
at present).
— Breaking down silos between departments to ensure that projects and programmes that are
interlinked, or potentially inter-connected, are harmonised and a coherent procurement strategy
developed.
— Independence, to be able to challenge departmental commercial and procurement strategies, including
project concepts and implementation.
— Independence, in order to bring objectivity to all procurement and commercial decision making and
reduce the risk of corruption and fraud. (See Note 6).
— Deﬁned and agreed levels of service. Service level agreements with each department would deﬁne
both the services to be provided and the responsibilities of departments (legal and practical
responsibilities) to enable a ﬁrst class service to be provided).
— Performance Measurement: A consistent, transparent and auditable approach.
— Specialist teams to manage key markets and major suppliers.
— Capability and assurance that projects are supported by ﬁrst class procurement strategies and practice
(This would solve the problem identiﬁed in paragraph 40 of the House of Lords 6th Report of
2012–13, The accountability of civil servants'). http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/
ldselect/ldconst/61/61.pdf
Note 6: Colin Cram, Samuel Pepys' Procurement Principles for Defence Chiefs
http://www.guardian.co.uk/public-leaders-network/2012/oct/16/samuel-pepys-procurement-defence-chiefs
— Specialist teams to manage major contracts and the procurement element of projects, thus ensuring
continuity and solving the problem highlighted by the House of Lords report referred to above.
— Oversight of the market to reduce the risk of cartels (Paragraph refers).
— Consistent speciﬁcations, ensuring that divergence from these are the exception.
— Much easier for suppliers to engage with government, knowing that they were always dealing with
ﬁrst class professional teams who understood their business and markets.
— Accountability for delivering government policies and results.
— Ability to take on companies that avoid UK corporation tax (See Note 7).
— Accountability for delivering departmental objectives.
— Support for and consistency with the proposed back ofﬁce shared services initiative (announced in
the past few days) for central government departments.
— Procurement research capability.
— Ability to implement more evidence based procurement policies (See Note 8).
— A complete inventory and gap analysis of skills and expertise.
— The possession and further development of the expertise needed.
— Good career paths and personal development for procurement staff, thus retaining expertise.
15. Based on my experience of creating joint procurement organisations, the number and cost of government
procurement staff would be reduced by a good 20%, whilst at the same time being able to increase the number
of contracting staff, ie increasing the expertise available.
16. Notwithstanding the growth of some powerful and respected procurement teams in the largest
departments such as Revenue and Customs and DWP, most of the beneﬁts mentioned above are largely lacking
at present. The argument for a single “Crown Commercial” organisation would seem overwhelming.
17. The major departments would need to retain commercial directors to develop and oversee the commercial
strategies with the departmental stakeholders and “Crown” procurement.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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18. Oversight by the National Audit Ofﬁce would be essential. There would need to be oversight also by a
management board consisting or representatives of the major departments plus 2 or 3 from medium sized and
smaller ones. There is an argument that such a board should be chaired by a member of HM Treasury.
19. The proposed organisation could be developed by the Government Procurement Service taking over
responsibility for all the procurement of smaller and medium sized departments and eventually the largest ones.
At the same time, there is huge commonality between what is purchased and the supply base of the wider
public sector. So the GPS should take over the procurement of those bodies also.
Within 5 years time, UK public sector procurement could be transformed and could be genuinely the envy
of the world.
Note 7: Colin Cram, Taking suppliers' tax payment into account on public contracts
http://www.guardian.co.uk/public-leaders-network/2012/dec/11/government-suppliers-tax-public-contracts
Note 8: Colin Cram, Public procurement: Time for evidence based policy
http://www.guardian.co.uk/public-leaders-network/2012/apr/05/public-procurement-evidence-based-policy
Skill and Capabilities
20. Fragmentation of government and public sector procurement generally, means that procurement skills
between (and sometimes within) departments are unevenly distributed and tend to be available only to those
organisations in which they reside. Smaller departments—ie the vast majority, will not be able to afford enough
people with the specialist capability and skills for all occasions. So, they either make do with what they have
got (and risk sub-optimal results) or employ consultants. Even if they could afford the specialists, their specialist
knowledge and skills would be under-used. Therefore, only the very largest departments or specialist
organisations can have a procurement organisation with sufﬁcient critical mass to possess all the expertise and
skills required and to be able to sustain this through developing staff. (See Note 9) A coherent procurement
structure would enable a satisfactory gap analysis could be done and a much more focused and cost effective
training programme designed to embed world class practices.
Lessons from Local Government
21. There are some examples of very good practice in local government. However, the procurement
capability of local authorities varies and the majority have insufﬁcient spending power to secure value for
money. Overall, local government procurement remains pretty chaotic and collaboration is weak.
— Excellent initiatives on construction by Hampshire County Council and SCAPE indicate potential
savings of 20% if all councils joined in.
— The lack of coordination of social care procurement is responsible for failing to prevent the Southern
Cross care homes scandal and the children's homes scandal in Rochdale and elsewhere (See Notes
10 and 11).
— Lack of joined up working in the NHS and local government enabled construction cartels to ﬂourish
(See Note 12).
— There are some superb initiatives on waste collection and management, the unitary council of
Cheshire West and Chester saving over 35% through innovation and merging the services of several
former councils. If all councils worked together on this the beneﬁts could be huge.
— There is increasing collaboration through purchasing consortia.
Note 9: Colin Cram, Lord Heseltine's expensive “sticking plaster” for public sector procurement
http://www.guardian.co.uk/public-leaders-network/2012/nov/12/lord-heseltine-public-sector-procurement
Note 10: Colin Cram, Care home procurement model fails vulnerable children
http://www.guardian.co.uk/social-care-network/2012/aug/13/care-home-procurement-children
Note 11: Colin Cram, Coordinating Social Care Procurement
http://www.guardian.co.uk/public-leaders-network/2011/jun/13/coherent-social-care-procurement
Note 12: The Telegraph, Construction cartel “may have cost taxpayer £300m”
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ﬁnance/newsbysector/constructionandproperty/2788332/Construction-cartel-may-
have-cost-taxpayer-300-million.html
22. There is some evidence that EU procurement directives may be tested by some of the large back ofﬁce
outsourcings and where chief executives seem able to over-ride effective competition in favour of their
preferred supplier. This can make it virtually impossible for new and innovative suppliers to break into the
market.
23. The lessons from local government are that joined up services can deliver very large savings. However,
failure to implement joint procurement wastes large amounts of money and can deliver poor services.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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Framework Agreements
24. In the absence of joint procurement, framework agreements can assist in securing better value for money.
The major part of the tendering exercise is done once on behalf of all who intend to use it. That is good for
suppliers as well as saving duplication and public sector resources. However, the lack of commitment from
those organisations seeking to use the frameworks means that volumes cannot be guaranteed and so suppliers
will rarely offer the best prices. The Government Procurement Service should be able to use the leverage of
central government departments to secure best value, of which other parts of the public sector would wish to
take advantage. However, the latest GPS procurement spend ﬁgures suggest there may be some backsliding. If
all departments (and, ideally the rest of the public sector) committed, value should be unbeatable. For example,
the Government Procurement Service was recently able to use its leverage on photocopiers, delivering savings
of up to 50%.
25. An alternative to frameworks is to let contracts for use only by those organisations that are prepared to
commit up front. I introduced this when Director of the North West Universities' Purchasing Consortium and
this has delivered some large beneﬁts.
26. In conclusion, many of the framework agreements are necessary because public sector procurement is
not joined up.
EU Procurement Directives
27. Blaming the EU Procurement Directives is often a cover for incompetence. There is much mythology
about them. They have compelled many public sector organisations to improve procurement standards. They
have enabled good procurement directors to argue for more resources and authority. They provided Virgin with
a right to appeal against the award of the West Coast Main Line contract to First Group and the standstill
period of 10 days meant that Virgin had time to appeal (See Note 13). They have forced much more discipline
in processes, for example, having to determine evaluation criteria and weightings at the start of the process—
very sensible and a means of reducing corruption and favouritism. EU Procurement Directive timescales are
short.
Note 13: Colin Cram, West Coast Rail Fiasco
http://www.guardian.co.uk/public-leaders-network/2012/oct/03/west-coast-rail-ﬁasco-procurement
28. Opportunities allowed by the EU procurement directives to be more entrepreneurial are often not used
by most UK public sector contracting authorities. Pre-commercial procurement, ie discussions with industry
before the formal procurement process starts are a good example. The Dynamic Purchasing System has rarely
been used (though some simpliﬁcation would help).
29. In local government, councils' legal teams tend to interpret the directives differently, some taking an
overly cautious approach. This problem exists to some degree in other parts of the public sector. Consistent
interpretation is essential—another argument for a public sector wide procurement organisation.
30. The directives make establishing partnerships with suppliers more difﬁcult and some of the timescales
for re-tendering of procurement agreements for repeat purchases or contracts for services are short.
31. It is often argued that EU thresholds for tendering are too low. However, central government and the
NHS are governed by the much wider international GPA agreement, the thresholds of which are lower. So,
increasing the EU thresholds will have little impact on central government and the NHS.
SMEs.
32. It has been government policy for over 25 years to increase public sector spend with SMEs. This was
because of assertions in the mid 1980s in the USA that SMEs were the main drivers of increased employment.
More recently, in the UK it has been argued that SMEs are more innovative than other suppliers and so can
further drive economic growth. Little or no progress was made until the current government. It has introduced
various practical initiatives to increase the proportion of spend with SMEs. However, there has been confusion
over the target and whether it is an aspiration. Also, it is not clear that increasing the proportion of spend with
SMEs will deliver the beneﬁts of innovation and economic growth that the government is seeking (See Note
14 and the House of Lords Science and Technology Select Committee report “Public Procurement as a Tool to
Stimulate Innovation”).
33. There are many more things that the government could do to increase spend with SMEs and drive
innovation. I am drafting a 15 point list of actions—in addition to those that the government is already taking—
that the government could adopt to achieve these objectives (See Note 15).
34. However, there seem to have been some question marks over the reliability of central government's data
on spend with SMEs. It would make sense to sponsor research to understand better the relationship between
SMEs, innovation and economic growth. This, together with a detailed and comprehensive purchase spend
analysis would be helpful in assessing where the focus should be, what a meaningful target should be and how
it could be achieved.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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Note 14: Colin Cram, Government focuses procurement on SMEs, but problems lie elsewhere
http://www.guardian.co.uk/public-leaders-network/blog/2011/mar/23/government-focus-smes-problem-
innovation
Note 15: Colin Cram, Time for public sector action on SME procurement spend
http://www.guardian.co.uk/public-leaders-network/2011/nov/14/public-sector-sme-procurement
Project Failures
35. Cost over-runs occur for a variety of reasons:
(1) Deliberately under-estimating the cost in order to get a project agreed, knowing that once started the
ﬁnance will be found to cover the escalating costs.
(2) Uncontrolled changes to speciﬁcations—extras, amendments etc.
(3) Poor project management and procurement.
(4) Poorly researched business case. In such instances procurement may not have the independence or
capability to challenge effectively.
(5) Deliberate over-statement of the potential beneﬁts (by £170m in at least one project recently criticised
by the NAO).
(6) The possibility of corruption cannot be ignored. There have been several cases in the USA of projects
going ahead when they shouldn't, due to corruption. The UK seems to be rather naive about the
possibilities. If any senior person obtains work, on retirement or after leaving the public sector from
a supplier that could have beneﬁted from their policy or other decisions, the possibility of corruption
should be considered as a matter of course. Equally, what appears to be incompetence, such as what
happened with the West Coast Rail contracting, must be considered as a possibility for corruption.
Only through the ability to challenge under the EU Procurement Directives, were the serious
contracting issues identiﬁed. (Note 12 refers)
(7) A failure to understand the changes needed to the organisation and to the roles of people within it
in order to secure the beneﬁts. This is common with outsourcings and has been identiﬁed as an issue
in a yet unpublished paper by the Manchester Institute of Innovation Research at Manchester
Business School (Part of Manchester University).
(8) Over-optimism by suppliers.
36. It is astonishing that such problems continue to occur. The introduction of the “Gateway” reviews in
about 2000 should have prevented this. The West Coast Rail project was “Gateway” reviewed. It is not clear
from the Laidlaw report why the Gateway reviews failed to spot the issues.
37. Introducing the “Crown Commercial” organisation recommended above would reduce the risk of projects
going ahead that shouldn't. The risk of projects not being managed and implemented properly would be much
reduced. Such an organisation would be able to ensure that expert teams remained responsible for the contracts
management throughout their life. This would provide a solution to projects issues identiﬁed in paragraph 40
of the House of Lords 6th Report of 2012–13, “The accountability of civil servants”)
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldselect/ldconst/61/61.pdf
Education and Defence
38. Either the Government Procurement Service, the Department of Education or the proposed “Crown”
procurement organisation should provide a contracting service to “free schools”. They are most unlikely to
have the specialist skills to do the contracting and should not attempt it. The EU Procurement Directives are a
side issue.
39. The idea of a GOCO for the Ministry of Defence is an interesting idea and needs to be properly explored.
(See Note 16)
Note 16: Colin Cram, A GOCO offers a good deal to the MOD
http://www.publicservice.co.uk/feature_story.asp?id=20546cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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APPENDIX:
Government Procurement Policies, Extract from 1989 Copy of Government Accounting
Useful Further Reading:
1. Towards Tesco, Colin Cram. Published by the Institute of Directors, March 2010
https://www.iod.com/MainWebSite/Resources/Document/policy_article_towards_tesco.pdf
2. Guardian's Public Leaders Network, Colin Cram.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/proﬁle/colin-cram
January 2013
Written evidence submitted by MRS Policy Unit (PROC 23)
Summary
— Not all procurement is the same and a one size ﬁts all approach works against effective and efﬁcient
procurement, and can stiﬂe innovation and jeopardize optimum outcomes.
— Market, social, opinion and economic research are all used to support critical policy and operational
decisions in all areas of public life. When procuring research, government is procuring evidence on
which important decisions are based. The procurement practices should be structured to reﬂect this.
— Research is an intellectual capital and creative service depending on skills, training and intellectual
capacity. It is highly labour intensive, which requires high levels of customisation and interaction
between procurers and suppliers, which can be achieved without conﬂicting with European
legislative restrictions.
— Any criteria used to evaluate service procurement which is based on a high level of intellectual
capital such as research, should be based on assessing whether a proposed solution is ﬁt for purpose
and good value for money; not on lowest cost. Lowest cost does not equate with value for money.
— MRS welcomes Cabinet Ofﬁce initiatives to open Government contracts to SMEs and to improve
public sector procurement.
— The Civil Service overall has the necessary skills to procure research services, via the network of
excellent government researchers and experienced procurement professionals who have expertise
built-up in public service evidence generation, but these skills are dispersed across Government and
are not located centrally.
— Any procurement of research within the public sector must include research specialists who can
advise on framing the business or policy problem to be addressed and the suitability of proposed
solutions.
— The procurement process must permit and foster communication between buyers and suppliers, with
reference to their information, policy and business needs, and not over-rely on technology to drive
efﬁciency. Communication and consultation early in procurement is considerably more efﬁcient in
the longer-term.
— Administrative procedures should be signiﬁcantly streamlined, enhancing efﬁciency and
effectiveness, by adopting some simple changes eg standardising core documentation and information
requirements, and storing such information centrally.
Introduction: About MRS and the Research Market
The Market Research Society (MRS) is the world's largest research association. It's for everyone with
professional equity in market, social and opinion research and in business intelligence, market analysis,
customer insight and consultancy. MRS supports best practice by setting and enforcing industry standards. The
commitment to uphold the MRS Code of Conduct is supported by the Codeline service and a wide range of
specialist guidelines.
The UK is the second largest research market in the world (second to the US) and the UK research sector
is recognised as leading the way in the development of creative and innovative research approaches.
According to the Ofﬁce for National Statistics' (ONS) Annual Business Survey34 it is estimated that the
total UK turnover of the 3,143 enterprises involved in market research and opinion polling to be £3,401 million
in 2010. Further in 2012, MRS with PWC undertook an assessment of the size and impact of the UK research
and evidence market, producing the MRS report The Business of Evidence.35 One of the main ﬁndings from
this report is the that the UK “business of evidence” market is substantially larger than previously estimated,
employing up to 59,000 people and generating £3 billion in annual gross value added (GVA).
34 Ofﬁce of National Statistics (ONS), (2011) Annual Business Survey. Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) 73.2: Market
research and opinion polling.
35 See www.mrs.org.uk/pdf/The_Business_of_Evidence_Final_08102012.pdf for a copy of the full report.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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Within the research market, the supplier market is dominated by SMEs. For example, based on the MRS
2010 League Tables,36 outside the Top 15 companies, all other suppliers are SMEs and there are a considerable
number of small and micro business suppliers.
MRS’s Current Procurement Position
In 2011 MRS contributed to a pan-European research response to the European Commission's Green Paper
on the modernisation of EU public procurement policy.37 Within this response recommendations were made
on improvements that could be made to research procurement within the Europe.
In 2012, MRS engaged with the Government Procurement Service (GPS) to advise on the arrangements for
procuring market research following the closure of the COI.
In response to the GPS's request for further information, MRS undertook extensive consultation with MRS
stakeholders, including research suppliers and in-house government research buyers; following which MRS
compiled a report submitted to the GPS, Improving Market Research Procurement: MRS Recommendations on
the Creation of Framework 2 for Research Services.38 Within this report there are numerous recommendations
on how the GPS could not only to improve the efﬁciency and effectiveness of research procurement but, in
doing so, reinforce the competitiveness of the UK.
MRS is also leading, with the Social Research Association, a Research Commissioning Group which is
working to improve the practice of public sector research procurement. The Group consists of representatives
of different types of research provider, together with social researchers and procurement staff working in
government.
Response to the Issues and Questions Paper
1. How successful has the Cabinet Ofﬁce been at improving public procurement policy and practice?
1.1 MRS welcomes the recent work by the Cabinet Ofﬁce to improve procurement, in particular to improve
access by and opportunities for SMEs.
1.2 The launch of Contract Finder and the elimination of PQQs for central government contracts are generally
welcome developments.
1.3 However, whilst the Cabinet Ofﬁce efforts are laudable, they have not as yet had a signiﬁcant effect on
research procurement policy and practice. There was little evidence of the Cabinet Ofﬁce's recommendations
being taken on board during MRS's recent experience with the GPS in regard to the replacement research
framework following the closure of the COI.
2. What should be the strategic aim of the Government's public procurement policy?
2.2. For research procurement the strategic aim of the Government's procurement policy should:
2.2.1 reduce costs and improve value for money via “intelligent procurement” of research services ie
buying research that addresses speciﬁc business or policy challenges within Government, is ﬁt
for purpose and good value for money; not necessarily lowest cost. Lowest cost does not equate
with value for money;
2.2.2 reduce administration by reducing duplication and waste eg standardising core documentation
and information requirements (eg Health & Safety policies, data protection and so on) and
storing such information centrally;
2.2.3 build on what already works within Government by utilising the capability and knowledge that
has already been invested in government research data and insight eg utilising the effective
elements of the former COI framework and developing these;
2.2.4 support SMEs for example by signiﬁcantly reviewing the Government's standard terms and
conditions which place a disproportionate burden on SMEs such as unlimited indemnities,
warranties, etc;
2.2.5 ensure procured research is legal, ethical, in accordance with research standards and bought
only from reputable, regulated research suppliers. In an era of high levels of public and press
scrutiny, conﬁdence in the quality of research evidence used must be high, and this can only
be guaranteed if regulated suppliers are used; and
36 See www.mrs.org.uk/intelligence/industry_statistics for more information about the MRS league tables.
37 The response was prepared by EFAMRO and ESOMAR and is available via http://www.efamro.eu/Files/
2011–04–18%20EFAMRO%20ESOMAR%20procurement.pdf
38 See www.mrs.org.uk/pdf/MRS_Procurement_document_for_GPS%20_FINAL_version.pdf for a copy of the full MRS report.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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2.2.6 support innovation and ensure best practice by retaining some ﬂexibility in procurement
approaches. The UK is the world's second largest research market after the US, and is
characterised by the innovation and adaptability of its research specialists. In order to ensure
Government has access to the most up-to-date and innovative methods and ideas, access to
government contracts should be ﬂexible with a degree of openness to enable access to new
suppliers entering the market.
3. Does the Government have the right skills and capabilities to procure effectively?
—Does the civil service have the skills and capabilities required to negotiate and manage contracts
effectively?
3.1 In regard to research, the civil service has the skills and capabilities required to negotiate and manage
research contracts effectively. The issue is that the expertise is not located in procurement departments, but
rather spread throughout the civil service.
3.2 One of the main beneﬁts of the COI approach to buying research was that researchers were employed
within COI who understood research and knew how to buy it effectively.
3.3 The skilled professionals who understand how to purchase research effectively should be able to do so
with a greater degree of discretion. At present there is a tendency for civil servants to go beyond the
requirements of the EU Procurement Directive to ensure full adherence to the legislation. More speciﬁc detailed
advice from the Cabinet Ofﬁce, allowing for discretion, would signiﬁcantly assist this situation.
—What skills do procurement authorities require in-house, what skills can be bought in and what skills can
be contracted out?
3.4 Good research procurement demands expertise in procurement techniques, together with a sound
knowledge of the methods of research and analysis, and an understanding of the policy or delivery area.
Without specialist research knowledge, poor research can be purchased which does not address the business or
policy challenges or problems it is sought to answer.
3.5 The Government model for research procurement has traditionally applied a combination of research
and policy subject skills, with expertise in procurement, and this model was largely successful. A similar
approach is required going forward.
—What lessons can central government learn from local government on procurement?
3.6 On the whole, anecdotal experience gathered by MRS is that central Government is more effective at
procuring research services than local Government, as it does so much more often and on a larger scale.
3.7 Recently there have been some research procurement tenders which have been conducted centrally on
behalf of local government. The impact of this has been that local suppliers are suffering with larger, nationally
based suppliers faring better. This approach appears to be at odds with the Government's broader localism
agenda.
—How successful are government departments and their agencies at communicating their needs to potential
suppliers?
3.8 Communication is essential in deﬁning the business or policy problem that research is to address.
Research is not a widgets business, it is an intellectual capital professional service, and its procurement cannot
be standardised or centralised without loss of efﬁcacy or value for money. Research procurement has worked
well where in-house Government researchers and research procurement professionals work together to ensure
the right and best research solutions are being procured within Government.
3.9 One of the key issues with centralised procurement is that government departments may be restricted to
requesting particular (and “lower cost”) research methodologies, without reference to whether these
methodologies will obtain the appropriate insight and evidence to meet the required information, policy and
business needs.
3.10 Any framework for procurement of research must be sufﬁciently ﬂexible to clearly understand and
document the policy and business needs of end buyers of research, who should not be expected to deﬁne their
needs in research methodologies but rather by research business specialism.
4. How should the civil service ensure it recruits and retains staff with the right skills to run procurements, to
negotiate and manage contracts and to deliver major projects effectively?
4.1 The skills of managing procurement are not so unique that civil servants cannot develop them with
appropriate experience. What determines effective and efﬁcient research procurement is that individuals are
trained to understand the three main angles:
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4.1.2 the right research approaches that can address this business/policy need; and
4.1.3 understanding how to undertake procurement to meet these needs.
4.2 Without the training in all requirements effective research procurement cannot result. If centralised
procurement is to be used by Government this must be complemented with strong research skills, by utilising
the excellent network of in-house government researchers, to ensure that the other two dimensions—policy
need and research requirements—are addressed to ensure that effective research is procured.
5. Does the Government have the organisational structures in place to enable it to procure effectively? (For
example, how far should the Government centralise responsibility for public procurement? Do central
government procurement “framework agreements” enable more effective public procurement?)
5.1 One of the most difﬁcult areas when buying research is ensuring that the business or policy problem or
challenge to be addressed has been properly identiﬁed and deﬁned, and as a consequence the best research
approach procured. In COI, having specialists that understood research as a discipline meant that, for the most
part, the right research solutions were procured and there was less wasted research, resources and time as
a result.
5.2 Any approach for procuring research should include some research specialists. The recommended way
to address this is to use the existing skills of good research suppliers much more in the early stage of the
procurement process, setting the business or policy problem to be addressed and effectively using suppliers to
suggest and reason a suitable research solution.
5.3 Another part of the solution would be much greater involvement and inclusion of professional researchers
already employed in government (in government departments, etc) in the procurement process. As the “in-
house consultants” within government, they are essential in ensuring that the most appropriate research is being
procured, and would provide the check and balance to ensure research suppliers are providing the right research
solutions to address the right research problems. When internal expertise is not available and a buyer desires
independent advice, there are also a wide range of practitioners who can act in a consultative capacity for
buyers (this already occurs in some government departments).
5.4 Including researchers properly (both in-house resources and research suppliers) in the research
procurement process, should result in better value for money for government as the research procured will be
ﬁt for purpose, address the right business and policy challenges and provide the right answers to the right
questions being asked within government.
6. Does the Government collect the management information it needs to understand how public procurement
is working?
6.1 MRS applauds the activity of the Crown's Representative for SMEs, Stephen Allott, and the “Mystery
Shopper Scheme” enabling SMEs to report examples of good and bad practice within public sector
procurement. Using research to provide Government with feedback is the ideal way to measure the effectiveness
of current procurement approaches.
6.2 However, this initiative needs to be adopted much more broadly for all public sector procurement—not
just those affecting SMEs—and requires a higher degree of promotion to ensure that all those with an interest
are aware of its existence.
7. How should Government ensure that European directives on public procurement do not inhibit public
bodies' ability to procure effectively?
7.1 Procurement rules, both UK and EU, are over-prescriptive, administratively burdensome and are not
widely understood. There is a tendency for civil servants to be too stringent in interpreting the requirements
due to fears of breaching these rules, rather than pragmatic within the conﬁnes of the legislative requirements.
7.2 An example of this is the reluctance of some procurers to engage in pre-contract engagement discussions.
Not engaging with suppliers to clearly deﬁne what is required, can lead to inefﬁciencies in the procurement
of research.
7.3 MRS submitted, via EFAMRO39 the European trade federation of which it's a member, evidence to the
European Commission's 2011 consultation on public procurement. MRS argued strongly that it is necessary to
distinguish services that are based on intellectual capital rather than supplies of material products or services
that require a low level of interaction or customisation (such as hotels, catering, etc). Following the consultation,
the Commission is proposing reforms to simplify rules and procedures, which if undertaken we welcome.
39 EFAMRO is the European Federation of Associations of Market Research Organisations—see www.efamro.eucobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
Ev w68 Public Administration Committee: Evidence
8. How should Government assess and manage risk when negotiating procurement contracts? (For example,
how much risk should Government be prepared to accept and what are the limits on the transfer of risk to
the private sector?)
8.1 MRS fully appreciates that Government will want to manage risks by including key outcome
requirements as part of research contracts (eg a required response rate in a research project). The issue is how
those requirements are set, particularly if penalty clauses are being used and how these are balanced with
broader Government objectives such as encouraging greater involvement of SMEs in Government procurement.
Current standard terms and conditions being proposed by the GPS include signiﬁcant indemnity and warranty
requirements that effectively disenfranchise smaller research suppliers from engaging with Government
procurement.
8.2 Target setting should be conducted openly and there should be an opportunity for the suppliers to
comment and contribute to the targets.
8.3 Service credit regimes used to manage risk should also include incentives for good performance as well
as penalties for poor performance.
9. What is the best role for “prime contractors” and what are the advantages and disadvantages of relying
on “prime contractors”?
9.1 MRS believes that any procurement approach should be ﬂexible and open to new suppliers and/or new
and emerging techniques.
9.2 Having a procurement process which enables contractors to partner in a consortium under the leadership
of one organisation is generally a good thing—for suppliers and commissioners. However, ﬁxed supply chains
should be discouraged as they favour the lead supplier at the expense of other suppliers and ultimately don't
provide value for money.
10. What are the key lessons to be learned from the experience of cost overruns, delays and project failures
in central Government procurement over the past ﬁve years or so?
10.1 Research contracts are generally modest in size and therefore MRS has no direct experience of large
scale failures within research.
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About NCVO
The National Council for Voluntary Organisations champions and strengthens the voluntary sector, with
8,500 members, from the largest charities to the smallest community organisations. Alongside our sister
councils in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, we make sure the voluntary sector can do what it does best.
www.ncvo-vol.org.uk
NCVO convenes the Public Service Delivery Network, Special Interest group of sub-contractor organisations
involved in the Work Programme, and a Payment-by-Results working group that will be making
recommendations in 2013.
Summary
— Procurement practice, particularly of central Government, can show a lack of understanding of the
voluntary sector. Too often, contracts are framed inappropriately for voluntary sector organisations
(VSOs) to participate—they are often too large, pass on too much risk, and require too much capital.
The voluntary sector has distinct strengths to bring to public services, but also distinct characteristics
that need to be considered by procurement ofﬁcials.
— Payment-by-results approaches are a particular concern for the voluntary sector. Most VSOs cannot
participate, as they cannot wait for payment. Charities that are involved, as sub-contractors to primes,
have had mixed experiences so far. These issues must be addressed urgently, as Government rolls
out more programmes in this way.
— Commissioning is the key to improvement, and procurement is only one part of the commissioning
process. Good commissioning involves public bodies consulting people properly about services,
engaging with and developing the supplier market, and considering social value—all before getting
to the procurement stage. Public bodies could then take more informed approach to decide on the
best procurement approach in each case: for example, considering grants, service delivery contracts
or payment-by-results.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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Introduction: The Voluntary Sector’s Role
The voluntary sector has been involved in public service delivery for many years. As such, we have extensive
experience of the Government's procurement policies and practice.
25% of voluntary organisations receive funding from one or more statutory sources. Over the period since
2000, the voluntary sector's statutory income has grown faster than total public spending, suggesting that the
voluntary sector has become a more important contributor to GDP and a notable player in the provision of
public services.
Over the past ten years, there has also been a shift towards service delivery contracts—worth £10.9 billion
in 2010, up from £4.3 billion in 2000 (inﬂation-adjusted)—with a reducing number of grants available—worth
£3 billion in 2010, down from £4.4 billion in 2000 (inﬂation-adjusted).
Although social work activities predominate, the voluntary sector provides services across a broad range
of areas:
INCOME FROM STATUTORY SOURCES, BY SUB-SECTOR, 2009–10 (% OF EACH SUB-SECTOR'S
INCOME)
Source: NCVO/TSRC, Charity Commission
Further information on the voluntary sector can be found in NCVO's UK Civil Society Almanac:
http://data.ncvo-vol.org.uk/
Our report Open Public Services: Experiences of the Voluntary Sector provides recent case studies on:
commissioning, supply-chain management, sharing information, managing scale, new forms of ﬁnance,
managing risk and ensuring quality.
http://www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/sites/default/ﬁles/open_public_services_experiences_from_the_voluntary_
sector.pdf
Q1. How successful has the Cabinet Ofﬁce been at improving public procurement policy and practice?
1. The Government's procurement policy and practice has proved difﬁcult for some voluntary organisations.
While recognising the Government's economic priorities, we are concerned that procurement approaches are
being used that are inappropriate and sometimes exclude the voluntary sector. This could lead to poorer
outcomes and services that do not meet people's needs effectively. In particular, we observe these changes in
procurement practice:
— Focus on savings, rather than improving outcomes and services;
— Contracts getting larger, so favouring larger companies with most capital, rather than the best
or most experienced providers;
— More decisions based on price, rather than quality and value for money;
— Central Government moving to payment-by-results as its preferred methodology, without
detailed consideration of advantages and disadvantages.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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2. Commissioning is the key to improvement, and procurement is only one part of the commissioning
process. Good commissioning involves public bodies consulting people properly about services, engaging with
and developing the supplier market, and considering social value—all before getting to the procurement stage.
Public bodies could then take more informed approach to decide on the best procurement approach in each
case: for example, considering grants, service contracts and payment-by-results contracts.
3. The Government must redouble its efforts to improve commissioning and support commissioners. The
Commissioning Academy and DCLG's new Commissioning hub will contribute to this, but strong leadership
from Ministers and central Government is also required. Procurement reforms on their own are not enough, it
is essential that good commissioning takes place at national and local levels to improve public services.
4. Internal changes at Cabinet Ofﬁce—to create the Efﬁciency and Reform Group and oversee the
Government Procurement Service—have not, in our experience to date, improved procurement practice at the
frontline. NCVO supported an earlier EU proposal for a procurement ombudsman, but this was not taken
forward by the UK Government. The Right to Challenge and Social Value Act are positive interventions that
should give service providers additional weight in their conversations with commissioners, but are not sufﬁcient
for accountability purposes. Cabinet Ofﬁce's “mystery shopper” function is a good initiative that aims to
address poor practice, but also does not offer clout or legal redress. Meanwhile, we are concerned about MoJ
proposals to reduce scope for judicial review, which is still the most important backstop when procurement
goes wrong.
5. Further comments about wider Government structures at Q5.
Q2. What should be the strategic aim of the Government's public procurement policy?
6. The Government's primary strategic aim should be to secure the best outcomes for service users, taking
account of value for money. Seeking value for money does not mean seeking the lowest cost. It should include
wider consideration, particularly of the social value that could be achieved through delivery of the service.
7. Commissioners are required by the new Social Value Act to take social value (that is, any additional
economic, social or environmental beneﬁts) into account when designing a service (ie pre-procurement) and
deciding to award a bid. An example of social value: If one contractor offers grounds maintenance services,
while another offers a comparable service but also employs ex-offenders and aims to reduce re-offending.
The additional value—preventing re-offending and creating employment opportunities for ex-offenders—is
potentially of signiﬁcant additional economic and social beneﬁt, and should be taken into account. Further
information on the Social Value Act: http://www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/networking-discussions/blogs/18452/12/07/
02/what-social-value-act
8. A further strategic aim of the Government's public procurement policy should be to support a diverse and
effective market. At present, the Government's approach to procurement favours larger companies and risks
creating oligopoly in some service areas. We are particularly concerned that voluntary sector organisations are
being shut out, as contract opportunities become larger, pass on too much ﬁnancial risk and require too much
capital. In all cases, commissioners should be required to involve the public and potential providers at the pre-
procurement stages, to inform design of the service and help determine the best procurement model.
9. If the Government wants a healthy and ﬂourishing market of service provision, then its procurement
approaches need to be varied to suit the individual circumstances.40 A grant may be most appropriate way of
funding a voluntary organisation to deliver services at a local level—particularly if the service is niche, small
scale and/or innovative. A service contract may be more appropriate where the commissioner wants the
provider to fulﬁl a detailed speciﬁcation—appropriate for most services, where effective practice is well-
understood and the commissioner wants to get best value by comparing a range of bids. Within a service
contract, the commissioner should be specifying additional social value that they want to achieve, and
considering the appropriate scale and capital requirements.
10. Meanwhile, Government has moved rapidly to establish payment-by-results as their preferred
procurement model. Payment-by-results contracts are different to regular service contracts and are only
appropriate in some circumstances. In this model, Government transfers risk onto service providers and pays
for agreed outcomes. It is best suited to circumstances where commissioners want to support innovative services
or innovative coordination of services (by prime contractor)—and are content not to specify the service.
However, there are a range of issues with this model that need to be considered. It is essential to have: agreed
relevant outcomes, a reasonable attribution method, a deadweight assumption, and to ensure that results
payments are sufﬁciently high to reward the provider for continuously improving results and managing ﬁnancial
risks. These conditions are not straightforward to achieve. It is also likely that the commissioner will pay a
premium cost for outcomes, to reﬂect provider risk, and incur signiﬁcant administrative costs in setting up
these complex contracts. Meanwhile, if results are not achieved, it does not mean that the commissioner has
not lost anything: the outcomes will not have improved and in many cases, this will mean the public sector
continues to incur acute service costs (eg A&E admissions, arrests, taking children into care etc).
40 NCVO provides guidance for voluntary organisations on different procurement approaches http://www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/
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11. While PBR is a compelling idea, in practice, we do not yet have developed examples of payment-by-
results working to improve outcomes. NCVO is also particularly concerned about the experience of service
providers in these contracts, where risk is inappropriately being passed down supply chains. Voluntary
organisations involved in the Work Programme have had mixed experiences, with few able to bid in the ﬁrst
place, some being used as “bid candy” but then receiving no referrals, and others experiencing “back door”
unfunded referrals.41 More discussion of the Work Programme is in our following answers.
12. The key again, is better commissioning, that reﬂects on what type of procurement approach is most
likely to deliver good outcomes and value for money in each speciﬁc circumstance. There is also a need for
better transition management, when Government wishes to move from one approach to another—to help service
providers prepare for and manage change.
Q3. Does the Government have the right skills and capabilities to procure effectively?
13. Civil servants at national and local level often demonstrate limited understanding of the voluntary sector.
As described above at Q2, a key issue is whether civil servants understand and use evidence to decide what
the most effective procurement approach will be for each speciﬁc service and provider market. There are a
wide range of procurement models, but little evidence that these are considered properly. For example, local
authorities switching from ward-level to LA-level contracts without realising that existing voluntary
organisations may not be able to bid. Or longstanding and effective local volunteer centres losing out to multi-
national companies to deliver local volunteering support (which could alternatively have been grant-funded).
Or national Government rushing through procurement of a new payment-by-results programme, without time
for voluntary organisations to form consortia.
14. Our analysis is that these problems are caused by:
— Civil servants and local ofﬁcers failing to consult communities and service providers before
embarking on procurement exercises. This is a clear requirement of good commissioning, set
out in EU & UK law, such as the Social Value Act. Government should do more to ensure all
staff are aware of these expectations.
— Poor communication between the staff responsible for the service area and those responsible
for procurement, leading to lack of understanding about the objectives.
— Overreliance on contract levers squeezing out the relationship between commissioners and
service providers—to the detriment of service quality.
15. Voluntary organisations also have responsibilities. To build relationships and stay informed about
forthcoming opportunities. And where it makes sense for services to be commissioned at scale, to come together
and form consortia or other partnerships.
Q4. How should the civil service ensure it recruits and retains staff with the right skills to run procurements,
to negotiate and manage contracts and to deliver major projects effectively?
16. The civil service would beneﬁt from external recruitment or secondments from both the private and
voluntary sectors, in order to bring in specialist expertise. We also anticipate that the Commissioning Academy
training programme will be relevant for many civil servants and that as far as possible this training should be
extended to others, including via DCLG's new e-learning hub for commissioners.
17. NCVO runs a work shadowing programme that pairs charity staff with staff from eight government
departments: DEFRA, BIS, MoJ, the Cabinet Ofﬁce, DCLG, DECC, DfE and the Home Ofﬁce. It is relevant
for civil servants looking to ﬁnd out more about the voluntary sector, and charity staff looking to improve how
they work with civil servants. Last year, 520 people took part in the scheme. Ninety-ﬁve per cent of participants
said they found their placements very worthwhile or worthwhile, and 92% of voluntary sector respondents said
it had increased their knowledge of how government works. Initiatives such as this can improve understanding
and practice on both sides.
Q5. Does the Government have the organisational structures in place to enable it to procure effectively? (For
example, how far should the Government centralise responsibility for procurement? Do central Government
procurement “framework agreements” enable more effective procurement?)
18. It is our assessment that many public services would be improved through more joined-up commissioning
across Government—across different policy areas and at the national and local level. Initiatives such as Total
Place and Community Budgets have signiﬁcant potential to transform services, but have been slow to progress
and their implications have not yet been fully realised. What we do know is that where central departments
drive separate initiatives—for example, to tackle re-offending or unemployment—and these services are then
commissioned and procured separately at the local level, it can lead to fragmentation or overlaps that are
unhelpful for individuals, for example, unemployed ex-offenders. In many cases, we would be more likely to
improve outcomes with “wraparound” or “pathway” services, but such integration remains the exception rather
than the rule. This is a longstanding issue that we would encourage the Government to continue pursuing.
41 The Work Programme—Perceptions and Experiences of the Voluntary Sector. June 2012 http://www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/sites/
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19. At a more immediate level, procurement requires a focus on the individual service being procured, to
determine the best approach. For example, a service for vulnerable children should not be contracted on a short
timeframe, because fundamentally it takes time to build relationships and trust with children and address issues.
Similarly, support for vulnerable families would be better sourced from specialist providers who will work
together to provide joined-up support, but all too often families experience multiple different services trying to
interact with them.
20. Framework agreements are popular in some areas of public service provision. This approach has
advantages and disadvantages, as explored in a blog by NCVO: http://www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/networking-
discussions/blogs/18683/11/12/16/preferred-provider-frameworks-dodgy-recession-time-procu
Q6. Does the Government collect the management information it needs to understand how public
procurement is working?
21. NCVO would like to comment on two speciﬁc data points.
22. Firstly, we welcome recent DCLG and LGA consultations that propose to improve information collected
about voluntary organisations. This is much needed, as it is evident from our discussions with ofﬁcials and
recent FOI requests by Compact Voice that the Government does not currently hold consistent data about
contracts and grants awarded to voluntary organisations.
23. Secondly, NCVO calls on Government to release more of the data associated with its Work Programme
and other payment-by-results initiatives. More information about ﬁnancial assumptions underpinning the
programmes, to help organisations assess risks and likely level of return. More data to ensure providers are not
“creaming and parking”: that is, helping those who are easiest to reach, at the expense of those with more
complex needs. Closely related to this, we would like to see more data about actual numbers of referrals to
voluntary organisations (which often provide the specialist support for people with more complex needs).
Q7. How should Government ensure that European directives on public procurement do not inhibit public
bodies' ability to procure effectively?
24. NCVO responded to the EU's procurement review in 2011 alongside other sector partners.42 We called
for raising of the procurement threshold for social services, clear explanations from commissioners about
contract size decisions, and supported proposals for a procurement ombudsman.
25. More generally, EU directives should not be considered in isolation, but alongside UK legislation and
practice. Regulation is an issue and can be a burden on smaller organisations, but (mis)interpretation of
regulation is also a widespread problem. For example, commissioners only disclosing TUPE liabilities to a
service provider at the point of contracting, because of a mistaken assumption that the law prevents disclosure
at an earlier stage. The Government should do more to provide local authorities and other commissioners with
clear guidance on EU regulations and counter common myths, for example on pre-procurement dialogue with
service providers and on disclosure of TUPE liabilities.
Q8.How should the Government assess and manage risk when negotiating procurement contracts?
26. Government should consider the characteristics of VSOs when assessing and outsourcing risk. Voluntary
organisations typically have limited assets, limited reserves and less access to ﬁnance. They are therefore
typically less able to absorb ﬁnancial risks than either the state or private sector. This makes it particularly
difﬁcult for voluntary organisations to deal with payment-by-results contracts.
27. If the Government wants the voluntary sector to be involved in these types of contracts, then it will need
a more nuanced approach. We recognise that the state, despite its greatest capacity to bear risk, is looking to
reduce its own exposure. But it will not succeed in achieving outcomes, if loading risks onto external providers
has the result of deterring their participation or causing them ﬁnancial problems. Likewise, prime contractors
should be bearing ﬁnancial risks, rather than passing these down supply chains. For example, several voluntary
organisations promised a certain level and frequency of referrals in the Work Programme, have found much
more volatile patterns in practice, with knock-on effects for their cash ﬂow and ﬁnances. Smaller voluntary
organisations need greater protection to take part in supply chains. Larger voluntary organisations need ready
access to ﬁnance—without delays—if they are to play a “prime contractor” or sheltering role.
28. More information on risks in the Work Programme can be found in our report, The Work Programme—
Perceptions and Experiences of the Voluntary Sector. June 2012 http://www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/sites/default/ﬁles/
sig_survey_june_2012_report_17.9.12.pdf
Q9. What is the best role for “prime contractors” and what are the advantages and disadvantages of relying
on “prime contractors”?
29. We have seen an increase in prime contractor delivery models in recent years, as a result of contract
sizes getting larger and Government enthusiasm for payment-by-results schemes. There are potential advantages
to this model: achieving greater scale and coordination of services, either thematically or geographically, and
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managing risk exposure. However, there are also potential disadvantages: lack of local or specialist expertise,
more layers of management and increased costs, as primes take signiﬁcant cut of contract value. In practice,
there is limited evidence so far of the effectiveness of the prime contracting model.
30. Prime contractors should have certain skills and expertise, including: contract management, risk
management, legal and in some cases back ofﬁce support eg IT systems, HR. Prime contractors need not
be specialists in the particular service area, but should at least have some relevant expertise and access to
specialist advice.
31. Prime contractors hold important responsibility for managing their supply chains. There are already
examples of good and poor practice in supply chain management within the Work Programme. NCVO is
currently working with Serco to develop some further guidance on supply chain management. An essential
part of this, in our view, must be greater sharing of data and information—by commissioners and prime
contractors, with their subcontractors. This will enable subcontractors to better understand and manage risks.
Given all the complexities of payment-by-results, another suggestion is that prime contractors are often be
better using a standard service delivery contracts for their sub-contractors, rather than attempting to parcel out
mini-PBR contracts with partial outcomes, complex attribution issues and uncertain payment arrangements.
32. The “ﬁnancial sheltering” of smaller specialist voluntary organisations by larger voluntary providers is
an approach adopted by organisations such as Barnardo's and NACRO. This is a voluntary sector version of
prime contracting. Here, the lead organisation develops a partnership structure in which it provides the
necessary capital and/or in-kind support to enable smaller organisations to deliver specialist areas of a contract.
Barnardo's describes this approach as the larger organisation taking responsibility for ensuring smaller
organisations are able to deliver and therefore maintain diversity of community-based provision within public
services.
33. The nature of this relationship can vary. At its simplest, it can be a sympathetic structuring of the funding
ﬂow, where upfront grants are paid to providers prior to beginning work; it could involve capacity-building
investment; and it can involve delivery of back-ofﬁce support or sharing physical space with smaller partners.
Some of these smaller organisations may be culturally uninterested in managing contracts directly—while
others can take the opportunity to learn about operating in the public service market in a relatively safe and
supported environment.
34. This partnership ensures that choice and quality of services are maintained for end-users despite the
increasing scale of contracts which would otherwise force smaller organisations out of the market. It enables
spot-purchasing of speciﬁc service interventions with personalised services in mind—including ﬂexibility for
budget-holding users. Success though is very much dependent on the integrity of the relationship between the
partners, the ability of the smaller organisation to maintain and enhance the quality of its unique work, and the
ability of the lead agency to quality manage the delivery.
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Written evidence submitted by UKCG (PROC 25)
1. The UK Contractors Group (UKCG) welcomes the opportunity to respond to the Public Administration
Committee's inquiry. UKCG represents over 30 leading construction contractors who together account for a
third of industry turnover. The construction industry as a whole remains a major contributor to the UK
economy—the construction value chain accounts for 14% of UK GDP, and the industry employs over 10% of
the workforce.
2. The industry continues to make good progress towards the government's goal of a 15–20% reduction in
the costs of construction procurement (as set out in the construction strategy), with cost reductions of £72
million having been achieved in-year (2011–12). UKCG is working closely with the Cabinet Ofﬁce on
implementing the construction strategy, and achieving the goal of more efﬁcient procurement.
3. Our responses to some of the questions set out by the Committee are given below.
4. How successful has the Cabinet Ofﬁce been at improving public procurement policy and practice?
Construction is not a simple commodity—and hence procurement of construction services is a complex
process. Improving procurement skills within the public sector is essential to improving procurement practice,
so that skills levels in the public sector are more comparable to the private sector.
Too little public construction is procured centrally (in contrast to private sector clients), and proposals for
more centralised procurement set out in the recent PFI review were a welcome step. Central procurement
allows teams to gain experience, build up their expertise, and learn lessons from project to project. The
increasing tendency towards devolved decision making and localism works against this principle.
5. What should be the strategic aim of the Government's public procurement policy?
To secure best value for the UK taxpayer, and world class outcomes from construction projects.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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6. Does the government have the right skills and capabilities to procure effectively?
—Does the Civil service have the skills and capabilities required to negotiate and manage contracts
effectively?
No, there is insufﬁcient in-house skills and experience. As a result the public sector often relies on a myriad
of independent advisers, which often complicates the process.
—What skills do procurement authorities require in-house, what skills can be bought in and what skills can
be contracted out?
The key skills required are project management and the ability to understand and manage risk. The current
lack of understanding of risk often results in micro management of projects, resulting in delays and extra costs.
In practice what is required are realistic output speciﬁcations, against which contractors can innovate and
propose solutions to deliver what is required to best effect.
—What lessons can central government learn from local government on procurement?
There are throughout both central and local government examples of best and worst procurement practices,
but there are no really effective mechanisms to spread the best practice more widely.
7. How should the civil service ensure it recruits and retains staff with the right skills to run procurements, to
negotiate and manage contracts and to deliver major projects effectively?
Recruit people with the right skill sets and reward them with appropriate remuneration. People need to be
properly incentivised to manage risk.
8. Does the government have the organisational structures in place to enable it to procure effectively?
For the reasons set out above, UKCG believes a more central approach to procurement would be helpful.
The establishment of the post of Chief Construction Adviser (within BIS) and the Construction Clients Board
(in which all major spending departments participate) has been helpful in establishing some common goals to
obtain better value and spreading best practice between departments. The construction strategy was developed
with private sector input. The challenge now is to deliver it.
9. Does the government collect the management information it needs to understand how public procurement
is working?
The establishment of a “construction pipeline” (http://data.gov.uk/dataset/government-construction-pipeline)
some 18 months ago drawing together all central and some local government investment programmes was
helpful. This provided greater certainty to the construction sector on future workloads. The challenge now is
to deliver the projects in the pipeline. Over time the pipeline will identify which departments and agencies are
procuring projects on schedule and which are seeing delays and slippages in timeframes. However more
information is required within the current pipeline to make clear which projects are on or behind schedule.
10. How should government assess and manage risk when negotiating procurement projects?
Government needs to have the ability to assess how much risk it wants to take for individual construction
projects. The spectrum ranges from no risk at all (eg some schemes under old PFI model where large amount
of risk was transferred to private sector), to considerable risk and increased costs if projects overrun. A way
of managing risk is to bundle projects into framework agreements so that the same contractor(s) are delivering
repeat projects (eg new schools) so that the risks involved are better understood.
11. What is the best role for “prime contractors” and what are the advantages and disadvantages of relying
on “prime contractors”?
The advantage of using prime contractors is that they have the balance sheet strength to manage large
projects and programmes. This allows government to bundle projects together to create economies of scale and
gain efﬁciencies through learning the lessons from the ﬁrst phases of any programme. It is often suggested that
the disadvantage is that it squeezes SMEs out of the market. However in practice main contractors act as
enablers of opportunities for SMEs in their supply chains, helping them to access work on major projects. A
recent UKCG survey of member contractors found that for every sub-contracted on a project, 64p goes to
SMEs (See Appendix 1).
12. What are the key lessons to be learned from the experience of cost overruns, delays and project failures
in central government procurement over the past ﬁve years or so?
That government needs to devote more up-front resource and centralised expertise to the process.
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APPENDIX 1
The Value of SMEs in the Supply Chain—UKCG Research
SMEs are a vital part of the construction supply chain. Main contractors working on a construction project
will be reliant on a network of often local SMEs to provide material supplies, on-site labour, and specialist
services.
UKCG represents over 30 leading contractors, who together account for a third of construction output. In
October 2012, UKCG conducted a survey of members on the involvement of SMEs in their supply chain. A
total of 19 members responded.
Value of Business Sub-Contracted to SMEs
The UKCG survey found a signiﬁcant amount of work is sub-contracted to SMEs:
— For every £1 subcontracted on a project, 64 pence goes to SMEs.
— Almost half of members in the survey subcontract over 70 pence in the £1 with SMEs.
Breaking down the value of business with SMEs between micro, small and medium ﬁrms43—the majority
of the 64 pence goes to small ﬁrms (with less than 50 employees).
The Number of SMEs in the Supply Chain
The vast majority of ﬁrms in UKCG member supply chains are SMEs:
— On average, 82% of UKCG member supply chains are SMEs.
— The number of SMEs in the supply chain varies by the size of the business—ranging from under
100 to over 5,000. On average there were just over 1,500 SMEs in a member's supply chain.
— In total, the 18 UKCG members who provided data on this question are supporting almost
30,000 SMEs.
Written evidence submitted by Cabinet Ofﬁce (PROC 26)
1. Since 2010 the Coalition Government has introduced signiﬁcant reforms to improve public procurement.
These measures have supported deﬁcit reduction and helped unlock growth, forming a core component of the
Efﬁciency and Reform agenda led by the Minister for the Cabinet Ofﬁce and Chief Secretary to the Treasury.
2. These early reforms formed a substantial contribution to the £5.5 billion saved across the whole of the
efﬁciency and reform agenda in 2011–12.
3. Alongside these cash releasing savings a number of wider beneﬁts have been secured including measures
to ensure smaller businesses and voluntary bodies have fair access to Government contracts and to streamline
the procurement process itself.
4. Progress has been made on three broad fronts:
A. Buying Common Goods and Services
5. We have demonstrated that signiﬁcant savings are possible by ensuring Government aggregates demand
and standardises speciﬁcations: buying once on behalf of many to ensure that all receive the best possible price.
6. The Government Procurement Service (GPS) was reformed in July 201144 to act as the execution arm
of Government procurement. With centres of expertise in Liverpool, Norwich and Newport the Government
Procurement Service focuses on those goods and services that are common across Government such as energy,
43 Using EU deﬁnition which covers both number of employees and turnover—see http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-
ﬁgures-analysis/sme-deﬁnition/index_en.htm
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ﬂeet, and consultancy, with more than £3 billion of spend ﬂowing through GPS contracts in 2011–12 which
saved Whitehall departments more than £420 million.
B. Strategically Managing Major Suppliers
7. For the ﬁrst time, Government has built strategic relationships with major suppliers, ensuring that it acts
as a single customer and leveraging buying power to secure the best possible price and resolve any performance
concerns swiftly. Acting through a network of Crown Representatives—experienced commercial negotiators
from the private or public sector—this agenda has focused on a small subset of Strategic Suppliers, saving
more than £430 million in 2011–12 in addition to the £800 million saved in 2010–11.
C. Procurement Policy
8. Procurement policies set by the Cabinet Ofﬁce impact on more than £45 billion of annual spend across
Central Government and substantial reforms have been introduced to streamline and simplify processes to
make them swifter and cheaper.
9. Negotiations with our European partners have helped the Government to minimise the burden of EU
regulations, whilst in the UK the introduction of a LEAN sourcing approach aims for all but the most complex
procurements to be completed in less than 120 days (target by March 2013), a signiﬁcant improvement from
the 199 days cross government average in 2011. The average is currently 153 days and we continue to make
progress in reducing this average as more procurement professionals complete the LEAN training programme.
10. A series of measures have been introduced to ensure SMEs have fair access to government contracts:
from the introduction of Contracts Finder (that makes it possible for all businesses to swiftly search for current
opportunities) to the publication of forward pipelines, worth £84 billion, of expected demand (helping
companies anticipate demand and target R&D spend). The appointment of a Crown Representative to the sector
has ensured SMEs have a champion at the centre of Government whilst signiﬁcant work has started to improve
the data held on SMEs. Government's aspiration is for 25% of spend to ﬂow to SMEs, and early progress is
encouraging with direct spend increasing from 6.5% in 2009–10 to 10% in 2011–12. More is being done to
understand indirect spend and ensure these numbers are robust.
11. Together these measures have changed the way Government procures goods and services: making
Government more businesslike and supporting both deﬁcit reduction and the growth agenda. Early progress is
encouraging and the Government plans to maintain the pace of change throughout the second half of the
Parliament, including through the implementation of the Civil Service Reform Plan, a core component of which
is the building of better commercial capabilities across the Civil Service as a whole.
Speciﬁc Questions
How successful has the Cabinet Ofﬁce been at improving public procurement policy and practice?
12. Since 2010 the Government has introduced a series of measures to improve public procurement policy
and practice. Early progress is encouraging; with substantial changes already evident in the way Whitehall
buys goods and services. Further reforms are planned for the second half of the Parliament to embed and
further strengthen this new approach.
13. Examples of success to date include:
(a) Aggregation and standardisation of common goods and services to enable Government to
leverage efﬁciencies of scale: in 2011–12 £3 billion of spend went through centrally negotiated
GPS45 frameworks, saving Departments more than £420 million.
(b) Radically simplifying the procurement process itself to avoid nugatory cost and wasted effort:
a new LEAN sourcing process has reduced the volume of public procurement guidance from
more than 6,000 pages to a 50 page standard operating manual.
(c) Tighter control processes: as part of the wider Efﬁciency and Reform agenda rigorous controls
have been introduced on a number of areas to enable Departments and the Cabinet Ofﬁce to
challenge spend robustly. In 2011–12 alone these controls led to savings of more than £1 billion
on consultancy and contingent labour.
(d) Strategically managing major suppliers: for the ﬁrst time, the Government is seeking to build
strategic relationships with its largest suppliers, ensuring that Government acts as a single
customer with all parts of government receiving the best possible price. Working through a
network of Crown Representatives—experienced commercial negotiators from either the private
or public sector—this approach has proved highly effective with £430 million savings in
2011–12 in addition to £800 million achieved in 2010–11.
(e) Publishing pipelines of likely future needs: providing long-term visibility to allow UK industry
to target R&D decisions and be well prepared to bid for government contracts. To date, 17
pipelines have been published with a total value of £84 billion.
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(f) Removing barriers facing SMEs: with unnecessary bureaucracy such as pre-qualiﬁcation
questionnaires removed entirely from lower value contracts, except where security is a
consideration, to make it cheaper and easier to bid for Government business. The introduction
of Contracts Finder has introduced unprecedented transparency to the range of opportunities
available, whilst the appointment of a Crown Representative for SMEs and voluntary bodies
has ensured that the voice of both is heard at the heart of Government. As a result of these
measures and others, spend with SMEs has risen noticeably, with direct spend increasing from
6.5% in 2009–10 to 10% in 2011–12, one example being the pan-government travel contract
recently won by an SME who competed and beat larger providers. Departments are also quoting
savings on bids from incumbent and large suppliers from 30% to 90% by using the G-Cloud to
open up the market to a more diverse and innovative range of suppliers.
(g) Training procurement professionals across all Departments: to ensure the swifter LEAN
processes are fully implemented. By November 2012, 626 staff had completed a 1 day
programme and 400 had completed a 3 day programme. Partly as a result the average observed
time for all but the most complex procurements in 2012 fell from 180 to 153 working days,
whilst the use of more efﬁcient Open Procedures doubled from 18% to 37%.
What should be the strategic aim of the Government's public procurement policy?
14. Spending less money overall, via demand management, superior negotiations and subsequent contract
management, actionable management information, creating scale economies and identifying opportunities for
re-use or sharing.
15. Widening the supplier base, including but not limited to small suppliers, also supports the objective of
increasing competition and thus improving price and quality.
Does the Government have the right skills and capabilities to procure effectively?
Does the Civil Service have the skills and capabilities required to negotiate and manage contracts
effectively?
What skills do procurement authorities require in-house, what skills can be bought in and what skills can be
contracted out?
How should the Civil Service ensure it recruits and retains staff with the right skills to run procurements, to
negotiate and manage contracts and to deliver major projects effectively?
16. Across Government the procurement profession has a wealth of talented individuals with deep experience
of procurement in both the public and private sector. However, too often in the past there was an over-reliance
on consultants and contractors. Skills transfer was patchy at best.
17. In addition, staff are duplicated in every organisation, resulting in excess staff levels, unhelpful generalist
teams and lack of concentrated and rare specialist skills.
18. Since May 2010 there has been a sharp focus on professional development: ensuring that civil servants
can develop their skills and deliver better outcomes for taxpayers. One recent example is the way in which
LEAN processes were rolled out across Government, with 626 staff completing a one day training programme
and 400 completing a three day programme.
19. The creation of the Major Projects Leadership Academy and the development of the Commissioning
Academy provide further examples of the focus on professional development. The Commissioning Academy
is a development programme aimed at more than 2,000 senior commissioners from across the public sector
over a three year period. Over the last nine months, we have conducted extensive consultations to determine
what an Academy should cover, and have designed, built, and delivered the ﬁrst pilot programme. We are
currently delivering the second pilot programme and roll out of the full programme will commence in April
2013.
20. In addition, a great deal has been done to attract and retain experienced commercial negotiators from
the private sector. One example of this would be the success of the Crown Representatives, with the current
set demonstrating a strong combination of private and public sector expertise.
21. Further work to strengthen commercial capability within the civil service remains an important priority.
The Civil Service Reform Plan identiﬁed the need to build commercial capability as a key priority area. It
committed to the development of a ﬁve year plan on how the Civil Service as a whole would develop the
necessary capabilities in this (and other priority areas). Ensuring that skilled professionals can be attracted,
trained, retained and deployed effectively, will be critical, as will ensuring that Government as a whole gains
maximum beneﬁt from the skills and expertise that exists in some areas.
What lessons can central government learn from local government on procurement?
22. Pockets of best practice exist right across the public sector and central Government is keen to learn from
this, including through regular engagement with DCLG, the LGA and a range of Local Authorities.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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23. The creation of the Commissioning Academy, another commitment in the Civil Service Reform Plan, is
one recent example of how central government schemes are reaching out to expertise in other areas. Created
to provide a development programme for senior commissioners from all parts of the public sector, the
Commissioning Academy is designed to bring key commissioners together to share ideas of what worked and
what could be improved. By sharing experience right across the wider public sector the goal is to help develop
a cadre of senior leaders with the conﬁdence and technical skill to help transform public services and improve
value for money. A number of Local Authorities are being invited to participate in the eight day pilot
programme planned for later this year.
24. In other areas, including where scale offers particular beneﬁts, central Government is keen to ensure that
frameworks that have been centrally negotiated are easily accessible for Local Authorities and other parts of
the wider public sector. No organisation wants to pay more than it needs for a unit of electricity or a box of
photocopier paper and by further aggregating buying power there are additional opportunities to provide
taxpayers with an even better deal. Already £5.4 billion of wider public spend ﬂows through frameworks
negotiated by the Government Procurement Service, an achievement central Government is proud of and keen
to build upon. Across the wider public sector, successful Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) are now in
operation with Yorkshire Purchasing Organisation (YPO), Eastern Shires Purchasing Organisation (ESPO) and
Devolved Administration procurement bodies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to optimise the approach
to delivering value.
How successful are government departments and their agencies at communicating their needs to potential
suppliers?
25. Over the past two years the Government has transformed the way it engages with potential suppliers:
providing unprecedented transparency about current opportunities by launching Contracts Finder and holding
a series of formal and informal engagement sessions with industry, including small events for Government's
strategic suppliers, targeted sessions aimed at SMEs and VCSE bodies, and large scale conferences.
26. To help UK industry compete for these opportunities the Government committed to publish, for the ﬁrst
time, data on likely upcoming requirements to enable businesses to plan more conﬁdently for the future and
invest in plant, machinery and people. To date 17 medium term pipelines have been published, containing £84
billion of likely opportunities.
27. These pipelines have been welcomed by industry and the Government plans to go further and publish
additional detail over the course of the next two years. Government is also keen to work collaboratively with
businesses and voluntary bodies to ﬁnd solutions to key challenges. One recent example of this was the
successful pilot of “Solutions Exchange”, a web based platform that enables Departments to share future
challenges and seek innovative suggestions from industry: just one example of the way in which Government
is seeking to capture ideas and innovative solutions from industry and other outside bodies.
Does the Government have the organisational structures in place to enable it to procure effectively? (For
example, how far should the Government centralise responsibility for public procurement?)
28. The creation of the Efﬁciency and Reform Group (ERG) led by the Minister for the Cabinet Ofﬁce and
Chief Secretary to the Treasury has transformed the Government's ability to deliver better value for money.
Extensive Ministerial interest both at the centre of Government and through PEX(ER) has considerably
increased the proﬁle of the procurement profession and the merger last year of the procurement and commercial
directorates under the leadership of the Chief Procurement Ofﬁcer has helped strengthen commercial capability
at heart of Government.
29. The ERG controls introduced by the Cabinet Ofﬁce with HM Treasury's support in 2010 have proved
particularly effective, signiﬁcantly strengthening the scrutiny applied to certain areas of spend. The focus on
consultants has been particularly successful. Following the introduction of the controls, which require Cabinet
Ofﬁce agreement to any spend over £20,000, total spend across Government has fallen by 80%, a change that
saved taxpayers £1 billion in 2011–12. Other controls have been similarly important and the Cabinet Ofﬁce
keeps the set of controls under regular review.
30. The next phase of reform to public procurement will lead to further evolution in the structure and
organisation of the procurement profession and the Government is keen to ensure that scarce resources and
talent is deployed on the most critical projects. There is also scope to increase the amount of spend that is
aggregated and procured once on behalf of many.
Do central government procurement “framework agreements” enable more effective public procurement?)
31. Framework agreements are one tool that, in certain circumstances, can offer a convenient contractual
vehicle to allow Departments to procure goods quickly by running mini competitions. Effective framework
agreements with good commercial terms and/or committed volumes can reduce costs (for both industry and
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32. Framework agreements are not suitable in all cases, and in all cases the detail of the agreement is
naturally critical. Signiﬁcant work is going on within the Government Procurement Service to ensure that all
frameworks offer the best possible commercial terms and to streamline the total number of frameworks.
33. The Government is also determined to ensure that framework agreements do not hamper competition by
locking out new entrants (including SMEs) for long periods of time. To this end the Cabinet Ofﬁce has
recently reviewed all ICT frameworks and made a number of recommendations to strengthen ICT procurement:
(http://www.cabinetofﬁce.gov.uk/news/fewer-government-ict-frameworks-attract-wider-range-suppliers).
Does the Government collect the management information it needs to understand how public procurement is
working?
34. In 2010, Government did not know how much it spent with key suppliers and the quality of most
management information was poor. Since then the quality and timeliness of MI has improved dramatically. As
part of the Civil Service Reform programme and under the auspices of the Efﬁciency and Reform Programme,
recent work has addressed short comings in government data, including setting clear data standards; simplifying
and strengthening the quarterly data summary reporting formats; improving quality assurance mechanisms;
establishing clearer accountabilities for management information quality; and improving the management
reporting of data.
35. Spend data on commodity goods and services is now captured on a monthly basis and the Government
has invested in technology to process transactional information automatically and people to act on this MI. As
a result Government has visibility of procurement spend by category, sub-category and supplier for the ﬁrst
time, ensuring performance against individually established targets and aspirations can be tracked and managed.
To aid transparency Departments publish key procurement data on a regular basis including on their direct
spend with SMEs, transactions and opportunities for potential suppliers
36. The progress over the past two years has been extremely encouraging and a number of European
countries have looked to learn lessons from the UK's approach. Despite this success there is a lot more that
could be done and the Government plans to enrich this data over the next two years.
How should government ensure that European directives on public procurement do not inhibit public bodies'
ability to procure effectively?
37. Too often in the past procurement professionals in central Government have felt inhibited by European
directives on procurement and the Government is determined to ensure that well trained, conﬁdent professionals
are able to use sound commercial judgements to ensure taxpayers receive best value.
38. To enable this, signiﬁcant work has been done over the past two years to engage with European partners
to amend the regulations themselves. The UK has consistently argued for simpler, more ﬂexible EU
procurement rules and the Government has succeeded in agreeing speciﬁc changes that support UK goals. As
a result, the new set of procurement directives contain more ﬂexible selection rules. They allow past
performance to be taken into account when awarding future work. The procurement timescale has been reduced
to make procurement processes swifter and cheaper, and the rules governing e-marketplaces and electronic
purchasing systems have been simpliﬁed.
39. In addition, to support public service reform, the UK is looking to secure an exclusion for mutuals to
explicitly allow innovative public service delivery agents such as employee-owned mutuals to become
established before they are subject to full competition. To avoid onerous new regulations the UK has helped
ensure that burdensome processes for “National Oversight Bodies” have been removed.
40. These changes and a number of others signiﬁcantly improve the directives themselves. Whilst negotiating
these amendments the Cabinet Ofﬁce has worked in parallel to ensure that procurement professionals do not
over-interpret or “gold-plate” existing requirements. The new LEAN standard operating procedure dramatically
reduces the length and complexity of public procurements. To embed this approach 626 staff have already
completed a one day training course with a further 400 completing a three day programme. Early results are
encouraging with the average observed time for all but the most complex procurements in 2012 falling from
180 to 146 working days whilst the use of the more efﬁcient Open Procedure doubled from 18% to 37%.
How should government assess and manage risk when negotiating procurement contracts? (For example,
how much risk should Government be prepared to accept and what are the limits on the transfer of risk to
the private sector?)
41. The appropriate balance of risk will vary contract by contract depending on the good or service being
procured.
42. In some cases, when buying basic goods and services the use of unlimited liability clauses may
unnecessarily increase the price paid by the public sector whilst discouraging new entrants (including SMEs)
from entering. At times it can make sense for Government to tolerate slightly more risk in exchange for the
upside on pricing and competition. More complex commercial negotiations—for example when outsourcing a
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cases a careful commercial judgement is required. Government's high level guidance is provided by “Managing
Public Money” and “Management of Risk” (MoR) is the recommended risk management methodology.
43. In light of the Open Public Services agenda the Cabinet Ofﬁce, in consultation with HM Treasury, is
keeping this area closely under review to ensure that sufﬁcient guidance and support exists for procurement
professionals across Government. The creation of the Commissioning Academy is one example of the steps
being taken to do this.
What is the best role for “prime contractors” and what are the advantages and disadvantages of relying on
“prime contractors”?
44. Prime contractors can offer a number of beneﬁts, though these vary considerably by the nature of the
contract and the type of good or service being procured. Naturally, any of these beneﬁts depend entirely on the
rigour with which the speciﬁc contract is negotiated and then managed, and the Government is focused on
strengthening this core commercial capability rather than favouring one contracting mechanism over all others.
45. In some cases the use of a prime contractor can aid accountability, ensuring that a single body is
responsible for delivery and performance, making it easier to manage the contract. This can be useful where
supply chains are long and complex including which if often the case with large defence procurements.
46. In addition, prime contractors may also provide valuable experience at managing sub-contractors, having
developed tried and tested partnerships over a number of years and ﬁelding experienced programme
management teams to co-ordinate complex projects (eg large construction programmes). At times prime
contractors are also willing to accept and manage more risk than is the case with a basket of smaller providers.
47. Areas that require focus when engaging a prime contractor include the cost overhead (balancing any
premium sharply against the beneﬁts of reduced contract management costs and the allocation of risk). There
is also a risk in some circumstances that the use of prime contractors can exclude smaller ﬁrms, either because
the amount of contractual risk is discouragingly high or because prime contractors turn to established partners
rather than new entrants or smaller ﬁrms. Commercial tensions between the prime and their supply chain need
to be considered carefully to ensure smaller sub-contractors do not face unreasonable pressures to accept less
favourable terms and the Government is particularly focused on ensuring that all sub-contractors beneﬁt from
existing prompt payment practice—one example of work to support SMEs and help unlock growth.
What are the key lessons to be learned from the experience of cost overruns, delays and project failures in
central government procurement over the past ﬁve years or so?
48. On coming to power, the Government recognised that major public sector projects have had a poor
delivery record. There had been no cross-governmental understanding of the size and cost of the Government's
Major Project portfolio, and projects often began with no agreed budget, no business case and unrealistic
delivery timetables. This Government has been determined not to allow that costly failure to continue.
49. In March 2011 this Government launched the Major Projects Authority (MPA) with an enforceable
mandate from the Prime Minister to oversee and direct the effective management of all large-scale projects
that are funded and delivered by central government. The MPA scrutinises projects, ensures accountability and
informs the Treasury's decisions on whether to approve projects. In the past, fewer than a third of government
major projects were delivered on time and on budget, now two thirds are on track to do so. The Major Projects
Authority has shown it can and will intervene in failing projects—the closure of e-Borders, the Fire Control
Programmes and National Programme for IT are all examples of this.
50. The Major Projects Authority successfully launched the Major Projects Leadership Academy, in
partnership with Oxford's Said Business School and Deloitte to bring world class project leadership to
Whitehall. It is on track to meet its Civil Service Reform Plan commitment that will see all senior Projects
Leaders commencing the Academy programme by 2014. The Academy builds the skills of senior project
leaders across government to deliver complex projects, reducing the over-reliance on expensive external
consultancy further and building expertise within the Civil Service. The Academy exposes these senior leaders
to world-class practitioners and academics, giving the opportunity to share lessons learned from key experts in
delivering successful Major Projects. In future no one will be able to lead a major government project without
completing the Academy.
51. The Olympic Delivery Authority Learning Legacy website, now hosted by the Cabinet Ofﬁce, forms
part of our plan to apply the lessons learnt from Olympics project successes to other projects. The Learning
Legacy provides a goldmine of knowledge that we must not waste. Building and through this website we will:
celebrate success; aggregate and amplify learning from and for the project delivery community; facilitate
collaborative working, knowledge sharing and networking.
52. The Autumn Statement stated that “the Government will strengthen the mandate of Infrastructure UK
(IUK) and increase its commercial expertise to boost the delivery of growth enhancing infrastructure projects
across Government”. As part of this new role, IUK, together with an enhanced Major Projects Authority
(MPA), will undertake a detailed assessment of Whitehall's ability to deliver infrastructure, building on their
existing work. This assessment will be completed by Budget 2013. To ensure the assessment is as thorough ascobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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possible, it will be led by Paul Deighton as his ﬁrst duty as Commercial Secretary working closely with the
Minister for the Cabinet Ofﬁce. The Minister for Cabinet Ofﬁce has asked Lord Browne to conduct a review
to enhance the Major Projects Authority so that it is built to last.
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Supplementary written evidence submitted by Colin Cram (PROC 27)
RE-STRUCTURING PUBLIC SECTOR PROCUREMENT: CREATING THE “CROWN PROCUREMENT”
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Executive Summary
1. Purpose of Proposed Structure. The proposed structure is designed to provide an exceptional procurement
service to government and the wider public sector. It:
— Maximises value from the huge commonalities, between sectors, of procurement spends and
the procurement expertise and techniques required.
— Addresses serious weaknesses in the management of procurement and those identiﬁed in recent
select committee reports.
— Provides a means to implement government procurement policies.
— Provides much improved access to essential procurement services.
— Helps break down operational silos between public bodies and sectors.
— Addresses 95% of public sector procurement spend.
— Builds on existing cross-sector collaborations and centres of expertise.
2. Explanation of Proposed Structure. The basic structure is that of six specialist teams—Directorates. Each
would be big enough to have and retain exceptional expertise. These teams, from left to right on the
organisation chart, would:
(1) Handle the most complex, critical and largest contracts, including PFIs.
(2) Create and manage public sector wide purchasing agreements and contracts.
(3) Create and manage purchasing agreements and contracts for specialist product categories.
(4) Determine public sector policy, handle international negotiations, identify and propose remedies
to any potential supply security issues and analyse public sector procurement spend.
(5) Customer relationship management for central government departments, customer
organisations, sectors (eg local government) and sector consortia.
(6) Through regional procurement hubs, provide regional and local contracting expertise and
services for contracts not covered by the ﬁrst 4 directorates.
The main report describes the responsibilities of the teams in greater detail.
3. Contracts for, say, less than £25,000 and small framework agreements would be handled by customer
organisations. This would sit outside the proposed public sector purchasing structure. Some defence functions
would also remain outside the structure. The main government departments would need to retain their
commercial directors, whose responsibilities would include being the department's “intelligent customer”.
4. The attached paper describes in more detail the proposed structure, how it could be implemented without
additional funding and the exceptional beneﬁts.
©Colin M Cram FCIPS
26 January 2013
Main Report
Why Restructure?
1. The proposed structure for public sector procurement builds on existing structures, centres of procurement
expertise and the cross-sector/cross-departmental working that is happening. Implementing it would harness
the power of 95% of the £200 billion per annum public sector procurement spend to support economic growth
and value for money. This is the by far the biggest resource the government has to inﬂuence economic growth.
This paper describes:
— the proposed structure,
— the potential beneﬁts,
— how the structure could be implemented,
— how its implementation could be funded, and
— how the organisation would operate and be funded.
Beneﬁts
2. The proposed structure would deliver the following beneﬁts:
(i) Authority, accountability and a means to deliver government and sectoral policies, including
supporting economic growth and value for money.
(ii) Accountability for delivering agreed service levels to all sectors.
(iii) Transparency: Costs of public procurement and beneﬁts would be known.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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(iv) Take maximum advantage of the great commonality of procurement expenditure and the skills,
knowledge and expertise required between all parts of the public sector including central
government, local government, the NHS, emergency services and education.
(v) Address serious weaknesses in the management of procurement, including those identiﬁed in
select committee reports in the past two years and the “Laidlaw” report.
(vi) Much improved access for many public sector organisations to essential procurement services
to which they previously may not have had access.
(vii) Build on existing cross-sector collaborations and centres of expertise and the increasing cross-
sector working being driven by the Government Procurement Service (accountable to the
Efﬁciency and Reform Group).
(viii) Help break down operational silos between public bodies and sectors.
(ix) Support the increasing cross-silo working between various parts of the public sector, such as
DWP and local government, local government and the NHS.
(x) Provide ﬂexibility to handle changes in departmental responsibilities and changing operational
boundaries between wider public sector organisations.
(xi) Support the shared back ofﬁce service initiative by the Efﬁciency and Reform Group.
(xii) Provide expert, independent commercial input into policy making.
(xiii) Independence of the proposed organisation from departments and other public sector bodies
would ensure impartial advice on contracts and projects. Risks of more “West Coast Main Line”
ﬁascos would be much reduced.
(xiv) Tackle global markets, suppliers and supply chains effectively, using leading edge
procurement techniques.
(xv) Ensure that no suppliers could again “divide and rule” in the UK public sector and eliminate
risk of cartels.
(xvi) Provide exceptional expertise available to deliver the above, which could be continually
refreshed and developed.
3. The potential beneﬁts would be enormous. The Appendix provides a list of 60 (not exhaustive) and
compares how far various procurement models are able to deliver the beneﬁts. All other procurement models
fall well short of the “Crown Procurement” model. The beneﬁts are in eight categories:
(1) Savings and Efﬁciency.
(2) Improved overall management of major contracts, projects and PFIs.
(3) Delivery of government policies and programmes.
(4) Customer service.
(5) Long term world class capability.
(6) Assurance and accountability.
(7) National security of supplies.
(8) Effective Parliamentary oversight and scrutiny.
Structure
4. “Crown Procurement” would be overseen by a management board of key stakeholders, rather as the
Government Procurement Service is at the moment. It would be subject to strong oversight by the National
Audit Ofﬁce. It should have independence in order to be objective. However, it will need to be accountable to
a government minister—probably a Treasury one.
5. It would be led by a managing director. Below that level 6 main functional groups are proposed, each
headed by a Director. These are from left to right on the organisation chart:
(1) The largest and most complex public sector procurements such as PFIs, the largest and most
complex contracts, support for major projects and outsourcings/insourcings. The team would
also be the ﬁrst port of call for providing commercial advice and support for government
policy making.
(2) Management of all cross sector procurement categories which, broadly deﬁned, probably
account for annual expenditure of £60–£80 billion a year. This team would undertake the
contracting, letting of purchasing agreements and contracts management. It would be
responsible for the management of major public sector suppliers and management of supply
markets. It would determine the best procurement strategies for each category. This would build
on the Government Procurement Service.
(3) Provision of specialist contracting service to government departments and other key public
sector bodies for major contracts not covered by the previous two categories, nor by the
proposed regional hubs (see below). Each sector, such as higher education, has its own specialist
requirements, as do certain government departments. Examples include roads construction andcobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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maintenance, medical equipment (though that is arguably cross sectoral as it is bought by the
NHS, higher education, research councils and some other R and D establishments), adult social
care accommodation, schools construction (where not covered by Group 1) and prison services.
(4) Procurement policy and procedures, including negotiating international procurement
agreements, identifying supply security issues (to which the UK looks increasingly vulnerable)
and what to do about them, research into the latest procurement developments and how the
public sector could use them and responsibility for regular and complete analyses of public
sector procurement expenditure.
(5) Managing relationships with all major customers, sectors and sector purchasing consortia,
ensuring service level agreements are robust and adhered to. This group would be the ﬁrst port
of call for customers.
(6) The regional directorate would undertake the contracting and letting of purchasing agreements
that are best done regionally or locally rather than nationally. The regional and “conurbation”
procurement hubs would have specialist category teams undertaking on behalf of their regional
client base:
(i) Medium to large contracts.
(ii) Support for projects not handled by the national teams.
(iii) Regional purchasing agreements/framework agreements.
(iv) Management of regional suppliers.
(v) Regional category management.
(vi) Delivery of government, regional and local policies.
(vii) Engagement with regional businesses.
(viii) Customer relationship management and engagement.
(ix) Advice, guidance and support to local procurement teams.
Each regional directorate would work closely with local organisations (operational units) and sector
consortia.
6. Operational units based, for example, in local authorities, hospitals, universities, schools, police forces,
would continue to do some local procurement. Their procurement personnel would not formally be part of
“Crown Procurement”, but would have deﬁned responsibilities, for example:
(i) Placing contracts under, say, £25,000.
(ii) Using standard terms and conditions prescribed by “Crown Procurement”.
(iii) Placing purchase orders.
(iv) Engaging with local suppliers.
(v) Supplier management for their suppliers.
(vi) Local elements of contracts management.
(vii) Ensuring the use of national and regional frameworks and contracts.
(viii) Feeding back, to national and regional teams, supplier performance on contracts and
frameworks let by them.
7. Sector consortia, eg Crescent Purchasing Consortium, would continue to exist, forming a useful link
between the “Crown Procurement” and sector customers. It would also be able to ﬁll any gaps. As now, such
consortia would be funded through rebates and would not need to be part of the “Crown Procurement”.
8. The “big picture” vision recommended in this paper might be easier to sell—perhaps more difﬁcult to
oppose—than a sectoral one. The internal politics within some sectors are renowned and inhibit joint working
on anything. Hence, despite some excellent initiatives, there has been disappointing progress in joint working
in local government procurement. The police and ﬁre services are making only limited progress in this and the
education sector perhaps even less. As local government accounts for £50 billion procurement spend each year
and education (schools, higher and further education) around £20 billion a year, this is serious. The NHS, with
its hospital spend of £20 billion a year has also made only limited progress, though this may change with the
publication of the Carruthers review.
9. The arguments that can be made against joint working in central government will sometimes carry more
substance as the biggest departments have built substantial procurement organisations. For a variety of reasons,
they will have least to gain from joint working. The “big picture” solution, proposed in this paper for the
public sector as a whole, will be more difﬁcult to oppose than a sectoral one for central government.
Implementation
10. Implementation must be done at a manageable rate and might take ﬁve years to complete because of the
sheer scale of public sector procurement in terms of its value, diversity and number of procurement units. It
should be achievable through a “push-pull” approach. The “pull” would be providing an irresistible offering thatcobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
Ev w86 Public Administration Committee: Evidence
organisations would wish to use. The “push” would need to be from ministers to put pressure on departments,
organisations and sectors that unreasonably refused to join and support the proposed “Crown Procurement”. It
would build on existing expertise of the main central government procurement operations, for example those
situated in London, Leeds, Salford, Bristol, Liverpool and Norwich, and the best in the wider public sector in
order to provide an adequate national distribution. These operations would be well positioned to serve the
wider public sector in their regions as well as providing the main procurement functions, so could act as
regional hubs in addition to being part of the other Directorates.
12. Retaining these hubs and building on them would make implementation much easier and more difﬁcult
to oppose.
13. In order to provide an “irresistible offering”, the infrastructure has to exist to deliver it. Retaining these
“hubs”, including those of the Government Procurement Service, should ensure that current service levels are
maintained and even enhanced during the transition period. The Government Procurement Service is rapidly
building business with the wider public sector and would therefore be ideally positioned to take a lead role in
building on its engagement with the wider public sector.
14. In order to make things happen, a Managing Director would need to be appointed without delay.
Experience suggests that in order to re-conﬁgure activities and functions, they would need quickly to take over
line management responsibility for the main departmental hubs mentioned above (within, say, two months of
appointment). They should then be given a realistic, but ambitious target time to re-conﬁgure, say one year.
This would create an immensely powerful procurement organisation. By taking on the procurement
responsibilities of other organisations at a measured pace, they will gradually build its power still further. Any
delays to their taking over line management responsibility will allow opposition to build.
15. Funding. The funding for implementation should come from the income generated by the Government
Procurement Service and by being provided with the budgets for the departmental procurement operations. At
some stage it would need to move from being funded by departments to charging for its activities and through
rebates from suppliers. It should not receive any extra funding from HM Treasury. Nor should there be any
extra funding to support IT. Any spend on IT or other investment should be from income generated by its
own activities.
16. Customer Service. This should be deﬁned through service level agreements. The proposed “Crown
Procurement” would need good service monitoring systems. Regular meetings would need to be held between
representatives of the Customer Relationship Managers Directorate and “intelligent customers” within the
customer organisations and, at a regional level, between members of the regional teams and customer
representatives. For major departments and organisations the “intelligent customer” would be the commercial
director.
17. Ensuring that the right framework agreements were let, which met customer needs, the 2nd and 3rd
Directorates, with the help of the 5th (Customer Relationships) would need to set up user groups to advise and
be involved in the contracting. This would need to be mirrored at regional level.
18. A clear process would need to be established for contracting requests to be processed. These should all
go through the “Customer Relationships” Directorate, that would ensure that the requester was authorised to
do so and had the budget. The progress of the request would be monitored by this Directorate. The approach
in regional hubs would need to mirror this.
19. The work of “Crown Procurement” would be made much easier if all organisations planned and provided
details of their procurement pipelines.
20. Monitoring Performance. “Crown Procurement”, in order to drive up its performance, but also retain
credibility with customers, would need to build in excellent performance monitoring. The Government
Procurement Service approach is ideal for this.
Conclusion
21. There is an excellent opportunity for the whole of public sector procurement to operate as one function
and generate huge beneﬁts in terms of supporting economic growth and delivering savings. This will not impact
on the operating independence of public sector organisations, eg central government departments or local
authorities. Whilst organisations would not beneﬁt equally from the implementation of what is proposed, the
overall beneﬁt would be such that arguments against participating in what is proposed in this paper would be
difﬁcult to sustain. Pursued with some determination and capability, public sector procurement should be
largely transformed within ﬁve years.
Appendix: Evaluating the Beneﬁts of Various Organisational Models for Public Sector Procurement
Colin M Cram FCIPS
Managing Director Marc1 Ltd
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Written evidence submitted by CBI (PROC 28)
1. The CBI is the UK's leading business organisation, speaking for some 240,000 businesses that together
employ around a third of the private sector workforce. With ofﬁces across the UK as well as representation in
Brussels, Washington, Beijing and Delhi the CBI communicates the British business voice around the world.
Question 1—How successful has the Cabinet Ofﬁce been at improving public procurement policy and
practice?
2. The public sector in the UK spends around £230 billion every year on buying goods and services from
external suppliers. To ensure that this money is well spent, public sector bodies need procurement processes
that reliably select the best product, at the best price and encourage suppliers to invest in developing products
that meet current and future needs.
3. While the direction of travel is positive, the government's procurement reforms have delivered mixed
results to date. We are yet to see signiﬁcant improvements to procurement practice. Much remains to be
done and the government needs to work with suppliers to ensure that policy reforms do not have unintended
negative consequences.
4. The Cabinet Ofﬁce needs to ensure that key policies are adopted more widely across central government
in order to speed up the pace of reform. In particular, we welcome the LEAN training programme for
procurement staff, the pilot of the Commissioning Academy and the Mystery Shopper scheme. The pipelines
of future opportunities, focus on SME access and encouragement of early engagement were also highlighted
by our members as positive developments. However, business is keen for these policies to start delivering
greater impact on procurement practices.
5. The current strategy is not sufﬁciently ambitious to realise the government's aims of achieving signiﬁcant
savings and service transformation through procurement reforms. The need for increased commercial skills in
the public sector has been recognised by the government and progress is being made in some areas. However,
to promote the implementation of procurement reforms, the government needs to set out wider reforms to the
civil service. These reforms must address the way in which services are delivered and the integration of diverse
parts of the public sector into joined-up structures that focus on delivering the best possible outcomes.
6. While our members are generally pleased with the reform agenda, some of the policies announced in
recent months will have negative implications for procurement reform. Of particular concern is the lack of
consideration of the implications for bidders of recent policy developments, most notably the Procurement
Policy Note (PPN) `Taking Account of Bidders' Past Performance' issued on 8 November 2012. The
requirements outlined in the documents would lead to a deterioration in the diversity of public sector markets
because of the signiﬁcant bureaucratic burdens and the barriers to entry the proposals entail.
7. While the CBI welcomes clariﬁcation on how the government intends to evaluate and apply minimum
standards for reliability based on past performance in assessing future contracts, the proposals are subjective,
burdensome and represent a barrier to entry for small and medium-sized businesses.
8. We have a number concerns about the nature of the proposals and the resulting reduction in the fairness
and transparency of the new process. Assessing responsibility for past performance is highly complex and in
the absence of judicial ﬁndings of fault we are concerned that the process would be highly subjective. This
would have signiﬁcant implications for the wider transparency of procurement processes.
9. There is signiﬁcant additional burden on potential suppliers created by the requirement for the submission
of supplier `performance certiﬁcates' from bidders to demonstrate past performance. Our members are
concerned that it will generate extra complexity and expense for both the public and private sector.
10. Large companies and established suppliers might be required to obtain and submit thousands of
certiﬁcates, while companies who have previously not supplied the public sector directly may ﬁnd themselves
excluded from competitions because of a lack of performance certiﬁcates. This part of the proposal in particular
runs counter to the government's focus on improving the quality of regulation and should be dropped.
Question 2—What should be the strategic aim of the Government's public procurement policy?
11. The government is right to have focussed on delivering better value for money from public procurement
spend. They have made a positive move towards procurement policies which prioritise the most cost effective
outcomes rather than just focussing on inputs. But there remains much to be done to ensure that the
governments aims align with the wider growth agenda.
12. Government departments can do more to harness the growth potential of public procurement expenditure
by engaging more effectively with the market to promote the development of new products. This is particularly
beneﬁcial in sectors where government is a major customer as it has the ability to stimulate industrial activity
from the demand side through more strategic policy making. A focus on innovation can also help ensure that
the focus on value for money does not revert to lowest cost as the default award criteria.
13. While the government have recognised the link between procurement and growth, implementation of
policies is still being hampered by complex and bureaucratic procurement processes which discouragecobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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companies from investing. 69% of the companies that responded to our procurement survey in autumn 2012
said better procurement practices would encourage them to consider investing more in the UK. 90% of
respondents felt that procurement reforms to date had not done enough to promote the potential for public
procurement to promote economic growth.
Question 3—Does the Government have the right skills and capabilities to procure effectively?
— Does the civil service have the skills and capabilities required to negotiate and manage contracts
effectively?
— What skills do procurement authorities require in-house, what skills can be bought in and what skills
can be contracted out?
— What lessons can central government learn from local government on procurement?
— How successful are government departments and their agencies at communicating their needs to
potential suppliers?
14. The lack of commercial and procurement skills in the public sector is repeatedly highlighted by
government and suppliers as the biggest single barrier to improving procurement processes. The government
have introduced a number of initiatives to improve practices including training programmes and secondment
opportunities and overall, progress is being made. However, the scale of the challenge remains signiﬁcant with
widely varying procurement outcomes at local and national levels.
15. We remain concerned that procurement is seen as a distinct process from the creation of policy. In too
many public sector bodies, procurement is seen as the step after policies have been designed and outcomes
determined rather than as a key part of policy formulation. This means that the skills needed to procure
effectively are often not available to policy teams in central and local government as they develop new policy,
leading to delays and duplication, hampering the purchasing of goods and services. One of the keys to
successful projects is timely input from suppliers to inform decisions throughout the commissioning and
procurement process.
16. Government departments also need to improve how they assess their need for internal and external
procurement support. The pressure to cut the costs of procurement, including relying on (often reduced) in-
house resources, has caused problems, especially on more complex projects, some of which may only become
apparent as they become operational.
17. Progress on procurement reform in local government is very mixed. Progress has been made in many
areas with collaborative procurement and shared services arrangements put in place. Progress has been much
more limited in other areas and consistency, even within those councils who have adopted many innovative
new approaches is lacking.
18. We welcome the work of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills in addressing the need for
better communication of future procurement needs. The pipelines of potential opportunities produced to date
are good step towards a more long-term dialogue with suppliers.
19. To further develop this engagement, government needs to move from a policy of simply communicating
needs to suppliers to one where it works with suppliers to assess the market of potential products that could
help improve outcomes across government departments and services. Pipeline notices should evolve as they
are shaped by engagement. Early notices should be conceptual—based on speciﬁc outcomes that are being
sought. Greater detail should be added to the pipelines as dialogue progresses towards formal procurement
with pipelines becoming broader (covering more areas of spend), deeper (including content from more public
sector bodies) and longer (going further into the future to match investment timescales).
Question 4—How should the civil service ensure it recruits and retains staff with the right skills to run
procurements, to negotiate and manage contracts and to deliver major projects effectively?
Question 6—Does the Government collect the management information it needs to understand how public
procurement is working?
20. In order to ensure it recruits and retains the right staff to procure and manage contracts, the Civil Service
will need to make signiﬁcant changes in how it assesses performance of procurement staff and the products
that they are responsible for purchasing.
21. At present, we see little evidence of a culture of rigorous analysis of the results of procurement across
the public sector. This makes it hard for public bodies to determine best practice and achievements against
policy objectives.
22. Increased analysis of departmental performance needs to be accompanied by better information for
managers and ministers about the performance of staff with procurement and contract management
responsibilities and the effectiveness of their decisions. The lack of understanding of procurement within senior
levels of organisations means that there is a signiﬁcant level of risk aversion that leads to delays and increased
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23. While more data on procurement is being requested from suppliers by government bodies—notably the
Cabinet Ofﬁce—providers are concerned about the way in which sensitive information is being handled and
the lack of consistency in the data which is being requested.
24. To improve performance, there is a need for an increased focus on internal performance assessment. In
particular, the lack of information on internal costs of service provision within departments is a serious barrier
to delivering efﬁciency savings through procurement and benchmarking price and performance.
25. We note that that in many cases public sector procurement staff are signiﬁcantly less experienced than
their private sector counterparts. We recognise the efforts being undertaken by the Chartered Institute of
Purchasing and Supply to support the recruitment and retention of staff but believe that further work is needed
to boost the commercial strength and experience of public sector teams by embedding best practice, developing
better relationships with potential suppliers and ensure that procurement and policy staff are more accountable
for the success or failure of their decisions.
Question 5—Does the Government have the organisational structures in place to enable it to procure
effectively? (For example, how far should the Government centralise responsibility for public procurement?
Do central government procurement `framework agreements' enable more effective public procurement?)
26. The government's reforms have had a major impact on procurement structures across the UK.
The prominent central role played by the Cabinet Ofﬁce in driving improved procurement policy has in the
main been a positive force in improving UK government commercial policies. The increase in central
purchasing and use of frameworks has bought sizeable efﬁciency gains across the public sector. However, we
are concerned about the lack of progress in implementing reforms in individual departments and the lack of a
strategic approach to procurement which ensures that suppliers have the opportunity to help shape policy
decisions where appropriate.
27. We welcome moves to consolidate purchasing in key bulk spend areas. In moving towards further
consolidation, care needs to be taken to ensure that greater centralisation does not lead to the commoditisation
of more complex products and a loss of the connection between the organisation buying a product and the
eventual users. There is much that central government departments can learn from local government and the
way that ofﬁcials have a clearer connection with the products and services they are buying.
28. This link is particularly important where more specialised services are being purchased through
frameworks. In these cases it is important that training for procurement staff is available.
29. Overall, members are pleased with the move to frameworks if the frameworks are well thought out and
widely used. Some frameworks are currently failing to deliver the hoped for spend and the welcome drive to
increase the number of small and medium sized suppliers on frameworks has led to considerable expense for
companies to get on frameworks without a ﬂow of opportunities..
Question 7—How should Government ensure that European directives on public procurement do not inhibit
public bodies' ability to procure effectively?
30. The feedback we receive from members is that the European directives on public procurement are not a
signiﬁcant cause of poor procurement practices in the UK. They are often used to divert attention from poor
practice in departments. We therefore welcome the action that the UK government have taken to challenge
myths about the directives.
31. In most of the cases highlighted by members relating to procedural issues, the problem lies in the way
the UK implements the directives. Members ﬁnd practices to be inconsistent even within individual departments
and the level of gold-plating remains unacceptably high.
32. CBI members operating in other EU countries have contrasted the UK's highly bureaucratic approach
with the more ﬂexible processes adopted in other countries. There is signiﬁcant scope for improvements if
procurement staff are able to apply the current rules with a better level of commercial understanding to underpin
how their work. This would substantially aid the reduction of gold plating.
33. We welcome the work that the UK government is undertaking in Brussels to improve the directives at
an EU level and are particularly pleased at the efforts being made by the Cabinet Ofﬁce to clarify what EU
directives do and do not permit.
Question 8—How should Government assess and manage risk when negotiating procurement contracts? (For
example, how much risk should Government be prepared to accept and what are the limits on the transfer of
risk to the private sector?)
The CBI is increasingly concerned by the government's aggressive approach to risk transfer and the
unforeseen implications that this has for suppliers and potential suppliers. As a basic principle, risk in contracts
should be borne by the party best placed to manage and mitigate that risk. This needs to be done in a way
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34. In recent months, we have become concerned by the increasing number of requests from government
departments for suppliers to assume unlimited and contingent liabilities on the products and services that they
supply. This leads increases in the price of goods and services (and a concomitant increase in the cost of public
procurement), as suppliers need to cover the signiﬁcant cost of insuring such liabilities. Where insurance is
unavailable, or is prohibitively expensive, suppliers are in some cases refusing the offer of government contracts
that request unlimited and/or contingent liability.
35. At present risk registers are usually prepared for major procurements but the level of granularity is often
weak. The quality of these documents is hampered by a poor understanding of what ﬁnancial risk the private
sector can bear.
Question 9—What is the best role for `prime contractors' and what are the advantages and disadvantages of
relying on `prime contractors'?
36. The decision as to whether to adopt a prime contractor or a divided contract based model needs to be
informed by the circumstances of each project and whether the public sector or an individual integrator offers
the best approach to delivering a contract.
37. Experience in the UK and abroad has shown the vital importance of commercial skills and engagement
with the market to determine the relative advantages and disadvantages of each possible approach followed by
swift, effective and outcomes based procurement processes which encourage as broad a range of bidders
as possible.
38. In order to ensure that the prime contractor model is more accessible to small and medium sized
businesses, more should be done to enable combined bids from groups of small and medium sized companies
and charities. Bids of this sort will be very negatively impacted by proposals for enhanced consideration of
past performance.
Question 10—What are the key lessons to be learned from the experience of cost overruns, delays and
project failures in central Government procurement over the past ﬁve years or so?
40. Experience in the UK and other countries has demonstrated any of the major issues in the procurement,
delivery and operation of major projects stem from poor initial planning on the part of the public sector and
the need to divert substantial resources to deal with complex planning and regulatory systems.
41. The lack of recognition of the importance of good procurement and contract management on major
projects has led to problems. Too often, procurement is seen as something that happens after a decision has
been made about what to buy, rather than one stage of the longer commissioning process with little attention
paid to the development of effective management processes to ensure delivery.
42. Many of the policy reforms currently being implemented are working well to address this situation,
however more needs to be done to ensure that procurement of major projects is effectively resourced and the
issue of performance is adequately considered. We welcome many of the announcements on procurement in
the Treasury's PF2 model.
43. To ensure delivery, contracts and funding agreements should also be explicitly clear about the KPIs
against which success and failure will be judged and where relevant drafted with failure and continuity in
mind. They should set out details about how it will managed and provider responsibilities. This also applies to
contract terms and conditions to ensure they support continuity. In many situations, providers who are capable
of stepping in to take over from a failed organisation end up being bound by the same commercial terms and
conditions making the prospect unattractive.
44. But as the Public Accounts Committee found in 2009, 56% of public service contracts do not contain
details on contingency planning for failure.[i] There is therefore potentially scope for more to be done, but yet
again it is also important to consider whether any conditions set out in a contract might prove so stringent that
they act as a barrier to entry for smaller organisations for whom these pose too great a risk if things go wrong.[ii]
References
[i] Quoted in OFT (2012) Orderly Exit: Designing continuity regimes in public markets
[ii] OFT (2012) Orderly Exit: Designing continuity regimes in public markets
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Written evidence submitted by Stephen Ratcliffe, UKCG (PROC 29)
I am writing about evidence given to your inquiry by Colin Cram on 22 January. He made reference to the
operation of a construction cartel that had cost the taxpayer some £300 million. This is a gross mis-
representation of the OFT's construction inquiry and I want to set the record straight.
The OFT inquiry focussed on the practice of “cover pricing”. Cover pricing occurred when a bid was entered
for a job that a contractor did not wish to win. In essence, the contractor would try to price the job too high to
avoid being awarded the work. This, in itself, is not an infringement of competition law. Covers were submitted
to avoid upsetting a client and avoid the risk of not being invited to bid for future contracts.
However, if this artiﬁcially high tender was then discussed with another contractor who was also bidding
for the work—for example, to conﬁrm it was high enough not to win—it would breach competition law. The
clear motivation for this practice was to avoid getting work rather than inﬂating prices. During the investigation
OFT certainly did not suggest there had been a cost to the taxpayer of £300 million.
It is fair to say that over 15 years ago the practice of cover pricing appears to have been widespread in the
construction industry. This was at a time when the vast majority of business was undertaken through single
stage competitive tendering where contracts were awarded at the lowest price. Over the past 15 years or so we
have seen signiﬁcant changes in the way construction is procured, including the advent of “best value”, more
collaborative forms of working and longer term relationships developing between contractors and clients. Thus
the opportunity for cover pricing has signiﬁcantly diminished and the practice is largely historic.
As a consequence of the OFT investigation, which had been ongoing for the past ﬁve years, construction
companies now have a clearer understanding of the fact that cover pricing is deemed to infringe competition
law and have put in place strict competition law compliance policies and procedures to ensure that they do not
become involved in this practice or any other similar practices in the future.
With the encouragement of the OFT, the UKCG has also launched a Competition Law Code of Conduct
which has been widely supported throughout the industry. I hope this sets the record straight. Please let me
know if you require any further information.
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Written supplementary evidence submitted by FSB on SMEs and procurement (PROC 30)
Introduction
This supplementary submission to the Public Administration Select Committee covers key areas of interest
regarding procurement in 4 sections.
1. An overview of FSB research ﬁndings on local authority procurement.
2. The FSB's recommendations on local authority procurement.
3. Common myths and misconceptions about procurement.
4. The FSB's best practice model for local authorities.
The FSB’s Recommendations on Local Authority Procurement.
The survey of local authority Directors and Head of Procurement provided FSB with a range of qualitative
and quantitative evidence about local government procurement practice and the relationship between local
authorities and SMEs. The key ﬁndings were as follows:
Spend
— 34% of local authorities spend less than £50 million annually upon procuring goods and services.
— The average total annual spend of local authorities upon procuring goods and services is £183
million.
— Authorities spent on average 26% of their total spend upon capital activities and 74% upon
revenue activities.
— 62% of local authorities record the amount of spend within their own local authority boundary.
— On average, local authorities spend 34.8% of their total procurement spend in their own local
authority boundary.
— 51% of local authorities record the amount of spend with SMEs.
— On average, local authorities spend 49% of their total procurement spend with SMEs.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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Barriers
— 66% of local authorities felt that SMEs face barriers in accessing procurement opportunities. Key
perceived barriers were around the capacity and skills of SMEs to bid and deliver; and a lack of
awareness of opportunities;
Engagement
— 94% of local authorities have initiatives to support SMEs in tendering; 68% of those with initiatives
in place felt they were best practice initiatives. These initiatives included online tools and guides
around tendering; simpliﬁed and streamlined documentation; and targeted capacity building for
SMEs;
— 74% of local authorities adopt different processes for below EU threshold tenders.
— The vast majority of local authorities use council and regional portals as a means of advertising
tender opportunities.
Economic, social and environmental beneﬁts
— 86% of local authorities felt their procurement strategy linked “well” or “very well” to wider
corporate objectives.
— The most important contemporary issue in the procurement process for local authorities is achieving
cost savings.
— 99% of local authorities utilise buying and purchasing frameworks in their procurement processes.
Payment
— 93% of local authorities have in place policies for the payment of suppliers.
— 51% of local authorities seek to pay suppliers in less than 28 days.
— 49% of local authorities seek to pass on their payment terms to their main contractors.
The FSB’s Recommendations on Local Authority Procurement
The results of the survey provided a relatively positive picture in terms of the relationship between local
authorities and small business when it came to tendering and purchasing. However, FSB and CLES felt that
there was more that could be done to ensure procurement was not only a spending decision, but a process
where consideration of economic, social and environmental beneﬁt were embedded at all stages. This and the
government's increasing drive for more efﬁcient and effective procurement practices shaped recommendations.
These recommendations were:
1. Councils to adopt a procurement strategy that recognises the signiﬁcant beneﬁts of procuring from
local small businesses when tendering for goods and services;
2. Local authority economic development strategies to take account of the needs of the existing local
economy and inform procurement strategy based on a comprehensive analysis of spend;
3. Councils to consider actively how much of each procurement decision should be assigned to social
value considerations;
4. All authorities to have mechanisms in place to record and analyse where and with which businesses
their money is spent. This should include measuring the size of enterprise—medium, small or micro;
5. Councils to make information on spend publicly available and easily accessible, at least annually;
6. Councils to monitor and take account of the economic impact of their key spending decisions;
7. All authorities to adopt the relevant government-led, streamlined and standardised pre-qualiﬁcation
questionnaires (PQQ), with further effort made to ensure simpliﬁed processes are in place for smaller
procurements below EU thresholds, including speciﬁc approaches for the lowest value contracts;
8. All councils in the UK to use the relevant national portal to advertise their procurement opportunities
(Contracts Finder, Public Contracts Scotland, Sell2Wales, Esourcing NI);
9. Council procurement strategies to set out how they will ensure best practice is followed and how
they will monitor that progress;
10. Local authorities to ensure their use of selection requirements is proportionate and based purely on
the needs of the contract;
11. Councils to ensure they have initiatives to support local SMEs with the tender process and to develop
the potential of their local small business supplier base;
12. Councils to provide detailed, speciﬁc and timely feedback to all businesses that tender unsuccessfully
so they are better placed to bid next time;
13. Councils to break down contracts into smaller lots wherever possible;
14. Councils to put in place and monitor speciﬁc payment policies for small business suppliers, ideally
following the lead of national government pledges to pay within 10 days of receipt;cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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15. Councils to use spending power to ensure that prime contractors pass on the council's payments
terms to their subcontracted suppliers;
16. Government to support councils in following good practice, including by issuing clear guidance and
taking action to ensure it is followed if necessary.
Common Myths And Misconceptions about Procurement
Urgent action is needed to address the prevalence of unnecessary selection practices such as disproportionate
turnover and insurance requirements. Procurers also need to be familiar with what is and is not permissible
within the procurement procedure. Some unnecessary approaches seem to become permanently embedded in
the procurement process, resulting in myths and misconceptions about what is permissible. What starts out as
guidance has in some cases become ingrained so that it is treated as a public procurement rule that cannot be
diverted from. This situation is compounded by the fact that many SMEs also believe these “rules” and
therefore do not participate in the process. There are number of issues that the FSB believes need to be
addressed and these are set out in more detail in section 7 of the report under the title, “Myths and
misconceptions to dispel”. A summary of this follows.
The FSB regularly hears tales of unnecessary rules causing problems or EU Directives preventing SME-
friendly procurement. It is often not the law itself that creates barriers to procuring from SMEs, but the way
that it is put into practice. In particular, both procurers and small businesses may believe commonly accepted
assertions that are in fact wrong. Some examples follow.
Myth 1: Procurers should use standard minimum turnover and insurance requirements, which
all businesses must meet.
Such tests are permitted but not required by law. There are no regulatory rules on the minimum “economic
and ﬁnancial standing”: these standards are actually set by the contracting authority and are often tested by
unnecessarily high turnover rules that exclude small companies.
Contracting authorities should avoid using a mechanistic approach, such as applying arbitrary minimum
turnover levels. Any essential insurance requirements should be a condition of winning rather than of competing
for a contract. EU rules actually require that any “minimum standard” must be necessary and proportionate in
each case, not set at the same threshold for each procurement.
Meeting such tests is no guarantee of future results. Many businesses that cannot meet the given criteria or
demonstrate a lengthy ﬁnancial track record do not represent a risk. The risk depends on the nature of the
contract, the type of service/good being procured and the ease with which it could be procured from an
alternative supplier. Tenders should be undertaken on this basis.
Myth 2: Procurers cannot divide contracts into smaller parts to make them more accessible to
small businesses
There is nothing in law that stops contracts being divided into smaller lots, so long as contracting authorities
are not doing this deliberately to avoid procurement legislation. In fact, the European Code of Best Practices
(EU guidance) speciﬁcally mentions subdivision into lots as a way of opening access to small ﬁrms. The
current proposals for change to the Directives are looking to strengthen this to make sure it occurs more often.
Myth 3: Aggregating contracts and reducing the supplier base is the best way to achieve
savings
Not necessarily. While it may be perceived as administratively easier, forcing suppliers to move down the
supply chain to work through a prime contractor may actually increase costs (including the prime's margin).
This approach can also risk reducing competition, increasing reliance on a small number of suppliers and
forcing out other innovative and useful businesses.
Myth 4: Procurers must fully adhere to the EU rules in all their procurements to make sure
they are not in breach of any regulations
Contracting authorities must adhere to EU Treaty principles when conducting their procurements. However,
there are a number of instances where the detailed provisions of the EU procurement rules do not apply, such
as for contracts below the threshold value and those for Part B services. In such instances, following the
detailed procedures set out in the EU procurement Directives is unnecessary and off-putting for many potential
suppliers, and may simply serve to lock out smaller providers.
Procurers should carefully consider what processes are really necessary in order to achieve their commercial
objectives. This will beneﬁt both suppliers and the procurer by saving unnecessary resources and avoiding
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Myth 5: Procurers cannot speak to potential suppliers prior to a procurement process
The rules do not prevent pre-procurement market engagement. Procurement teams are encouraged to consult
freely with the market place before starting the procurement process to help them select what to buy and how
best to buy it. Pre-procurement discussions are not about showing favour to a particular bidder, but rather
exploring market capability. Events such as “supplier days” are an excellent way to meet small businesses as
potential suppliers and see what they have to offer. It is important that all suppliers are treated equally and no
one bidder is given an unfair advantage. For example, speciﬁcations must not be drawn up in such a way as
to favour a particular solution.
Myth 6: Procurers are under a duty to ﬁnd the cheapest price for their contracts
Public contracts should be awarded on the basis of value for money, not lowest price. Putting too much
emphasis on price opens up the procurer to a range of potential problems, not least the risk that contracts are
awarded to a supplier who has deliberately bid too low or is unable to deliver the contract with sufﬁcient
quality. Procurements should be approached with a sensible balance of quality and cost.
Myth 7: Procurers cannot lawfully incorporate social value such as sustainability into
procurement
If social or other sustainability requirements are relevant to the subject matter or performance of the contract,
they can be taken into account during the tendering process. If written into the contract speciﬁcations such
considerations must be proportionate and represent value for money. Provided a sufﬁcient number of potential
suppliers are capable of delivering that requirement, the procurement can still be competitive. Bidders can then
be asked to put forward proposals such as around employment creation and supply chain engagement for
consideration by the contracting authority when it decides which tender is the “most economically
advantageous”.
The Public Services (Social Value) Act will mean that all public bodies in England and Wales are required
to consider how their services procurement might improve the economic, social and environmental wellbeing
of the area.
The FSB’s best practice model for local authorities
The FSB believes that a model procurement authority:
(1) Has an SME Procurement Policy with clear and identiﬁed links to wider corporate objectives
(2) Has in place a mature supplier database that breaks suppliers down by:
(a) Number of employees (not just by SME but by micro, small and medium);
(b) Location (primary and secondary postcode);
(c) Revenue or capital spend; and
(d) Type of service/good delivered
3) Has a close working relationship between procurement and economic development, with economic
development providing market intelligence on local suppliers and SMEs
4) Has a mechanism for regular monitoring and mapping of procurement spend and the outcomes
achieved through that spend
5) Has an effective understanding of the barriers facing certain organisations in the procurement process
and a menu of appropriate initiatives with which to respond
6) Has clear advice and guidance available for SMEs on how to supply to the council
7) Has a range of means of advertising and promoting contract opportunities according to the scale of
the contract and the types of good and service on offer, including:
(a) A clearly accessible dedicated procurement section of the council website;
(b) Consistent use of online mechanisms for bidders to register their organisation's information and
interest in contract opportunities; and
(c) Use of the relevant national portal in addition to any other methods to publicise opportunities.
8) Has effective cross-departmental relations and partnership working with local business forums and
networks
9) Has transparent mechanisms and a policy for the prompt payment of suppliers
10) Has standardised and simpliﬁed PQQs
11) Has a means of engaging with SMEs from market testing through to contract award
12) Provides a host of tender support activities, including training and workshops
13) Actively promotes supplier engagement policies with core contractors
14) Provides training for procurement staff in economic, social and environmental beneﬁts
15) Provides timely and detailed feedback to unsuccessful bidderscobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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16) Has a clear and simpliﬁed process for undertaking procurements below the EU threshold
17) Has put in place steps to ensure future procurements will comply with the relevant national
government legislation and guidance
March 2013
Written evidence submitted by Professor Christopher Bovis (PROC 31)
Public Procurement in the Single Market of the European Union and its Member States
1. Public procurement is an essential component of the single market and the European integration. Public
procurement has been identiﬁed as a considerable non-tariff barrier and a hindering factor for the functioning
of a genuinely competitive single market.
2. The main reason for regulating public sector and utilities procurement is to bring their respective markets
in parallel to the operation of private markets. European policy makers have recognised the distinctive character
of public markets and focused on establishing conditions similar to those that control the operation of private
markets. The public markets reﬂect an economic equation where the demand side is represented by the public
sector at large and the utilities, whereas the supply side covers the industry.
3. The state and its organs would enter the market place in pursuit of public interest.46 However, the
activities of the state and its organs do not display the commercial characteristics of private entrepreneurship,
as the aim of the public sector is not the maximisation of proﬁts but the observance of public interest.47 This
fundamental difference emerges as the ground for the creation of public markets where public interest
substitutes proﬁt maximisation.48 However, further variances distinguish private from public markets. These
focus on structural elements of the market place, competitiveness, demand conditions, supply conditions, the
production process, and ﬁnally pricing and risk. They also provide for an indication as to the different methods
and approaches employed in their regulation.49
4. Private markets are generally structured as a result of competitive pressures originating in the interaction
between buyers and supplier and their conﬁguration can vary from monopoly or oligopoly conditions to models
representing perfect competition. Demand arises from heterogeneous buyers with a variety of speciﬁc needs,
is based on expectations and is multiple for each product. Supply, on the other hand, is offered through various
product ranges, where products are standardised using known technology, but constantly improved through
research and development processes. The production process is based on mass-production patterns and the
product range represents a large choice including substitutes, whereas the critical production factor is cost
level. The development cycle appears to be short to medium-term and ﬁnally, the technology of products
destined for the private markets is evolutionary. Purchases are made when an acceptable balance between price
and quality is achieved. Purchase orders are multitude and at limited intervals. Pricing policy in private markets
is determined by competitive forces and the purchasing decision is focused on the price-quality relation, where
the risk factor is highly present.
5. On the other hand, public markets tend to be structured and to function in a different way. The market
structure often reveals monopsony characteristics.50 In terms of its origins, demand in public markets is
institutionalised and operates mainly under budgetary considerations rather than price mechanisms. It is also
based on fulﬁlment of tasks (pursuit of public interest) and it is single for many products. Supply also has
limited origins, in terms of the establishment of close ties between the public sector and industries supplying
it and there is often a limited product range. Products are rarely innovative and technologically advanced and
pricing is determined through tendering and negotiations. The purchasing decision is primarily based upon the
life-time cycle, reliability, price and political considerations. Purchasing patterns follow tendering and
negotiations and often purchases are dictated by policy rather than price/quality considerations.
6. The regulation of public procurement has been justiﬁed on economic grounds. Justiﬁcations for its
regulation are based on the assumption that by introducing competitiveness into the relevant markets of the
Member States, their liberalization and integration will follow. This result, in theory, would increase import
penetration of products and services destined for the public sector, would enhance the tradability of public
contracts across the common market and would bring about signiﬁcant savings and price convergence.
7. Signiﬁcant legal reasons have emerged by positioning the regulation of public procurement as a necessary
ingredient of the fundamental principles of the Treaties, such as the free movement of goods and services, the
46 See Valadou, La notion de pouvoir adjudicateur en matière de marchés de travaux, Semaine Juridique, 1991, Ed. E, No.3;
Bovis, La notion et les attributions d'organisme de droit public comme pouvoirs adjudicateurs dans le régime des marchés
publics, Contrats Publics, Septembre 2003.
47 Flamme et Flamme, Enﬁn l' Europe des Marchés Publics, Actualité Juridique—Droit Administratif, 1989.
48 On the issue of public interest and its relation with proﬁt, see cases C-223/99, Agora Srl v Ente Autonomo Fiera Internazionale
di Milano and C-260/99 Excelsior Snc di Pedrotti Runa & C v. Ente Autonomo Fiera Internazionale di Milano, [2001] ECR
3605; C-360/96, Gemeente Arnhem Gemeente Rheden v. BFI Holding BV, [1998] ECR 6821; C-44/96, Mannesmann Anlangenbau
Austria AG et al. v. Strohal Rotationsdurck GesmbH, [1998] ECR 73.
49 See Bovis, The Liberalisation of Public Procurement in the European Union and its Effects on the Common Market, Ashgate,
1998, Chapter 1.
50 Monopsony is the reverse of monopoly power. The state and its organs often appear as the sole outlet for an industry's output.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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right of establishment and the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality.51 Finally, policy
justiﬁcations of public procurement regulation have revealed a sui generis market place often referred to as
marchés publics.52(public markets), where despite of the inability of competition law to regulate it, an
overwhelming need for transparency and accountability points towards the regime of public procurement as a
safeguard to the above principles.53
8. Inﬂuenced by the White Paper for the Completion of the Internal Market54 and the Single European Act,
the 1996 European Commission's Green Paper55 and the 1998 European Commission's Communication56
public procurement law and policy has been shaped by reference to the instrumental role of the European Court
of Justice.57
9. The current public procurement Directives58 are based upon a clear dichotomy between the public sector
and utilities procurement. Although the same fundamental principles underpin procurement liberalization in
the public and utilities sectors, their separate regulation reveals the positive effects of liberalization of network
industries which has stimulated commercialism and competitiveness and provided for the justiﬁcation of a
more relaxed regime in utilities procurement and the acceptance that utilities, in some form or another represent
sui generis contracting authorities which do not need a rigorous and detailed regulation of their procurement.
10. The separation between public and utilities procurement regulation also reﬂects on the main emphasis
of European Institutions to open up the public sector procurement markets. The fusion of the public sector
rules governing supplies, works and services procurement into a single legal instrument represents a successful
codiﬁcation which has two important implications: legal efﬁciency and compliance. The main inﬂuence for the
codiﬁed public sector procurement Directive can be traced in important case-law from the European Court of
Justice, in particular case-law on the deﬁnition of contracting authorities,59 the use of selection and
qualiﬁcation criteria,60 and the possibility for contracting authorities to use environmental and social
considerations61 as criteria for the award of public contracts.
11. The public procurement Directives are lex specialis, aiming at complementing duties and obligations
arising from fundamental freedoms of Community law in respect to intra-community trade in public contracts.
The application of primary Community law is precluded in the presence of exhaustive provisions of secondary
law,62 and by deﬁnition, the public procurement Directives as lex specialis legal instruments contain exhaustive
harmonisation legislative measures which prevent the general application of Community law.
51 See Drijber and Stergiou, Public Procurement Law and Internal Market Law, 46 CMLRev, 2009, 805–846; Bovis, Recent case
law relating to public procurement: A beacon for the integration of public markets, 39 CMLRev, 2002, pp. 1025–1056.
52 See cases C-223/99, Agora Srl v Ente Autonomo Fiera Internazionale di Milano and C-260/99 Excelsior Snc di Pedrotti Runa &
C v. Ente Autonomo Fiera Internazionale di Milano, [2001] ECR 3605; C-360/96, Gemeente Arnhem Gemeente Rheden v. BFI
Holding BV, [1998] ECR 6821; C-44/96, Mannesmann Anlangenbau Austria AG et al. v. Strohal Rotationsdurck GesmbH, [1998]
ECR 73.
53 See European Commission, Report to the Laeken European Council: Services of General Interest, COM (2001) 598; European
Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the regions on the Status of Work on the Examination of a Proposal for a Framework Directive
on Services of General Interest, COM(2002) 689; European Commission, Green Paper on Services of General Interest, COM
(2003) 270; European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: White Paper on services of general interest, COM (2004)
374. See also Bovis, The State, Competition and Public Services, Chapter 11 in The European Union Legal Order after Lisbon,
Birkinshaw and Varney (Eds), Kluwer, 2010.
54 See European Commission, White Paper for the Completion of the Internal Market, (COM) 85 310 ﬁn., 1985.
55 See the Green Paper on Public Procurement in the European Union: Exploring the way forward, European Commission 1996.
56 See European Commission, Communication on Public Procurement in the European Union, COM(98) 143.
57 See Bovis, Developing Public Procurement Regulation: jurisprudence and its inﬂuence on law making, 43 CMLRev 2006, p.p.
461–495.
58 See Directive 2004/18, OJ L 134, 30.4.2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public
supply contracts and public service contracts and Directive 2004/17, OJ L 134, 30.4.2004 coordinating the procurement
procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors.
59 See cases C-237/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-939; C-470/99 Universale-Bau and Others [2002] ECR I-11617; C-
373/00 Adolf Truley [2003] ECR-193; C-84/03, Commission v Spain, not yet reported; C-44/96 Mannesmann Anlagenbau
Austria, [1998] ECR I-73; C-31/87 Beentjes [1988] ECR 4635; C-360/96 BFI Holding [1998] ECR I-6821; C-18/01,
Arkkitehtuuritoimisto Riitta Korhonen Oy, Arkkitehtitoimisto Pentti Toivanen Oy, Rakennuttajatoimisto Vilho Tervomaa
andVarkauden Taitotalo Oy,; C-223/99, Agora Srl v Ente Autonomo Fiera Internazionale di Milano, and C-260/99 Excelsior
Snc di Pedrotti runa & C v. Ente Autonomo Fiera Internazionale di Milano, [2001] ECR 3605; C-360/96, Gemeente Arnhem
Gemeente Rheden v. BFI Holding BV, [1998] ECR 6821; C-343/95 Diego Cali et Figli [1997] ECR 1–1547; C-380/98 University
of Cambridge [2000] ECR I-8035; C-237/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-939; C-26/03, Stadt Halle, RPL Recyclingpark
Lochau GmbH v Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische Restabfall- und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna; C107/98 Teckal
[1999] ECR I8121; C-18/01 Korhonen and Others [2003] ECR I-5321; C-237/99 Commission v France (OPAC), [2001] ECR
I-939.
60 See cases C-315/01, (GAT) and Österreichische Autobahnen und Schnellstraßen AG (ÖSAG), ECR [2003] I-6351; C-21/03 and
C-34/03, Fabricom SA v État Belge, judgment of 3 March 2005; C285/99 and C286/99 Lombardini and Mantovani [2001] ECR
I9233; C324/98 Telaustria and Telefonadress, [2000] ECR I10745; C-126/03, Commission v Germany, [2004] ECR I-11197; C-
176/98 Holst Italia [1999] ECR I-8607, paragraph 29; C-399/98 Ordine degli Architetti and Others [2001] ECR I-5409,
paragraph 92; C-314/01 Siemens and ARGE Telekom & Partner [2004] ECR I-2549, paragraph 44; C57/01 Makedoniko Metro
and Mikhaniki [2003] ECR I1091.
61 See cases C-31/87, Gebroeders Beentjes B.V. v. State of Netherlands [1988] ECR 4635; C-225/98, Nord-Pas-de-Calais
Commission v. French Republic, [2000] ECR 7445; Case C-513/99, Concordia Bus Filandia Oy Ab v. Helsingin Kaupunki et
HKL-Bussiliikenne, [2002] ECR 7213.
62 Case C37/92 Vanacker and Lesage [1993] ECR I4947, paragraph 9; Case C324/99 DaimlerChrysler [2001] ECR I9897,
paragraph 32; and Case C322/01 Deutscher Apothekerverband [2003] ECR I14887, paragraph 64.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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12. The Public Sector Directive and the Utilities Directive provide for mutual exclusivity of their
provisions63 as well as their non applicability in cases of public contracts awarded pursuant to international
rules,64 or secret contracts and contracts requiring special security measures or contracts related with the
protection of Member States' essential interests.65
13. The Public Sector Directive also does not cover public contracts of which their object is to provide or
exploit public telecommunications networks,66 contracts for the acquisition or rental or land; contracts related
to broadcasting services; contracts related with ﬁnancial securities, capital raising activities and central bank
services; employment contracts; and research and development contracts which do not beneﬁt the relevant
contacting authority67. The Directive does not also apply to service concessions68 or service contracts awarded
on the basis of an exclusive right awarded by a contracting authority to another contracting authority or to an
association of contracting authorities on the basis of an exclusive right which they enjoy pursuant to a published
law, regulation or administrative provision which is compatible with the Treaty.69
14. The Utilities Directive does not apply to contracts awarded to contracting authorities on the basis of an
exclusive right which they enjoy pursuant to a published law, regulation or administrative provision which is
compatible with the Treaty,70 contracts awarded for purposes of resale or lease to third parties,71 contracts
awarded in a third country,72 contracts awarded to afﬁliated undertakings,73 contracts awarded by contracting
entities engaged in the provision or operation of ﬁxed networks for the purchase of water and for the supply
of energy or of fuels for the production of energy,74 contracts subject to special arrangements for the
exploitation and exploration ing geographical areas for the purpose of exploring for or extracting oil, gas, coal
or other solid fuels by virtue of European law,75 contracts and framework agreements awarded by central
purchasing bodies,76 contracts of which their object activity is directly exposed to competition on markets to
which access is not restricted77 and contracts related to works and service concessions78 which are awarded
by contracting entities carrying out one or more of the activities covered by the Utilities Directive and in
particular activities including gas, heat and electricity, water, transport services, postal services, exploration for
oil, gas or other solid fuels, extraction of oil, gas or other solid fuels and provision of ports and airports where
those concessions are awarded for carrying out those activities.
15. Public procurement and Industrial policy
16. The intellectual support of public procurement regulation in the European Union draws inferences from
economic theories. Although the regulation of public procurement aims primarily at the purchasing patterns of
the demand side, it is envisaged that the integration of public markets through enhanced competition, could
bring about beneﬁcial effects for the supply side. These effects focus on the optimal allocation of resources
within European industries, the rationalisation of production and supply, the promotion of mergers and
acquisitions and the creation of globally competitive industries. Public procurement has cyclical dynamics. It
purports to change both behavioural and structural perceptions and applies its effects to both the demand and
supply sides.
17. The integration of the public markets of the European Union is achieved solely by reference to the
regulation of the purchasing behaviour of the demand side (the contracting authorities). The behaviour of the
supply side is not the subject of public procurement legislation, although its regulation would arguably be of
equal importance to the integration of public markets in the European Union. The supply side in the public
procurement equation is subject to the competition law and policy of the European Union, although there is
not any integral mechanism in the public procurement legislation which is capable of introducing the anti-trust
rules to the supply side. Stricto sensu, anti-competitive behaviour of undertakings or collusive tendering do not
appear as reasons for disqualiﬁcation from the selection and award procedures of public contracts.
18. European Institutions have assumed that by encouraging the public and the utilities sectors in the
European Union to adopt a purchasing behaviour which is homogenous and is based on the principles of
openness, transparency and non-discrimination will achieve efﬁciency gains and public sector savings and
stimulate industrial restructuring in the supply side.
63 See the Utilities Directive 2004/17, OJ 2004, L 134/1.
64 See Article 15 of the Public Sector Directive and Article 22(a) of the Utilities Directive.
65 See Article 14 of the Public Sector Directive and Article 21 of the Utilities Directive.
66 See Article 13 of the Public Sector Directive.
67 See Article 16 of the Public Sector Directive.
68 See Article 17 of the Public Sector Directive.
69 See Article 18 of the Public Sector Directive.
70 See Article 25 of the Utilities Directive.
71 See Article 19(1) of the Utilities Directive.
72 See Article 20(1) of the Utilities Directive.
73 See Article 23(2)(a) of the Utilities Directive.
74 See Article 26(a) of the Utilities Directive.
75 See Article 27 of the Utilities Directive.
76 See Article 29(2) of the Utilities Directive.
77 See Article 30(1) of the Utilities Directive.
78 See Article 30(6) third indent of the Utilities Directive.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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19. The European Commission has claimed that the regulation of public procurement throughout the
European Union and the resulting elimination of non-tariff barriers arising from discriminatory and preferential
purchasing patterns of Member Sates could bring about substantial savings. Combating discrimination on
grounds of nationality in the award of public procurement contracts and eliminating domestic preferential
purchasing schemes could result in efﬁciency gains at European and national levels through the emergence of
three major effects which would primarily inﬂuence the supply side. These include a trade effect, a competition
effect and a restructuring effect.
20. The trade effect represents the actual and potential savings that the public sector will be able to achieve
through lower cost purchasing. The trade effect is a result of the principle of transparency in public markets
(compulsory advertisement of public contracts above certain thresholds). However, the principle of transparency
and the associated trade effect in public markets do not in themselves guarantee the establishment of
competitive conditions in the relevant markets, as market access—a structural element in the process of
integration of public markets in Europe—could be subsequently hindered by the discriminatory behaviour of
contracting authorities in the selection stages and the award stages of public procurement. The trade effect
has a static dimension, since it emerges as a consequence of enhanced market access in the relevant sector
or industry.
21. The competition effect relates to the changes of industrial performance as a result of changes in the price
behaviour of national ﬁrms which had previously been protected from competition by means of preferential
and discriminatory procurement practices. The competition effect derives also from the principle of
transparency and appears to possess rather static characteristics. Transparency in public procurement breaks
down information and awareness barriers in public markets, and as mentioned above, it brings a trade effect
in the relevant sectors or industries by means of price competitiveness. The competition effect comes as a
natural sequence to price competitiveness and inserts an element of long-term competitiveness in the relevant
industries in aspects other than price (eg research and development, innovation, customer care). The
competition effect will materialise in the form of price convergence of goods, works and services destined for
the public sector. Price convergence could take place both nationally and Community-wide, in as much as
competition in the relevant markets would equalise the prices of similar products.
22. Finally, the restructuring effect reveals the restructuring dimension and the re-organisational dynamics
in the supply side, as a result of increased competition in the relevant markets. The restructuring effect is a
dynamic one and refers to the long-term industrial and sectoral adjustment within industries that supply the
public sector. The restructuring effect will encapsulate the reaction of the relevant sector or industry to the
competitive regime imposed upon the demand and supply sides, as a result of openness and transparency and
the sequential trade and competition effects. The response of the relevant sector or industry and the restructuring
effect itself would depend on the efﬁciency of the industry to merge, diversify, convert or abort the relevant
competitive markets and would also reﬂect upon contemporary national industrial policies.79
23. If scale economies were important in deﬁning the most desirable purchasing pattern for the public sector
and if competition were to increase amongst industries which supply the latter, an efﬁcient European industrial
structure would support less ﬁrms operating at full capacity.80 Strategic mergers and cross-border investments
would reshape the industries and reorganise the operation of ﬁrms. Within this reorganisation process, the
structural adjustment would constantly change in order to adapt to the new market environment introduced by
the legal regime on public procurement. In the process of developing new industrial strategies, two factors
appear essential: the need for integration of industrial activities81 and the need to meet local demands.
24. During the past many of the advantages offered to national champions and locally operating ﬁrms in
public procurement markets had discouraged the tradability of public contracts82 amongst European
industries.83 Persistently low import penetration in protected public procurement sectors dictated a corporate
strategy to the relevant industries. Before the opening-up of the public procurement in Europe, the typical
strategic choice was low on integration and high on responsiveness, including the replication of all major
corporate functions (production, research and development, marketing) in each member state. The on-going
realisation of the common market and the regulation of public procurement in the European Union have been
forcing undertakings to revise their strategies and to build-up network organisations, which combine local
responsiveness with a high degree of centralisation and co-ordination of major supporting activities. The new
strategy has the characteristics of a multi-focal strategy.
25. The adoption of multi-focal strategies or global integration strategies involves a major shift in location
patterns of key functions within ﬁrms.84 The old decentralised multinational organisations which duplicated
major functions in each country which they operated need to transform into an integrated system of which the
79 See European Commission, The Opening-up of Public Procurement to Foreign Direct Investment in the European Community,
CC 93/79, 1995.
80 See Dunning, Explaining Changing Patterns of International Production: in Defence of the Eclectic Theory, Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and Statistics, (1979), Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 269–295.
81 See Dunning, The Globalisation of Business, The Challenge of the 1990s, (1993), Routledge, London and New York.
82 The term tradability of public contracts denotes the effectiveness of the supply side to engage in transactions with public
authorities in Member States other than the State of its residence or nationality.
83 See McLachlan, Discriminatory Public Procurement, Economic Integration and the Role of Bureaucracy, Journal of Common
Market Studies, (1985), Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 357–372.
84 Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, (1990), MacMillan, London.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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key elements show a different degree of regional concentration.85 As a consequence of the new organisational
structure, different types of international transactions are expected to occur.86 Specialisation and concentration
of activities in certain regions will lead to more trade between certain Member States. In addition, as a result
of the corporate network system, trade will increasingly develop into-intra-ﬁrm trade and intra-industry trade
with greater exchange of intermediary products.87 The organisational rationalisation following the
development of network organisations may result in a problem of ownership and location of the corporate
headquarters. Some Member States may fear losing strategic control in the restructuring process88 and
therefore may resist the rationalisation process that the industry has been undergoing, by imposing various
restrictions in terms of ownership or control structures of locally operating ﬁrms.
26. Import penetration in the public sector remains signiﬁcantly lower than in the private sector. In 2005
public sector import penetration stood at 7.5%, compared to private sector import penetration of 19.1%. The
low level of public sector import penetration can be attributed to the nature of the goods and services that the
public sector consumes. Public administration, education, health and social services make up more than 60%
of public sector expenditure (25.3%, 14.3% and 21.2% respectively in 2005). These sectors have import
penetration close to zero (0.1%). In markets for public contracts which are the speciﬁc focus of EU public
procurement legislation, only a small proportion of contracts are awarded for ﬁrms from another Member State.
Direct cross-border procurement accounts for 1.6% of awards or approximately 3.5% of the total value of
contract awards. In addition to direct cross-border procurement however, there is a considerable volume of
indirect cross-border procurement, where undertakings can bid for contracts through their foreign afﬁliates
or subsidiaries.89
27. The implementation of industrial policies through public purchasing focuses on either the sustainability
of strategic national industries, or the development of infant industries. In both cases, preferential purchasing
patterns can provide the economic and ﬁnancial framework for the development of such industries, at the
expense of competition and free trade. Although the utilisation of public procurement as a means of industrial
policy in Member States may breach directly or indirectly primary Treaty provisions on free movement of
goods and the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services, it is far from clear whether the
European Commission and the European Court of Justice could accept public procurement as legitimate state
aid.
28. The industrial policy dimension of public procurement is also reﬂected in the form of strategic purchasing
by public utilities. Public utilities in the European Union, which in their majority are monopolies, are
accountable for a substantial magnitude of procurement, in terms of volume and in terms of price. Responsible
for this are the expensive infrastructure and high technology products that are necessary to procure in order to
deliver their services to the public. Given the fact that most of the suppliers to public utilities depend almost
entirely on their procurement and that, even when some degree of privatisation has been achieved, the actual
control of the utilities is still vested in the state, the ﬁrst constraint in liberalising public procurement in the
European Union is apparent. Utilities, in the form of public monopolies or semi-private enterprises appear prone
to perpetuate long standing over-dependency purchasing patterns with certain domestic suppliers. Reﬂecting the
above observations, it is worth bearing in mind that until 1991 utilities were not covered by European legislation
on procurement. The delay of their regulation can be attributed to the resistance from Member States in
privatising their monopolies and the uncertainty of the legal regime that will follow their privatisation.
29. Nevertheless, the public procurement legal framework is positively in favour of strategic
subcontracting.90 Sub-contracting plays a major role in the opening up of public markets as it is the most
effective way of small and medium sized enterprises' participation in public procurement. All Directives on
Public Procurement, inﬂuenced by Commission's Communications on sub-contracting and small and medium
enterprises encourage the use of sub-contracting in the award of public contracts. For example, in public
supplies contracts, the contracting entity in the invitation to tender may ask the tenderers on their intention to
sub-contract to third parties part of the contract. In public works contracts, contracting authorities awarding the
principal contract to a concessionaire may require the subcontracting to third parties of at least 30% of the total
work provided for by the principal contract. A public works concession is deﬁned by the Works Directive91 as
a written contract between a contractor and a contracting authority concerning either the execution or both the
execution and design of a work and for which remunerative considerations consist, at least partly, in the right
of the concessionaire to exploit exclusively the ﬁnished construction works for a period of time. The regulation
of concession contracts was introduced to the aquis communautaire by virtue of Directive 89/440 which
amended Directive 71/305. In fact, it incorporated the Voluntary Code of Practice, which was adopted by the
Representatives of Member States meeting within the Council in 1971.92 The Code was a non- binding
85 Prahalad and Doz, The Multinational Mission, Balancing Local Demands and Global Vision, (1987), The Free Press.
86 Dunning,, Multinational Enterprises in the 1970's, in: K. Hopt, European Merger Contract, de Fruyter, (1982) Berlin.
87 Vandermerwe, A Framework for constructing Euro-networks, European Management Journal, (1989) Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 55–61.
88 Tirole, The theory of Industrial Organization, The MIT Press, (1988), Cambridge.
89 This public procurement accounted for 11.4% of awards published in TED and 13.4% by value during 2006–9.
90 See European Commission, SME TASK FORCE: SMEs and Public Procurement, Brussels 1988; European Commission, Pan
European Forum on Sub-Contracting in the Community, Brussels 1993. Also, Mardas, Sub-contracting, Small and Medium Sized
Enterprises (SMEs) and Public Procurement in the European Community, Public Procurement Law Review, 1994, Vol. 3, CS
19.
91 See Article 1(d) of Directive 93/37.
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instrument and contained rules on the advertising of contracts and the principle that contracting authorities
awarding the principal contract to a concessionaire were to require him to subcontract to third parties at least
30% of the total work provided for by the principal contract.93
30. The industrial policy dimension of public procurement evolves around public monopolies in the Member
States which predominately operate in the utilities sectors (energy, transport, water and telecommunications)
and have been assigned with the exclusive exploitation of the relevant services in their respective Member
States. The legal status of these entities varies from legal monopolies, where they are constitutionally
guaranteed, to delegated monopolies, where the state confers certain rights on them. During the last decade
they have been the target of a sweeping process of transformation from underperforming public corporations
to competitive enterprises. Public monopolies very often possess a monopsony position. As they are state
controlled enterprises, they tend to perform under different management patterns than private ﬁrms. Their
decision making responds not only to market forces but mainly to political pressure. Understandably, their
purchasing behaviour follows, to a large extent, parameters reﬂecting current trends of domestic industrial
policies. Public monopolies in the utilities sector have sustained national industries in Member States through
exclusive or preferential procurement. The sustainability of “national champions”, or in other terms,
strategically perceived enterprises, could only be achieved through discriminatory purchasing patterns. The
privatisation of public monopolies, which absorb, to a large extent, the output of such industries will most
probably discontinue such patterns. It will also result in industrial policy imbalances as it would be difﬁcult
for the “national champions” to secure new markets to replace the traditional long dependency on public
monopolies. Finally, it would take time and effort to diversify their activities or to convert to alternative
industrial sectors.
31. Around one-ﬁfth of the procurement advertised at EU level originates from utility operators. Utility
operators were brought under the public procurement regime on the grounds that, because they enjoy monopoly
or special and exclusive rights, they could not be presumed to have the incentives to procure efﬁciently.
Consequently, they run the risk of engaging in preferential procurement and failing to offer foreign suppliers
the opportunity to compete for their custom. As the rationale for Utilities procurement Directive stems from
the absence of competition-induced discipline to procure efﬁciently and competitively, the evaluation examined
whether the utilities sectors are now more exposed to competition than they were. On the occasion of the 2004
legislative modiﬁcation, EU authorities concluded that the liberalisation of the telecommunication sector and
introduction of competition in that sector were sufﬁcient to warrant its exclusion from the scope of the Utilities
Directive 2004/17/EC.
32. A number of factors are relevant. First, is the degree of liberalisation and privatisation, and the extent
of competition and the effectiveness of regulation. Secondly, competition in a sector is assessed in very broad
terms, taking into account the number of competitors, the degree of concentration and barriers to entry in the
markets concerned, and the degree of switching amongst operators. The introduction of signiﬁcant EU
legislation has been directed with the aim to liberalise market access in four sectors covered by the Utilities
Directive: electricity, gas, postal services and exploration for oil and gas. There has been less EU legislative
activity to liberalise access in the rail, bus transport or port sectors and little or no direct action in the area of
water, heat industry or airports. The liberalisation of air transport and ground-handling services has intensiﬁed
competitive pressure on undertaking of some airport operations. In certain sectors competition is based on
public tendering under speciﬁc EU transport legislation.
33. Progress on the legal or regulatory front has not translated into sustained or effective competitive pressure
on incumbent operators in markets where access is unrestricted. In many utility sectors, high levels of market
concentration or anaemic competition continue to be observed. Conditions have not evolved to the extent that
competition can be deemed to be sufﬁciently strong on a sector wide basis to permit the exclusion of sectors
from the scope of the Utilities procurement Directive. One possible exception is the market for oil exploration
where markets are global.
34. Moreover, there is such wide variation in the degree of liberalisation and effective competition across
Member States as to preclude any EU wide conclusions. The rationale for the Directive would seem to continue
to apply in general, while speciﬁc exemptions from the application of the Directive may be justiﬁed on the
basis of an in-depth, case by case analysis of each sector, broken down by relevant activities/product markets
and relevant geographical markets.
35. Article 30 of the Utilities Directive provides a way of exempting market sectors from the EU public
procurement rules where there has been both a regulatory liberalisation and the emergence of meaningful
competition. Currently, in excess of ﬁfteen applications have been received for ten Member States concerning
either the postal or energy sectors and seventeen Decisions have been adopted (ten positive, three negative and
four mixed).
36. The protected and preferential purchasing frameworks between monopolies and national champions and
the output dependency patterns and secured markets of the latter have attracted considerable foreign direct
investment, to the extent that European Union institutions face the dilemma of threatening to discontinue the
93 Between 2006 and 2008, small and medium enterprises among companies won around 60% of contracts covered by the
Directives. The total value of public contracts awarded to SME was for around 34% of the total over these three years. These
ﬁgures only take into account the contracts directly awarded to SME and do not include the value of subcontracts which could
be considerable. Available data suggest that subcontracting is involved in around 8% of published contracts.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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investment ﬂow when liberalising public procurement in the common market. However, it could be argued that
the industrial restructuring following the opening-up of the procurement practices of public monopolies would
possibly attract similar levels of foreign direct investment, which would be directed towards supporting the
new structure. The liberalisation of public procurement in the European Union has as one of its main aims the
restructuring of industries suffering from overcapacity and sub-optimal performance. However, the industries
supplying public monopolies and utilities are themselves, quite often, public corporations. In such cases,
procurement dependency patterns between state outﬁts, when disrupted can result in massive unemployment
attributed to the supply side's inadequacy to secure new customers. The monopsony position when abolished
could often bring about the collapse of the relevant sector.
37. Industrial policies through public procurement can also be implemented with reference to defence
industries, particularly for procurement of military equipment. The Procurement Directives cover equipment of
dual-use purchased by the armed forces, but explicitly exclude from their ambit the procurement of military
equipment. It should be also mentioned here that every Member State in the European Union pursues its own
military procurement policy by virtue of Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome. In the light of the Maastricht
Treaty on European Union, the creation of a framework within which a common European Defence Policy
should be established, defence contracts and procurement of military equipment by member states should be
harmonised, to the extent that a centralised mechanism regulating them should take over independent national
military procurement practices.
38. Attempts have been made to liberalise, to a limited extent, the procurement of military equipment at
European level under the auspices of European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM). This initiative is a
programme of gradual liberalisation of defence industries in the relevant countries and has arisen through the
operation of the Independent European Programme Group, which has been a forum of industrial co-operation
in defence industry matters amongst European NATO members. The programme has envisaged, apart from
collaborative research and development in defence technology, the introduction of a competitive regime in
defence procurement and a modest degree of transparency, subject to the draconian primary Treaty provisions
of Article 223. Award of defence procurement contracts, under the EDEM should follow a similar rationale
with civilian procurement, particularly in the introduction of award criteria based on economic and ﬁnancial
considerations and a minimum degree of publicity for contracts in excess of EURO 1 m.
39. The new Defence and Security Directive attempts to regulate the procurement of armaments and other
security supplies, services, and works, worth about e30 billion annually, which so far have been often treated
as falling outside the ﬁeld of application of the EC Treaty, the Public Sector Procurement Directive, and the
Public Sector Remedies Directive. The importance of this defence market to the European economy is
considerable.
40. While the acquisition of supplies, services, and works is subject to the internal market, the `generous'
use of a number of derogations, most notably Article 296 EC Treaty, has taken most armaments and related
services outside the Community's trade, competition, and procurement rules. This resulted in 27 separate
defence markets characterised by protectionism, inefﬁciencies, and corruption, resulting in reduced levels of
innovation and competitiveness, high prices, and a lack of transparency. The “costs of non-Europe in defence”
are signiﬁcant. Many initiatives of the Commission, the Council, and groups of Member States aimed at
addressing the problem, without many tangible results.
41. The EU Defence and Security Procurement are areas of law and policy which rest at the borderline
between core EU competence and core Member State sovereignty. This was due to the perceived lack of clarity
of a number of defence and security exemptions in the EC Treaty, most notably the armaments exemption in
Article 296 EC. The new Directive which was published in the Ofﬁcial Journal in August 2009 and must be
implemented into Member States national laws by 21 August 2011 represents the most signiﬁcant contribution
of the Community (1st Pillar) legislator to the development of a European Defence and Security Policy, outside
the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The new Directive is also a major step towards the completion of
the set of legislative instruments regulating public and utilities procurement in the EU, alongside the Public
Sector Procurement Directive 2004/18/EC and the Utilities Procurement Directive 2004/17/EC.
42. The scope and coverage of the Defence and Security Procurement Directive implies that the new
instrument applies to Ministries of Defence and the procurement of armaments, its scope is wider than that
since other procuring entities in the security sectors, such as the police, border control, and homeland security
are also covered. Moreover the Directive applies to services and even works and construction projects.
43. There is considerable alignment between defence and security procurement frameworks under the
premises of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. The European Defence Agency (EDA) was
established in 2005, legally as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) or second pillar of the
EU and therefore institutionally as part of the Council. Within the context of this second pillar, the sui generis
characteristics of Community law, such as supremacy, direct effect, and State liability and its democratic
legislative process and judicial review do not apply. In 2006 the EDA introduced a non-binding Code of
Conduct for Armaments Procurement with its own contract portal for its participating Member States (now all
EU Member States except Denmark). Moreover, EDA introduced non-binding codes of conduct for supply
management and offsets. It is argued that these instruments represent a competing legal framework for both
the old Public Sector Procurement Directive with regards to armaments and for the new Defence and Securitycobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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Directive. The emergence of such a competing framework can be explained by the unclear interpretation of
Article 296 (1) (b) EC and the alleged inappropriateness of the Public Sector Procurement Directive for defence
and security purposes. However, political and economic interests also play a major role. Crucial is the division
between Member States with and those without a signiﬁcant defence industrial base. Furthermore, a number
of Member States with the most developed defence industrial bases established the Organisation for Joint
Armaments Procurement (OCCAR) and the Letter of Intent (LoI) forums. These were partly founded due to
frustration with the EU decision making processes. Both forums have their own procurement rules. An
understanding of defence procurement frameworks outside the Community pillar is necessary to understand
the legal and political context of the Defence and Security Procurement Directive to be discussed in the
following themes.
44. The establishment of a Common European Defence Policy could possibly bring about the integration of
defence industries in the European Union and this will inevitably require a change in governments' policies
and practices. Competitiveness, public savings considerations, value for money, transparency and non-
discrimination should be the principles of the centralised mechanism regulating defence procurement in Europe.
The establishment of a centralised defence agency with speciﬁc tasks of contractorisation, facilities
management and market testing represent examples of new procurement policies which would give an
opportunity to the defence industry to adopt its practices in the light of the challenges, risks, policy priorities
and directions of the modern era. In particular, risk management and contracting arrangements measuring
reliability of deliveries and cost compliance, without penalising the supply side are themes which could
revolutionise defence procurement and play a signiﬁcant role in linking such strategic industries with national
and European-wide industrial policies.
45. The industrial policy dimension of public procurement as a discipline expands from a simple internal
market topic, to a multi-faceted tool of European regulation and governance covering policy choices and
revealing an interesting interface between centralised and national governance systems.
March 2013
Written evidence submitted by Cabinet Ofﬁce (PROC 32)
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FROM PASC AT THE PRIVATE BRIEFING ON 22 JANUARY 2013
Thank you for allowing me time to brief you on public procurement issues on 22 January 2013.
During our discussion the Committee asked two questions about procurement leadership and effectiveness
which are answered in more detail below.
Context
The publication of the Civil Service Reform Plan in 2012 set out a clear need to build commercial capability
in the Civil Service as a key priority area. The Government committed to the development of the ﬁrst ever ﬁve
year plan on how the Civil Service as a whole would develop the necessary capabilities in this (and other
priority areas). Ensuring that skilled professionals can be attracted, trained, retained and deployed effectively,
is critical, as is ensuring that Government as a whole gains maximum beneﬁt from the skills and expertise that
exist in some areas. In particular, where more services are commissioned from outside there is an obvious need
for many more civil servants to have commercial and contracting skills.
Since 2010, the Cabinet Ofﬁce has recruited a number of senior leaders who have a wealth of private sector
and commercial experience. For example, the role of Chief Operating Ofﬁcer for Government was a new
appointment to strengthen the team in improving the way government operates, making efﬁciency savings and
supporting UK growth. As a former CEO of a US NASDAQ company and more recently CEO of a FTSE
company, Stephen Kelly brings extensive experience from the private sector. The role of Chief Procurement
Ofﬁcer was expanded in July 2012 to include a range of commercial as well as procurement responsibilities
and to strengthen commercial capability at the heart of Whitehall to match best practice in the private sector.
Several senior civil servants have been recruited with a broad range of commercial experience to drive the
efﬁciency and reform agenda including Ed Welsh (Executive Director, Commercial Models, Efﬁciency and
Reform Group), Mike Bracken (Executive Director, Government Digital Service), Katharine Davidson
(Executive Director, Strategy and Management Information, Efﬁciency and Reform Group) and Liam Maxwell
(Chief Technology Ofﬁcer, HM Government, Government Digital Service) and myself. In addition, we are
nearing the end of an exercise to recruit a number of highly experienced commercial negotiators from the
private sector to the role of Crown Representatives. Bringing board level experience from the public or private
sector, the Crown Representatives each will lead the strategic relationship with a number of suppliers to secure
better value for taxpayers and improve the way services are delivered.
In this context, the Minister for the Cabinet Ofﬁce (MCO) and Sir Bob Kerslake have recently asked me to
lead a programme to improve commercial capability across central government to achieve consistently effective
business outcomes, improve value for money for the tax payer and run efﬁcient commercial operations.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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Procurement Senior Leaders
The ﬁrst question was in relation to how much procurement experience we have within the procurement
senior leadership team.
We currently have in the region of 60 Senior Civil Servants in procurement leadership roles within central
government. In the absence of central HR systems that hold career history information, we have collected data
from sources in the public domain and by individual follow up, which provides a broad picture of the nature
of private sector procurement experience that currently exists at a senior level.
In summary, more than 50% of the sample (where information has been obtained) have private sector
commercial experience, and of those recruited from the private sector, over 85% held previous roles within
procurement or supply chain management. Furthermore, half of these individuals were recruited from the
private sector within the past ﬁve years. The nature of private sector commercial experience is set out in the
table below.
Typical length of
Nature of experience/ private sector
Number of SCS Sector experience typical commercial roles experience
32 have private — Banking Services — Senior Purchasing Manager 49% >10 years
sector — Utilities — Senior Logistics Director 45% > 5–10
experience years
— Consultancy — European/Global Supply 6% < 5 years
Chain Director
— Retail — Company Director
— Manufacturing — Operational Manager
— Insurance Services — Senior consultant
— Telecomms/ICT
12 have Public N/A N/A N/A
Sector
experience only
17 (not known) Information not available
The Efﬁciency and Reform Group is leading an ambitious programme of Procurement Reform which is
designed to consolidate, rationalise and improve commercial capability in all government departments. We are
actively considering establishing a centrally managed commercial service which will comprise a team of experts
(with deep private sector experience) to be deployed on common but complex procurements and contracts
eg ICT.
Finally, in my role as Head of Profession for Procurement, I have commissioned Civil Service Resourcing
as part of the Civil Service Reform plan to establish more consistent and reliable recording and reporting of
workforce data for those in specialist roles—so that in future we have the mechanism in place to systematically
identify, develop and deploy specialist expertise into the places where it is needed most.
Procurement Effectiveness
The second area you asked us to look at was measuring the effectiveness of procurement across a sample
of projects.
You asked that we look at “a sample of approximately 100 projects and assess the number of people involved,
the time taken, and the money spent and then measure this against how effective the procurement exercise
was”. This was to test your view that a successful outcome is largely independent of process (such as number
of people, duration, techniques, etc). Further, you stated your view, which we agree with, that “attitude” was
likely to be as important a factor as process in delivering good outcomes.
Findings
This sample indicates that outcomes are not signiﬁcantly impacted by any of the process elements—resource
deployed, budget or time taken. From the results of this exercise we conclude that neither increases in duration
nor people deployed correlates directly with how effective the procurement exercise was (determined by eg
delivery to time, expected budget price, satisfactory contract); indeed, if anything, the opposite may be the
case. However, in the case of contract value, higher values showed reduced quality of outcome in terms of
delivery to budget. We conclude that successful outcomes are not determined solely by process factors. Our
plans for procurement reform need to focus on practitioners' capability and skills as much as on process.
Given the short timescales to complete this exercise, there are a number of mitigating factors which may
impact the ﬁndings—self-assessment was sourced from procurement staff rather than business users; no account
is taken of the outcome of the contract through delivery of the sourced goods/service; resource deployment in
departments may focus on high spend procurements; and the survey was conducted via a series of structured
telephone interviews, as opposed to formal written responses.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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To fully test the hypothesis it would be necessary to engage with the business customers of the procurements
and complete the assessment at the end of the contract delivery period.
Media coverage of bad procurements in government creates the impression that large procurements fail.
However, the failure of smaller procurements is less newsworthy and effective procurements attract either no
or very limited attention. The vast majority of procurements deliver good outcomes but there are clearly a
limited number of high proﬁle failures.
Detailed analysis of these ﬁndings is included as Annex 1 and Annex 2 contains the approach and caveats.
We were able to gather complete information for 80 procurements in the sample. Generally assessments of
outcomes are positive overall—which is as expected as the majority of procurements deliver good outcomes—
it is only the (publicised) minority that do not. The analysis shows that generally:
— Outcome is assessed more positively for higher value contracts.
— Delivery on time is assessed more positively for contracts > £1 million in value.
— The lowest overall assessment of delivery to budget is on lowest value contracts, although the
extremes are all in contracts with a value in excess of £1 million.
Additionally from the data we can see that:
— There is no correlation between the duration of the procurement and the assessed quality of
outcome.
— The overall procurement resources deployed have no apparent impact on the outcome
assessment.
These ﬁndings support the direction of the reforms we are implementing in the Efﬁciency and Reform
Group, as we seek to drive better value for taxpayers. We are doing this through embedding good procurement
processes enhanced with judgement underpinned by improved commercial capability.
I hope that the above provides you with all of the information you need in relation to the two questions posed.
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Annex 2
Approach
The full information set required to address this question is not held centrally. From the central Contracts
Finder providing visibility of individual supply opportunities to potential bidders we built a sample of candidate
contracts (140). The sample is sub-divided into four categories by contract value with a spread of contracts
across each value range.
<£100k £100k–£1m £1–20m >£20m
Value
Number 40 40 40 20
The sample includes contracts across all Central Government departments and is for a mixture of works,
services and supplies as shown below:
BIS
CLG
CO DCMS
DECC
DEFRA
DfE
DFID
DFT
DH DWP
FCO
GPS
HMRC
HMT
HO
MOD
MOJ Other
Services
Supplies
Works
ContractsFinderholdsinformationonthestartandenddatesforprocurementsfromwhichwehaveassessed
theelapsedtimeforeach.Theotherinformationrequiredtoconducttheassessmentisnotheldcentrally,so
contactwasmadewiththeregisteredcontactforeachcontractandtheyprovidedaself-assessmentscaled
response(1–4)onthefollowingthreecriterias:
— Qualityofprocurementoutcome.
— Deliveredtobudget.
— Deliveredtotime.
Additionally,toassesstheresourceappliedweaskedforprocurementresourcesdeployed(splitbyinternal
andexternalprovisionwhereappropriate).
Caveats
The information sources used were contracts ﬁnder and feedback provided by named contract contacts. We
cannot provide assurance that the contracts included in the sample are typical or representative, however, we
selected by value and annex 2 shows the proportion for each value category in the sample versus volumes for
a one year period. The questions addressed to the nominees for each contract were speciﬁcally focussed on the
completion of the procurement, not the delivery of the resulting supply or service or the overall end-to-end
process. Timeframes assessed are from the start of the procurement as identiﬁed by the publication date of the
OJEU or the date registered on Contracts Finder. Completion dates are likewise the contract award date for
OJEU or the date from Contracts Finder. The sample does not include any abandoned procurements.
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Written evidence submitted by Basil Cousins on behalf of Openforum Europe (PROC 33)
Openforum Europe—As an organisation that has limited hands on knowledge of all the areas of government
procurement we are targeting our response on Information Technology (IT) matters of which we have 10 years
experience. We are working towards eliminating lock in to propriety IT standards to allow interoperability of
government computer systems throughout Europe and highlighting discriminatory practise in IT procurement
with the intention to reduce the cost of ownership of the government IT portfolio.
(1) Summary
1. This submission focuses on the procurement of software and related services on which the British
Government is almost totally dependent. The Government's IT procurement policy should aim to improve the
delivery of services to the citizen in cost effective manner, not just to “spend less money overall”. (PROC 20)
2. The Civil Service Reform Plan sets out the need to move to a “digital civil service”—digital by default
in skills, style and how citizens use services to interact with government. Following on from that, the
Government Digital Strategy was published in November 2012. It set out a clear vision for digital services so
straightforward and convenient that all those who can use them prefer to do so. These services would be more
efﬁcient and cost-effective, delivering on the government's Efﬁciency and Reform agenda.
3. The UK government has now published, probably the most robust and substantiated set of open standards
principles worldwide (for which they should be given credit), but the only value is if they can and are being
implemented in practice. This is now reinforced by the Digital by Default Service Standard—which clearly
states the role of open source and open standards.
4. The Cabinet Ofﬁce set out a procurement transparency agenda:
— all new central government ICT contracts over the value of £10,000 to be published in full
online from July 2010;
— all new central government tender documents for contracts over £10,000 to be published on a
single website from September 2010, with this information to be made available to the public
free of charge;
— new items of central government spending over £25,000 to be published online from November
2010; and
— all new central government contracts to be published in full from January 2011.
5. These actions were intended to drive down signiﬁcantly the £16 billion (estimated) it spends on IT each
year. This was to be achieved by moving away from the small number of System Integrators (SIs) estimated
to be providing 80% of Government IT utilising Open Software and the new digital channels G cloud services.
6. It should be recognised that the IT systems of local government and other public services as well as
supporting organisations are very closely tied into the IT Strategy of central government departments. The
embedding of proprietary software stacks into departmental IT services makes it very difﬁcult for related
organisations and the general public to adopt alternative, lower cost solutions.
7. We observe, however, that these policy areas are taking much longer to implement than ﬁrst envisaged as
a result of a number of factors—current suppliers ﬁghting back, lack of key skills and inertia. This is not just
a procurement issue but one that extends deep into the IT organisations demonstrating a lack common purpose.
How do we get this back on track, strong leadership, clear IT strategy and open standards based architecture
for government services?
(2) Current Government Policy
1. The current policy as outlined in Government Digital Strategy is a major step forward setting a clear
strategy for digital services, for example clarifying where to use software as a service, or when to use open
source software should be used “Use open source software in preference to proprietary or closed source
alternatives, in particular for operating systems, networking software, Web servers, databases and programming
languages. Problems which are rare, or speciﬁc to a domain may be best answered by using software as a
service, or by installing proprietary software.” But for added future prooﬁng, take care to mitigate the risk of
lock-in to a single supplier by ensuring open standards are available for interfaces.
(3) Implementation in Practise
1. We see sporadic adoption of current and previous Government Strategies with a general failure to
understand when and how to adopt these strategies. Alongside of this the current small number of IT Systems
Integrators (SIs) account for the majority of IT spend by Government. One of the major current blockers
observed is the offering of discounted contract renewal terms—this may achieve the short term action of
reducing costs but will contribute nothing to the transformation to digital services.
2. We would question the level of practical buy in at individual Departmental level, and have observed
examples of recent purchases which would seem at least entirely contrary to the objectives stated in the core
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3. We have often raised the issues of culture and skills in the past. I quote Mike Bracken from his cabinet
ofﬁce blog—“As we move away from a large procurement approach to technology and become adept at
commissioning and co-delivering digital public services our capability proﬁle needs to change technically, and
culturally”. In the last few months, in GDS and in other departments, we are hiring and commissioning
roles including:
— data scientists;
— information architects;
— technical architects;
— product managers;
— service managers;
— software engineer;
— designers of all types;
— user researchers; and
— delivery and test managers.
4. The procurement process still appears to be blocking progress with the perceived inability for Government
Procurement Services to handle embedding of The Open Standards Principles in the contractual processes and
the risk adverse approach taken by the Government Legal Services when dealing with Digital Services and
Open Source contracts, addressing unlimited liability, warranties and guarantees. It is vital that Service Design
Manual set the direction with the move to agile, cloud digital services—hence there needs to be a similar
transformation at both the departmental level and within GPS.
5. The growing interconnectedness of IT technologies and the move to Digital Services means that
government systems need to be designed in a more ﬂexible manner with interoperability considerations clearly
in mind. Open Standards enable government applications to be reduce lock-in, reduce cost etc.
(4) Ways Forward
1. We fully support the new Strategies and Policies of the Cabinet ofﬁce (now GDS), but the key as always
will be in the implementation with mechanisms in place to judge improvements care must be taken not to rely
solely on ﬁnancial targets but to able to set and monitor improvements in all these areas.
2. We do recognise that these fundamental changes will take time and more importantly strong leadership.
— Culture—each IT group works independently, believing their requirements are unique, looking
for bespoke services not commodity. Rapid scaling and innovation investment are not shared
between departments. It is not only an IT issue. The civil service in general need to comprehend
the capability of IT in delivering Government services effectively and understand the impact of
rapidly developing technologies on such services as well as on the expectation of the citizen.
— Legacy contracts—framework agreements and dependency on Systems Integrators (SIs) make
status quo the easy option. Licensing usually over-speciﬁed based on needs of few not majority.
Major bodies including the UK Government ﬁnd it structurally easier to deal with the major
corporates.
— Financial targets—existing System Integrator (SI) suppliers will make cuts and meet spending
review target but this will not deliver transformation of public services.
— Debunking the perceived risks and myths:
— Adopting Digital Services or Open Source Software seen as non-mainstream and high risk
owing to a lack of vendor funded marketing.
— There is a perception that existing ICT infrastructure based on conventionally licensed
technology will interoperate better with technology from the same supplier, which tends
to favour pre-selection of conventionally licensed solutions.
— Few public sector case studies on open source software as opposed to conventionally
licensed technology make assessment difﬁcult.
— Many believe that if an issue arises in relation to interoperating components, a single
supplier is better placed to resolve than multiple suppliers, favouring monolithic project
tenders.
— Concerns exist about user resistance to Digital Services and Open Source Software
solutions which are perceived as unfamiliar when they impact the desktop.
— Managers assume that support skills not available.
— Legal issues are little understood (indemnities, warranties) with potential patent
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— Network effects—(eg training, mutual support between IT departments, legacy technology skill
sets of contractors, knowledge of end-users) favour incumbent solutions, which are typically
proprietary. The beneﬁt of digital services and open source software dynamic and network
effects not clearly understood (improves sharing of knowledge, support, and even code between
ICT departments with similar requirements). These effects are not speciﬁed as part of the
procurement process nor recognised in TCO valuations.
— Inertia—No comeback if procurement legislation/guidelines are not followed. The only way to
challenge the status quo is for a supplier to sue the government: this is not going to happen.
It's easier to prepare and manage a tender for a monolithic project, as opposed to a number of
smaller interoperable projects with the same overall functionality. Suppliers including
conﬁdentiality clauses within contracts hide details of response limiting comparisons.
3. What should be the objectives of IT public procurement process:
1. Deliver services to the citizen in a cost effective and timely manner.
2. Support UK PLC—Encourage the development of the software industry.
3. Published and transparent—objectives and restrictions clearly open for public inspection and
compliant with EU legislation.
4. Open Standards and technology neutral—neither brands nor vendor-based speciﬁcations; future
prooﬁng through interoperability opening the opportunity for innovation.
5. Business or Development Model Neutral—equally open to business, not-for-proﬁt and
community approaches. Leverage new entrepreneurial approaches to deliver savings.
6. Open Projects—separating out the design, build and run stages with appropriate granularity to
increase number of potential respondents, creates SME friendly tenders.
7. Audit—Internal/Government audits challenge costs but seem ill equipped to challenge
compliance with open policies or judge the potential of over-speciﬁcation, network effects
or neutrality.
4. Beneﬁts to be accrued from this Approach:
Adopt Digital Services and Open Standards based solutions (inc. use of Open Source) should extend
savings well beyond single ﬁgure targets enabling a wider range of suppliers to compete for tenders,
increasing competition (and beneﬁting SMEs).
Project success will be less ultimately dependent on one supplier, increased granularity, clearer
breakpoints in staged contracts and the use of open standards will increase ﬂexibility, both during
the implementation phase of the project, and during its operational phase and will improve the ability
to upgrade the project in the future in phased stages, rather than a big bang.
5. Digital Services and Open Source Software should deliver immediate licensing reductions, with additional
set up and support costs. However the key savings are longer term—reduction in ongoing costs freeing up
more project funds, greater ﬂexibility and reduction in total cost of ownership. In particular far lower barriers
to exit and early termination of under performing projects and to scaling up successful projects.
(5) Conclusions
We see much good in the direction set by the Digital by Default strategy, but the devil will be in the detail
of implementation. To achieve the strategy these issues must be addressed:
— Contracts:
— To ensure a level playing ﬁeld, conﬁdentiality clauses should be abolished from public
sector contracts.
— Systems Integrators (SIs) should also adhere to the Open Standards Principles as
implemented by Cabinet Ofﬁce.
— Put in place framework contracts that let companies compete on capabilities, these
Framework agreements should be part of and overall contract strategy.
— Ensure risk is appropriately and fairly proportioned to achieve the overall best value for
public expenditure. In particular for open source software solutions unlimited liability,
warranties and guarantees should be properly assessed and mitigated to ensure they are
not barriers to small companies and innovative projects.
— Distinguish clearly between supported and unsupported software applications.
— Education/Skills:
— IT Procurement is a key specialised function requiring people who understand the issues
and have the ability to engage with business and the IT industry and Open Standards,
interoperability, and structuring open tenders that encourage competition and access by
SME's.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
Ev w110 Public Administration Committee: Evidence
— Business Analysis is often missing resulting in modular procurement rather than staged
procurement—separating out the design, build and run stages. Tenders should be
appropriately granular, and all interfaces should be open standards.
— The new Digital Services Strategy has set the agenda now every depart and IT group need
to be educated.
— All these services function within the overall political and civil service cultures. Informed
understanding of the potentiality of the Open Standards Principles in the long term
development of successful ﬂexible IT is essential.
The creation of the Major Projects Leadership Academy and the Commissioning Academy are particularly
welcome as part of the commitment of the Civil Service Reform Plan. It is hoped that the special role of
software and the importance to the Open Standards Principles to the ﬂexible functioning of Government will
be properly recognised and incorporate into the curricula.
— Standards based Digital Services:
— The Open Standards consultation and analysis provided rigorous evidence of the beneﬁts.
The next phase is to move beyond the strategy and establish clear guidelines on what
standards in what scenarios are to be used.
— Ensuring Compliance/Delivery:
— Publish all IT tenders and responses—enabling external oversight allowing benchmarking
of projects and monitoring the use of brands, standards and proprietary technology in
public tenders.
— More Audits—No. Establish a process for external challenge to compliance—external
audit or competition bodies should be empowered to challenge openness of tenders
independently of the supplier community.
Note
OFE is independent, not-for-proﬁt, and supported by both major corporations, SMEs and is a member of the
Multi Stakeholder Platform on Standards. OFE acknowledges all the input received from its members and
partners in the compilation of this document. However, OFE does not seek to represent any speciﬁc community
nor present its opinions as being unanimously supported by its full membership.
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Written evidence submitted by Recruitment and Employment Confederation (PROC 34)
I am writing to you from the Recruitment and Employment Confederation, the professional body for the
UK's £25 billion recruitment industry. With over 3,750 corporate members, we represent 60% of recruitment
agencies by volume and over 70% by turnover. Many of our members supply into the public sector and
procurement now shapes this marketplace. We have actively worked with partners such as the Government
Procurement Service (GPS) and the Department of Health to feed in supplier concerns about the formulation
of the parameters of supply; working across areas such as compliance and supplier communication. The REC
also represents the recruitment industry on the Department of Health's National Procurement Council—the
body with strategic oversight of the £18billion a year the NHS spends on procurement.
We are aware the PASC are currently carrying out an inquiry on procurement and wished to submit our
views on this important area. Whilst the REC appreciates the drivers for the development of framework
agreements for the supply of agency staff in a difﬁcult economic environment, we have consistently raised
issues around SME access to and ability to compete in public procurement exercises, as well as the deﬁnition
of value in the public procurement space.
This is a time of transformation of the procurement function across the public sector. We believe the
efﬁciency, sustainability and quality of services must be the primary driver for procurement rather than just
cost. Procurement has to work for the public sector and enable value. In looking at public procurement, it is
essential that the notion of value is deﬁned correctly. Value in public services cannot be just associated with cost
but, in areas such as health for example, be intrinsically linked with clinical outcomes and patient experience.
In particular, we would like to highlight our concerns about the state of the procurement market for the
delivery of agency stafﬁng services to the National Health Service (NHS). There are multiple procurement
providers offering framework products for agency stafﬁng in this sector. I attach a document that acts as a
valuable introduction to this market. We believe there is a disconnect between procurement strategy and
implementation on the ground which is resulting in confusion and waste in the health service.
The increasingly complex and fragmented nature of the marketplace means that an agency member of staff
could effectively enter into a placement at a minimum of four different price points (if the NHS client is on
assorted frameworks or ignores the frameworks and goes off-framework). In addition, SMEs are becoming
increasingly frozen out of the market—lacking the resources to tender in complex and bureaucratic procurementcobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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procedures. The government is starting to address this through their NHS procurement review yet much remains
to be done.
We believe quality suppliers and transparent systems are central to developing frameworks that are of value
to NHS clients. We would urge the PASC to look at this important area as part of their inquiry on procurement.
April 2013
Written evidence submitted by Project Management Institute (PROC 35)
About PMI
1. The Project Management Institute (PMI) is the largest project management member association in the
world, and the leading global advocate for the project and programme management profession. With a global
vision that organisations will embrace, value and utilise project management and attribute their success to it,
we currently have over 700,000 members and credential holders in 185 countries across Europe, North and
Latin America, Australasia and South East Asia, working across the public and private sectors to undertake
certiﬁcation, standards development and training.
2. PMI has over 6,000 members and credential holders in the UK, and have run academic programmes at
universities including Cranﬁeld, Southampton, Manchester, UCL, UWE and Strathclyde. We also host regular
executive roundtables in London, bringing together representatives of the public and private sectors to share
project and programme management best practice. We are a proud sponsor of the Project and Programme
Management Award at the annual Civil Service Awards. We will also be investing in research this year to
identify factors contributing to project and programme success in the UK public sector.
Project Management as a Driver of Contract Efﬁciency
3. PMI's global research and experience demonstrates that effective project management can improve service
delivery, minimise costs and manage risks. The key to this in our experience is the development of a culture
of best in class project management. Effective project and programme management (PPM) can help to greatly
improve efﬁciency and drive down costs for government departments that manage large and complex
programmes.
4. The beneﬁts are clear to see in projects that have been executed properly across the world. The US Army
Corps of Engineers, for example, reported a cost reduction of 20–30% by using trained project managers and
a more systematic approach to project management. Successful delivery of the capital infrastructure for the
Olympic Games is another case in point.
5. Project failure also has severe consequences. When a project fails, around 17% of the budget is lost for
good according to PMI research. When project timelines are not met, when budgets are exceeded or when
intended project goals are not fulﬁlled, unintended demands are placed on other resources—people, projects,
products, budgets and overall organisational goals. This is money that an organisation can never get back.
6. The United Kingdom has made good progress in improving its project management capability and
performance in recent years. The creation of the Major Projects Authority and the Major Projects Leadership
Academy are both to be welcomed. However, overall performance remains patchy and there is still some way
to go.
Key Issues
7. There are a number of key issues that continue to impact on project success.
8. High staff turnover continues to be a problem, especially at the level of Senior Responsible Owner. This
is exacerbated by the fact that civil servants move position regularly and do not see projects through to their
conclusion. Whilst the Civil Service Reform Plan and the Defence Reform Unit's 2011 report identiﬁed this as
a problem, high churn has nevertheless continued.
9. There continues to be a shortage of dedicated project managers with strong global experience. The Civil
Service Reform Plan notes that “There are some superb project managers in the Civil Service, but not nearly
enough and too many projects fail.”
10. Furthermore, the majority of UK-based project management qualiﬁcations do not include a requirement
for ongoing assessment, meaning that many of the civil servants with the qualiﬁcation have little incentive to
keep their knowledge up-to-date. PMI would argue that training should be at least in line with the provisions
of its Project Management Professional (PMP®) credential, which requires ongoing maintenance over a three
year cycle, and three to ﬁve years of dedicated project management experience. As a general principle,
performance should be regularly reviewed and project managers should be assessed on their experience and
track record of actual projects, not purely on the basis of theoretical examinations.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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11. In addition, there have been particular issues with some very capable civil service leaders not having the
necessary skills to manage projects or contracts, but being moved into project delivery positions as part of
their civil service careers. This is neither desirable nor sustainable.
12. However, even when effective teams are in place, it is difﬁcult for the public sector to compete on salary
terms with private sector organisations that are willing to pay higher salaries to project managers. The
combination of this with the freezing of expenditure on consultancy across government runs the risk of
squeezing project management capability and capacity.
13. The lack of resources dedicated to the assurance function within the Major Projects Authority is another
concern. This is an issue that was recently highlighted by the National Audit Ofﬁce and the Public Accounts
Committee in their reports on assurance of major projects (HC1698 2010–12 and HC384 2012–13). The
report commented:
“With a budget of £6 million and a 40% cut in stafﬁng there are inevitably questions over whether
[the MPA] can achieve the improvements intended. Inevitably, the Authority has to focus on the
biggest, most risky projects. This raises the risk that signiﬁcant problems within lower priority
projects in the Authority's portfolio may be missed.”
14. In oral evidence to the committee, Marc van Grondelle of KPMG also contrasted the amount spent on
assurance in the private sector with the amount being spent in the UK public sector, commenting that for major
capital projects, it is usual for between 0.2% and 0.5% of the total project cost to be spent on assurance
(question 3, Ev 2, HC 384 2012–13). This contrasts with the £6 million budget of the MPA to monitor over
200 projects worth £376 billion—which amounts to only .016% (page 3, HC384).
15. An issue that has arisen repeatedly in PMI's UK executive roundtables is attitude to risk, and ways of
dealing with risk effectively. The public sector is often too cautious, and this adds time and cost to projects.
The prevailing job climate within the Civil Service also makes it less likely that ofﬁcials will take risks and
put their heads above the parapet. The impact of political drivers on project scope should also not be
underestimated. Effective project management can reduce risk: PMI's 2013 Pulse of the Profession report,
published in March, found that globally organisations with high performance in meeting project goals, timelines
and budgets risk only £20 million per £1 billion spent, whilst their less successful peers jeopardise £280 million
for the same £1 billion.
Recommendations
16. The MPA and MPLA have already made progress. We would also recommend that government consider
the following:
— Government should be looking more at international best practice across both the public and
private sectors. International standards, secondments and networking events all form part of
this exchange process. The committee has already taken evidence from Lieutenant Colonel Dan
Ward of the USAF on the FIST approach. As mentioned, PMI holds regular executive
roundtables, run on Chatham House rules, pulling together the public and private sectors to
exchange information and best practice. We would be very happy for the committee to address
or attend one of these in future.
— Government should consider implementing the IT Program Management Job Classiﬁcation
introduced in the US Federal Government, completed through PMI advice to the Ofﬁce of
Management and Budget and the US Federal Government CIO. The beneﬁts ﬂowing from this
demonstrate why similar initiatives should be adopted elsewhere—a dedicated cadre of project
managers with expertise and experience, a reduction in the “accidental project manager”
phenomenon and better project results in the long term—dedicated project managers rather than
people doing project management as part of their civil service tour of duty.
— The Cabinet Ofﬁce should consider introducing something similar to the US Federal
Government's IT Dashboard, a public website providing information on all IT investments
across the Federal Government. This provides visibility into the operations and performance of
Federal IT investments and allows people to see how and where money is being spent in
IT. Information on cost, schedule, operational performance and CIO evaluation are updated
every month.
— Consideration should also be given to the creation of a speciﬁc Project Management Fast
Stream within the civil service to complement the existing ﬁve specialist fast streams. This
would be open to individuals with proven interest and expertise in project management, and
would ensure that those with the right skills and aptitudes to become project managers are
nurtured from an early stage.
— Ministerial toolkit: Public comments by ministers, sometimes delivered in the heat of the
moment on the campaign trail or in television studios, often drive the demand for projects. As
the 2015 General Election draws closer, politics will become increasingly important in
programme delivery—and demand for new projects and programmes will increase, despite the
tough ﬁscal conditions. Increasing ministerial awareness across the board, and providing basic
training could help address this.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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— Improving attitudes to risk: Attitudes to risk are critical to project success, as discussed above.
A possible solution discussed at previous PMI roundtables is the creation of a joint risk registry
between the stakeholder and the contractor. Investment in success is shared, and the culture is
transformed as the customer is part of the team. Government needs to export a certain amount
of risk to its private sector partners, but is often reluctant to do so. The role of the contract is
also important—the contract should not drive every discussion between contractor and client,
but should only be resorted to in select situations.
— More funds should also be dedicated to project management assurance. This will be a difﬁcult
sell politically—but would result in savings in the medium to long term as more projects came
in on time and on budget.
March 2013
Written evidence submitted by Ask us Drain Services (PROC 36)
The Here and Now Experience with Local Public Procurement in Essex and Suffolk from a Micro Small
Business perspective.
Thank you for seeing me at your surgery in Wivenhoe recently, which enabled me to draw your attention to
my concerns with the current Public Procurement Market for low value Public Contracts.
As a Small Business in your constituency I recognise growth plays an important part in our economy but
fail to understand why it is still one long milestone of bureaucracy for businesses that don't have Procurement,
QS or Legal Departments, but are still expected to achieve the same results as larger companies.
It's pleasing to know that you are the Chairman for the PASC who are currently making enquiries into the
Procurement issues. The Prime Minister assures us he wants to invest “accountable” money for start-up
business and SME's to help pull us out of recession, my concern is the length of time this is taking. A new
start up business will come under greater pressure when they themselves have to go through policy building
and applying audit trails like my company had too, to enable us to achieve BS EN ISO 9001:2008 Quality
Management Accreditation, plus all the other trade related certiﬁcates and documentation required JUST to
achieve high scoring results at a PQQ tender stage process for a low value contract.
To date, I have found only one contract where simpliﬁcation was introduced, all other contracts we have bid
for or shown an interest in, have required exorbitant man hours trying to understand the Portal, Tender
information including difﬁcult questions, all this just to enable us to get through the ﬁrst stage of PQQ. Why
is this, particularly when you consider the contracts were all under the value of £100,000? When bidding for
a low value contract the most ridiculous part is the repetitive nature of each individual Contract requesting
their own Letter Head References. We have one very worthy client whose reference is very valuable in proving
our company is competent and reliable, but repetitive requests for references requested from your most valuable
client each time you tender isn't going down very well. Why do we have to make individual requests to our
clients for references each time we want to tender for a contract, surely up to date generic references for all
PQQ portals and tendering purposes would be sufﬁcient for a Micro Company.
To date I have found no evidence of reduced red tape, as mentioned by Vince Cable and strongly identiﬁed
following encouraging research, in the Richard Report by Doug Richard back in “2008” there is still no sign
of bringing in a lower entry level for SME's to competitively compete. We have and still are, spending and
wasting considerable amounts of money and time in relation to the actual value of the contracts on offer. Why
are we still spending money? Why have things not been simpliﬁed, standardised and made more transparent, so
we are not spending valuable time and money and in return becoming more cost effective for the Public Sector?
I have documented my own experiences to date to highlight the issues we have faced with the current Public
Sector Procurement Market for your consideration.
June–September 2009
The Drainage Industry was heading towards the biggest change in history with private sewers being
transferred over to all eight Water Companies. During this period I had a crucial decision to make in my small
business, to either take what I can and wind the company down or employ a part time person to help achieve
the next level of business and at the same time diversify as much as I possibly could. There were only four of
us at this point in the business, but my decision was to face the red tape bureaucracy and employ a suitable
candidate to assist me with this daunting challenge.
If I include the next challenge ahead which is currently the ISO14001 certiﬁcation it will have taken us three
years to get through the bureaucratic red tape which I understand is UK Government criteria not European
Government criteria, is this correct?cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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Essex Contract—Value under £100,000–2012
This was a Borough Council contract which fell under the heading of Small Works and Maintenance
Services. Speciﬁcations in the tender included Ditch Clearing, Garden Clearing, small plumbing works but it
was also found to include Supply and Servicing of Gym Equipment which had no relation to the contract. This
was brought to the attention of the Procurement Ofﬁcer by another Company and the Tender Documents were
withdrawn and resubmitted removing the Gym Equipment section.
There were nine Lots in all to bid for and two of these lots had no speciﬁcations to assist in the pricing, it
was advised in the tender documents to carry out research into what would need to be supplied for these two
Lots. We had to research the speciﬁcation and descriptions of the work to enable us to calculate and submit
our pricing for the bid. Why were no details provided for these two lots? This was very unfair as the existing
Contractor had the advantage already knowing the job speciﬁcations and the winning bid price which enabled
the Company to win the Contract in the ﬁrst place. We were unable to ﬁnd any information on the contract
and only had four weeks until closing date of the bid, another wasted exercise.
Essex Contract—Value under 100k, 2013
This was a Housing contract we showed an interest in and it was to provide support on an emergency basis
for burst water mains. They required us to submit our prices for repair of Copper and Alkathene pipes, but in
the 350 page speciﬁcations section we found our Insurance would need to cover us for dealing with burst
Asbestos pipe work. Not enough information was given in this 350 page document for us to be able to correctly
submit the most accurate price to produce a good quality of work and a sensible capability to maintain this for
the term of the contract, without the Company failing to meets its demands. The Government will not achieve
savings with Public Money by these rewording speciﬁcations in contracts or minimal transparency or producing
350 pages of speciﬁcations that didn't relate directly with the contract.
Essex Contract—Value under 100k, 2012
A Housing Association I have supported in Essex where our work is for emergency coverage for special
needs people who live in their own homes with a carer.
We have supported this local client for four years as a Sub Contractor. The contract was coming to an end
and I was asked by my client to assist in the bidding process by providing a schedule of rates that fall under
the Plumbing and Drainage sub section of a Building Maintenance Term Contract. Keeping the day to day
running of the business stable but paramount to achieve a competitive price for my clients bid, I employed on
a temporary basis through an Employment Agency an Estimator and then a Contracts Manager with experience
in pricing schedules, this was expensive but the right move at £175.00 to £200.00 a day.
We achieved the deadline, our Contractor received our Schedule of Rates and he submitted his bid. A couple
of months later we found out that we are to continue the current contract for a further year as following the
selection process the three remaining candidates (my Contractor being one of them) were informed the contract
was being withdrawn as the Local Council had identiﬁed the current way the tender was written was proving
not viable in other County's.
Suffolk Contract—under £100,000, 2013
The Suffolk Procurement Portal who delivered the Borough Council contract required us to download a
program to be able to read and complete the tender documents. The step by step instructions on the logging in
to the PQQ stage was very good, but what was missed was a Very large Warning in Red stating that the software
would need to be downloaded on every individual work station to be able to enter company information on
the electronic PQQ forms.
We lost over 40 hours of work from repeatedly loosing Documents and information entered on the electronic
forms until our mistake was identiﬁed by the Council's Procurement Technical Department. We as a VSME
don't have a technical IT Department.
How many Procurement Portals shall I Join?
If we are to keep all current procurement portals where Local Councils can place contracts, could we please
have free training sessions made widely available by them. This will enable staff to know how to use the portal
BEFORE starting the online, download, upload criteria depending on the Portal format. Rather than trying to
learn how to use it DURING the PQQ and Bidding process stage. The current system causes the Stress Policy
Risk Assessment to be broken on numerous occasions with no Micro SME Business Support Provider with
procurement knowledge that I could ﬁnd, Yes we welcome a Business challenge but we were left with the
blind leading the blind, two left feet scenario to achieve the PQQ requirements, this doesn't help business
growth its just stunts it.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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Is BIP Solutions the only current available Procurement Training Provider for Micro Small Businesses to
use?
I want a better understanding of the supply chain, my staff and i need training to achieve success in winning
contracts and to be able to employ more staff. I contacted Business Link back in 2010 for Procurement
assistance but they only had basic literature information and fact sheets. I contacted local Colleges but found
no courses available, I contacted COLBEA they couldn't help me (that was a ﬁrst!). I contacted Essex
University who had run a course but there wasn't another one in the foreseeable future. Q: Why are there no
courses available locally to better educate my staff and I, so we can complete and achieve a viable bid for our
Communities rather than “catch you outs or trip ups” that Micro SME's could succumb because of limited
knowledge in the tender documents.
We have set up our company proﬁle on several different Web Procurement Portal sites, each contract tendered
for so far has been under a different Portal application process, some set up to reply in return by hardcopy
format others by electronic format or electronic and hard copy. Q: If a very small Business runs into difﬁculty
with the electronic submitting because they don't have an internal IT Department, can the Low Value Contract
Procurement Rules allow for a request to the Procurement Ofﬁcer be granted so the bid can be submitted in
paper form to reduce our already now wasted time on an unknown portal which would reduce stress levels
from reaching boiling point?
With the above in mind I would ask for your kind consideration in getting to the bottom of why Transparency
and Simpliﬁcation has not already happened for very small Businesses who have the potential to expand and
further employ more people and get on with our current objective and priority, which is survival, training,
winning small contracts in a faster turnover time, so expanding and most importantly from that Employing
which as we know moves the “Little Ships” closer to the battle front in helping to play a part in rescuing the
current UK economic crisis, instead of the exhausting time and costs with limited resources being wasted on
the current Procurement and Bureaucracy that's causing a stunting Growth effect in the Micro SME sector.
I have also held a meeting this week with the FSB Regional Manager Iain Wicks in relation to the above
and he has agreed to promote the issues I have raised.
I look forward to hearing from you.
March 2013
Supplementary written evidence submitted by Cabinet Ofﬁce (PROC 37)
Further to the recent PASC hearing, I undertook to provide some further information on the Procurement
Investment Fund (PIF) in respect of its purpose, operation, funds invested and future plans, and also examples
of wasteful spending and poor value contracts.
Procurement Investment Fund
Purpose and background
The Strategic Review of Buying Solutions and subsequent paper “Delivering Centralised Procurement (24th
March 2011)”, outlined the intention to establish a process for using any Government procurement Service's
(GPS) surplus income to fund GPS and Government Procurement improvements. The recommendation was
agreed by the March 2011 PEX (ER). The Procurement Investment Fund (PIF) Board was established in
September 2011 as a sub-board of the Procurement Executive Board (now Procurement Delivery Board) to
provide a transparent mechanism to invest in improving government procurement capability.
Operation
The fund is generated from the supplier levy charged on managed spend through GPS frameworks after
allowing for GPS running costs and internal investments. The level of the fund is set as part of the GPS
Business Plan process and approved by the GPS Board.
PIF Board members ensure that the funds are utilised transparently to ﬁnance Government Procurement
operations and investments. Business cases are assessed against a set of core investment principles:
— Ensuring pan government beneﬁts—cases need to demonstrate that investment will deliver beneﬁts
across government.
— Delivering Savings for the Nation—investment will need to show how it supports the delivery of
procurement savings.
— Sustainable—initiatives are ideally for pumped prime funding and not necessarily fully funded. In
the example of a learning and development requirement, then resources are invested where possible
in to train the trainer to ensure a lasting legacy.
— Substantial—pan government lean training coursescobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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— Effective Governance—cases will need to demonstrate that effective governance in terms of
managing project delivery exist with the mechanisms to track beneﬁts post completion.
FUNDS INVESTED AND COMMITTED
The following funds have been invested/committed by the PIF Board:
DESCRIPTION 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 2014–15
ACTUAL COMMITTED COMMITTED COMMITTED
£'000 £'000 £'000 £'000
Cabinet Ofﬁce stafﬁng 900
resource
Licence to Source 48
Training
Lean Sourcing Training 62 479
e-Enablement Systems 1,229 2,853 2,050 2,070
Commissioning Academy 445
TOTALS 2,239 3,332 2,495 2,070
— Cabinet Ofﬁce stafﬁng resource:
— Short term procurement stafﬁng resource provided by Cabinet Ofﬁce to GPS to
address some key capability gaps.
— License to Source and Lean Sourcing training:
— Pan government training for lean sourcing
— The most signiﬁcant investment has been in eEnablement systems which include:
— Spend analytics across the whole of Central Government and increasingly Wider Public Sector
to improve expenditure intelligence and further drive aggregated deals.
— eSourcing to drive efﬁciency across procurements.
— Government eMarketplace to enable departments to efﬁciently transact on-line through
catalogues.
— Single supplier registration incorporating Dunn & Bradstreet data to improve commercial
intelligence on suppliers.
— Procurement portal for all public sector buyers with access to all centralised deals.
Future Plans
The Chief Procurement Ofﬁcer is currently reviewing future plans for the fund including whether this is the
right mechanism to support pan government capability development, what its governance structure should be
and potential demand for 2013–14. This is due to be discussed at the next Procurement Delivery Board in May.
Wasteful Spending
The list below has been compiled by the Efﬁciency and Reform Group and provides examples of wasteful
spending and poor value contracts.
Prices/Rates
1. A supplier charges us a 15% ﬁnance charge for invoices paid late.
2. Well over 350 different rates for labour on one contract with one supplier.
3. One supplier contract agreed to charge us in excess of £4,000 (including VAT) per day for their most
senior personnel; over 4.5 such FTE's assigned to the project.
4. One supplier has an average day rate variation across several departments (and including some police
forces) ranging from £500 to £850.
Cost of Poor Quality
5. One supplier told us that the difference between the average margin which they price and what they
receive is about 5% due to delivery/quality “problems”.
6. One supplier told us that they would be making a loss of around £20 million in a year at one department
(several contracts) on total revenue that year of in excess of £100 million.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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Contract growth
7. One contract will have grown from almost £5.7 billion, when signed, to £8.9 billion by time expires.
8. Another contract will have grown from £350 million (and £50 million per annum), when signed, to likely
over £1.25 billion (and £100 million per annum) at expiry.
Other
9. Mid-range Xerox Mono MFD £5162.60 over the term of a 5 year lease. GPS price £2627.20.
10. Mid-range Xerox colour MFD £5336.80 over the term of a 5 year lease. GPS price £2795.60.
11. Insurance brokerage (through GPS)—opening eAuction bid £10,750, winning bid £1,715.
12. A major service integrator charged £30,000 to change a logo on a web page.
13. An existing provider offered to host a Government service for £4 million. Instead we found an SME
who is providing a good service for £60,000.
14. An outsourcing ﬁrm signed a contract worth £50 million a year, yet has gained at least £100 million of
revenue each year following further Contract Change Notices.
15. One supplier charged Cabinet Ofﬁce £57 for a PC Power cable; when this can be purchased online for
£20 and likely much cheaper (est. £8) wholesale.
May 2013
Written evidence submitted by Robert Halfon MP on Public Procurement and Apprenticeships (PROC
38)
A fully costed proposal: how to create 120,000 apprenticeships, and cut youth unemployment by 7%, at no
cost to the Treasury.
Youth Unemployment in England, souce: DfE NEET quarterly brief 2000–2011
The Proposal
— Ask public Contractors and Sub-contractors to “take all reasonable steps to ensure that 5% of their
employees are on a formal apprenticeship programme.”
The Principles
— Is it possible? Yes. The public sector spends around £240 billion annually on procurement (of which
£188 billion is in Whitehall). The DWP has already piloted the proposal, and it has worked.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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— Will it beneﬁt the private sector, too? Yes. Research by BIS in 2009 found that “businesses that do
not train their staff are 2.5 times more likely to fail than those that do.”94
— Will it be revenue neutral for the Treasury? Yes. Our proposal does NOT require Contractors or
Sub-Contractors to take on extra employees—merely to ensure that 5% of their workforce are on
apprenticeship programmes. Costs should be equal to or less than now.
Pilot Study: the Department of Work and Pensions
— What has the DWP done? The DWP's new Apprenticeship and Skills Requirements Contract
Schedule, published in July 2011, requires that “The Contractor shall and shall procure that its
Sub-contractors take all reasonable steps to ensure that 5% of their employees are on a formal
apprenticeship programme.” 95
— How is it monitored? The Contractor must provide an Apprenticeships Report within six months of
the contract commencement date, and every year thereafter. This sets out the number of existing and
new apprentices involved in the delivery of the contract. A robust explanation is required from the
Contractor, if the 5% target has not been met.
— What are the results? Preliminary data indicate that 1,979 apprentices are now employed, delivering
goods and services to the DWP.96 These ﬁgures are drawn from only the top 21 suppliers to the
DWP. The Department has an annual procurement spend of £3.88 billion. Therefore, the DWP have
a success rate of at least one apprentice employed for every £2 million of procurement spend.
Beneﬁts
— If the proposal were to be rolled out across Britain, what would the beneﬁts be?
— Create up to 120,000 apprenticeships, an increase of over 25% from 2010/11. (This assumes a
similar success-rate to the DWP of one apprentice for every £2 million of procurement.)
— Reduce youth unemployment by up to 72,000, or 7%.97
— Reduce the costs of youth unemployment.
— No legislation is required.
Assuming the DWP ratio of apprenticeships to procurement spend would prevail across other Departments,
we can predict that 96,000 apprenticeships would be created if the Apprenticeship and Skills Requirements
Contract Schedule (ASRCS) were included in all Whitehall procurement contracts. If the policy's remit were
to be extended to local government as well, at least 120,000 apprenticeships would be created. This is a
conservative estimate: the DWP data on which it is based comes just from the Department's top 21 suppliers.
Costs of the Proposal
— If the proposal were to be rolled out across Government, what would the costs be?
— Best case scenario: there is a net saving to the Treasury. The Apprenticeship and Skills
Requirements Contract Schedule (ASRCS) does not require Contractors or Sub-Contractors to
take on extra employees—merely to ensure that 5% of their workforce are entered on formal
apprenticeship programmes. Therefore their wage costs should be lower, as apprentices are
typically on entry-level salaries.
— Is this credible? The Conservative Administration in charge of Essex County Council have
implemented a similar scheme to the DWP. They have created at least 200 new apprenticeships
using clauses in public contracts. At the same time, and as part of a wider cost-reduction
programme, their procurement costs DECREASED by £120 million.
— Worst case scenario: a total cost of £160 to £214 million. In order to assess a total worst case,
we have calculated the total cost if the Treasury if the state ﬁnanced the entire cost of employing
and training the extra apprentices? The answer is an initial outlay of between £160.8m and
£214.4 million.98 Ongoing annual costs would be expected to be lower, as apprenticeships last
between one and four years.
94 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dius.gov.uk/skills/public_procurers/faq
95 schedule 10, 2.2 of the model DWP contract: http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/dwp-model-tc-for-services.pdf
96 House of Commons, Written Answers, 28th November 2011.
http://services.parliament.uk/hansard/Commons/ByDate/20111128/writtenanswers/part021.html
97 In the 2010–2011 academic year, 60% of total apprenticeship starts were by those aged 24 or under. This means the proposal
would reduce youth unemployment by up to 72,000, or 7%, based on current unemployment statistics amongst those aged 16–24
of 1.03 million.
98 The average apprentice costs an employer around £9,000 a year in wages. If an apprentice is between 19 and 24, then the
employer must pay up to 50% of the cost of training, which is estimated to be between £3,000 and £4,000 per apprentice (so
between £1,500 and £2,000 to be paid by the employer). The ﬁnal total cost to the employer will therefore depend on the size
of its workforce and the age of the apprentice, but the average apprentice costs an employer between £9,000 and £11,000 a year.
In the 2010/2011 academic year, 60% of apprentice starts were aged 24 or under. Assuming that the uptake of new
apprenticeships across the age groups follows the pattern of new apprentice starts in the 2010/2011 academic year, then the total
initial outlay by the Government would be between £160.8 million and £214.4 million—IF the taxpayer were to pay for the full
cost of employment and training. Ongoing yearly costs would be lower, as apprenticeships last between one and four years.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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Costs of Youth Unemployment
— The Prince's Trust estimates that, even before the ﬁnancial crisis, youth unemployment cost £10
million every day in lost productivity, and £20 million a week in Job-Seeker's Allowance.99
— The secondary costs associated with youth unemployment are even greater. A Recruitment and
Employment Confederation report estimated the total cost to be £4.7 billion a year.100
Legality
— Is it legal? Both Essex County Council, and the DWP, are already implementing pilot schemes and
have judged it to be legal under both European Union and British law. Of course, care must be taken
to ensure that any potential suppliers from outside the UK are not disadvantaged. Any skills
requirements must recognise non-UK equivalents.
Conclusion
The beneﬁts are clear:
— Up to 120,000 extra apprenticeships and a 7% fall in youth unemployment.
— No expected costs for the Treasury.
— No legislation is required.
— It is legal under EU and British law.
— It is already happening under Conservative Ministers in the DWP, and Conservative Councillors at
Essex County Council.
APPENDIX
This is a scan of the relevant page (p83) of the model DWP contract. It was introduced in July 2011.
Schedule 10
APPRENTICESHIPS AND SKILLS REQUIREMENTS
This Schedule sets out the Apprenticeships and Skills Requirements which are applicable to the provision of
the Contract.
1. General
1.1 Government is committed to addressing skills issues and promoting training opportunities through
procurement, to maximise the potential for improvements provided by its considerable spend.
1.2 In order to support and drive economic growth, the Government announced that it has prioritised the
key policy agendas to be promoted through public procurement. Supporting apprenticeships, skills
and the ﬁght against youth unemployment is one of these “Policy through Procurement” priorities
on which Departments must now focus.
1.3 The Contractor acknowledges that the Authority is required to support the above apprenticeships and
skills aims and targets.
1.4 In delivering the Services, the Contractor shall, and shall procure that its Sub-contractors assist and
cooperate with the Authority by fully complying with the requirements of this Schedule 10.
2. Compliance
2.1 The Contractor shall and shall procure that its Sub-contractors take all reasonable steps to employ
apprentices, and report to the Authority the numbers of apprentices employed and wider skills
training provided, during delivery of the Services.
2.2 The Contractor shall and shall procure that its Sub-contractors shall takek all reasonable steps to
ensure that 5% of their employees are on a formal apprenticeship programme. This can include
administration and support staff.
2.3 The Contractor shall and shall procure that its Sub-contractors make available to employees
information about the Government's Apprenticeship Programme and wider skills opportunities.
2.4 The Contractor shall and shall procure that its Sub-contractors provide any appropriate further skills
training opportunities for employees involved in delivery of the Contract.
2.5 The Contractor will produce an Apprenticeships and Skills Report in accordance with paragraph 3
(and sub-paragraphs) of this Schedule 10.
99 The Prince's Trust, The Cost of Exclusion.
http://www.princes-trust.org.uk/PDF/Princes%20Trust%20Research%20Cost%20of%20Exclusion%20apr07.pdf
100 Recruitment & Employment Confederation, Avoiding a Lost Generation.
http://www.rec.uk.com/about-recruitment/externalrelations/campaigns/youth-taskforcecobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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3. Monitoring and reporting
3.1 The Contractor shall provide an Apprenticeships and Skills Report within six (6) months of the
Commencement Date and annually thereafter. The
Written evidence submitted by Lord Levene (PROC 39)
SOME THOUGHTS ON THE PROPOSAL TO TRANSFER DE&S TO A GOCO
I would like to make it clear that I am enthusiastic about GOCOs. In fact I believe that I may have been the
ﬁrst person to set up a GOCO within the MoD, even at the time before I was appointed as Chief of Defence
Procurement when I was acting as a Personal Adviser to the then Secretary of State, who had asked me to
address a solution to the ongoing problems of inefﬁciency and delay within the Royal Naval Dockyards, at
Rosyth and Devonport.
I had come across the concept of the GOCO in the USA, where it had frequently been used, particularly in
the defence area. The concept of the GOCO is to take an industrial/commercial organization which was being
managed by civil servants, to transfer the responsibility for running it to an experienced company in the private
sector, but to keep ownership within the Government department for which it worked.
This transfer worked very well for the Royal Naval Dockyards where it succeeded in reducing the workforce
in the two dockyards from something in excess of 20,000 people to less than 5,000 people. The commercial
management also managed to solve the long running problems with the trade unions involved, in quite swiftly
dispensing with the many demarcation lines which had previously existed.
Senior civil servants and senior Royal Navy ofﬁcers had been very cautious about the proposal because it
would overturn a system which had been in operation at least since the time of Samuel Pepys. However, with
the beneﬁt of a very wise selection of contractors (there were different contractors for each dock yard), the
results were impressive. These results were indeed so impressive that fairly soon, a decision was taken to
privatize the two dockyards. By this time the fear of transferring these industrial operations to commercial
operators, had subsided and they remain in the hands of commercial operators to this day.
With that clear level of success in the dock yards, why do I believe that to transfer DE&S to a GOCO would
not be a good idea?
The long term and ongoing criticisms of the system of Defence Procurement which we have in the UK, is
based on the view that the civil servants and uniformed personnel, both senior and junior, who are involved in
its management, have a long record of failure and have produced commercial solutions which are overpriced
and still lead to lengthy delays and indeed failures in the performance of equipment which has been purchased.
When I was ﬁrst appointed by Margaret Thatcher and Michael Heseltine to be the Chief of Defence
Procurement in 1985, it was at a time which closely mirrored our present situation of overspending, poor
performance and late delivery. Indeed, before I was given this task, Ted Heath had called in the then Sir Derek
Rayner, Chairman of M&S, to take over the procurement system on the basis that M&S were a hugely
successful company who produced nothing themselves but had an outstanding procurement system for buying
high quality goods at competitive prices linked with punctuality of delivery. It was Sir Derek Rayner who set
up the procurement executive, which he then headed himself from 1970–73.
I went to see Sir Derek in 1984, and said that far from wishing to critique what he had done, it seemed to
me to be an excellent solution but soon after he had left, it had fallen back into its bad old ways. I asked him
what he thought was the cause and what the solution might be. He said that when he had taken it over, he did
so as a businessman, and tried to run defence procurement along commercial lines. However as soon as he left
the job, he was replaced by the bureaucracy which took charge again, and the system soon reverted to type.
As to the question of what should be done to reverse the problem, Sir Derek said to me: “I ran the procurement
executive on the basis of my experience as a businessman, and I do not believe that it will become effective
again, unless and until it is run by a businessman once more.”
I duly reported Sir Derek's words back. Thereafter, following some remarkable Whitehall inﬁghting, I was
duly installed in March 1985. The situation which I inherited was not very different in essence, from where
the Coalition found itself on taking up ofﬁce—marked by considerable overspending, late deliveries and poor
performance.
This followed other initiatives which had been taken by the previous administration. Firstly by the McKinsey
report, produced by John Dowdy, who set up what he called “Smart Acquisition”. I have to say that I never
really went along with the idea of Smart Acquisition, since it seemed to be based on the concept of complete
cooperation and unanimity of purpose between the buyer and the seller, with all the cards being played face
up on the table.
All of my experience in business told me that this was an unrealistic concept, and that the real essence of
commercial negotiations is for the two parties in a transaction—the buyer and the seller—each ﬁghting their
corner to obtain the best possible terms. My experience, and I am sure that of many other people, is that that
is what commercial transactions are all about.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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This indeed was the basis of my approach to procurement and one which was adopted with, I believe,
considerable success. Opponents of this concept deemed it “The Levene era of confrontation”. I make no
apology for this because, perhaps it is just playing with words, but when both sides are negotiating to obtain
the best for themselves, that leads to confrontation and, certainly in my experience, a fair compromise between
the positions of the two sides.
The era of Smart Acquisition was later followed by a concept which Lord Drayson introduced during his
time as Minister for Defence Procurement, of The Defence Industrial strategy. The idea was to ensure that both
the Government as buyer and the industry as seller came out of it fulﬁlling very parallel aims. Ideally, this
would be a very attractive solution, but in real life this is not what happens. So we arrived at a situation where
both Smart Procurement and the Defence Industrial Strategy were set aside, and in most recent times we were
effectively back at the point at which I found myself in the spring of 1985.
One of the most widely held criticisms of the present system of defence procurement in the UK is that those
working in it on the Government's side, however well intentioned, have insufﬁcient commercial background
to be able to negotiate successfully with the major suppliers of defence equipment. The idea, therefore, of the
GOCO is to give that process to a commercial company which will not be constrained by Civil Service limits
on pay and conditions which can then recruit the best possible people and pay them well, on the basis that
they will produce a better result. I am afraid that I don't subscribe to this theory. Defence procurement requires
signiﬁcant experience in negotiations as a large procurer, coupled with a knowledge of Defence materiel and
the purpose for which it is intended to be used.
Where are these qualities most likely to be found? In my view they were and are most likely to be found
within the MoD. If this is indeed the case, the result could well result in the GOCO employing the same
civilian and service individuals, but paying them considerably more, which with a further markup would then
be added to the bill that MOD would have to pay. and I certainly found, to when I ﬁrst joined the MoD in
1985, that there were many senior personnel in both the civilian side of the MoD and the military side, who
had an outstanding understanding of the technical and operational requirements. Again, in my experience, they
worked very hard and in the most part they were very bright. What, therefore, you may ask is lacking? To me
it was clear as soon as I took up the post and had a number of discussions with my senior staff, that what they
were lacking was a commercial understanding of how to deal with large companies and how to try to ensure
that they would deliver on time and on cost. That, I think, was my job to bring to the party.
At the time I joined the MoD, the procurement executive (as it was then called) employed 36,000 people
and incorporated all the research establishments which were certainly industrial operations coupled with the
Royal Ordnance factories.
I have to say that I found a number of very uncommercial practices on the commercial side, but as soon as
these had been exposed to view and I was able to discuss them with my staff, they were rapidly able to take a
more commercial approach to these practices producing very good results. Certainly, many of the procedures
which had been imposed by the Treasury or other Civil Service rules mitigated against cost effective
procurement in a number of areas. I found that by ensuring that I had the right people in the right positions—
and this did not involve bringing in people from outside—we were soon able to make a radical difference. We
were, at that time also faced with a considerable percentage of MoD contracts being let on a cost plus basis,
which, in my experience, was really a recipe for the contractors to make more money at no risk, and for the
MoD as buyer to have to pay out large sums of money with no guarantee of success. This had to be changed.
To cut a long story short, by having constant interface with the senior staff within the procurement executive,
they were soon able to adopt similar attitudes themselves and, after ﬁve years of this, the result by 1991 as
reported in the Defence Major Projects Statement read as follows:
Extract from a report by the Public Accounts Committee into the Ministry of Defence Major Projects
Statement dated October 1991:
“The department has undertaken a review of a total of 37 projects, each valued in excess of
£100 million started in the last ﬁve years … the cost to date was just under one% less than the
department estimated when the orders were ﬁrst placed. And … 28 of the 37 projects were
expected to be completed on time, one was ahead of schedule and of the rest, only three had
delays that were expected to exceed one year, the delays would not result in additional costs
falling on the department.”
COMPARISON 1991 V 2002
1991 2002
Ahead of time 1 -
On time 28 3
Within one year late 5 2
More than one year late 3 15*
Cost out-turn v estimate -1% NKcobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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*6 up to 2 years late, 4 up to 5 years late, 5 more than 5 years late
By comparison, as can be seen, the result in the 2002 Statement after the introduction of Smart Procurement
showed a very different picture.
So what, I now ask, is it thought can be achieved by setting up DE&S as a GOCO? What I see instantly is
that it will give the freedom to pay more commercial salaries. I acknowledge that this is an issue but with a
very small number of people at the top of the organization and when I say very small, I mean less than 10.
That having been said, however, I was the only person at the time brought in from the outside and paid what
was perceived to be an outrageous amount of money (£95,000 per annum), and so far as I can remember, we
didn't bring in another person from the outside to become part of the Government system.
But even if it is true that a small number of people need to be brought in on a higher rate, and I am fully
aware of the constraints on pay at senior levels for Government staff, it seems to me to be an extraordinary
price to pay necessitating the change of the whole system of Government procurement, by transferring it to a
private company, in a move which has not been carried out in any other country in the world, simply in order
to be able to pay a handful of people more money. The ﬁgures that I have seen showing how much can be
saved by handing over to a commercial company are, I believe, fanciful, particularly when set against the real
cost of introducing a GOCO.
There are, of course, other issues relating to a GOCO which would require very careful consideration. How
would such a system be regarded by our Allies?—the US has already expressed concerns about it; how would
the GOCO be able to cope with the economic and political effects of a decision to place a contract with one
contractor as against another?; how would the service input be included in the GOCO? Would serving ofﬁcers
be, in effect, seen to work for a private company and, if not, how would the interface be managed?
When I was asked by Liam Fox, the then Defence Secretary, to chair the Defence Reform Review, I agreed
to do so on condition that DE&S formed no part of our study. I felt that I had deep seated views on the matter
which perhaps ought to be ﬁrst considered by others, and I also felt that the appointment of a new CDM should
take place without his having to inherit a new organisational structure into which he had had no input.
So some two years later, we now have the proposal of either setting up a GOCO or having an enhanced
DE&S, the advantages and disadvantages of which are going to take another year to study.
My view unreservedly is that an enhanced DE&S, hopefully with a certain relaxation on pay levels for the
few people at the very top (cf—the new Governor of the Bank of England) would, I believe, offer us the
best solution.
The GOCO for this purpose is untested anywhere else in the world and I believe would lead to considerable
problems in a number of different areas, which I have tried to address brieﬂy.
I hope that these reﬂections on the proposal may be of assistance.
Peter Levene
May 2013
Supplementary written evidence submitted by Cabinet Ofﬁce (PROC 40)
Response to Q593 Apprenticeships and Procurement
The DWP supply chain commitment to apprentices may well be applicable in speciﬁc circumstances in
central government, and we are happy for the experience and outcomes here to be shared more widely.
However, we are not convinced that it would be appropriate to impose a blanket requirement across all
procurements. Too often in the past the procurement process has been loaded with multiple and, sometimes,
competing policy objectives. This can result in lengthy, complex processes and onerous reporting requirements
which deter SME and voluntary, charitable and social enterprise sector suppliers from participating. This leads
to poor value for money for the taxpayer. Securing value for money must be the primary objective in public
procurement activities.
It should, therefore, be for individual departments to decide if and when requirements relating to
apprenticeships should be included in procurements on a case by case basis.
Response to Q1034 on the “Tight-Loose” Approach
The Efﬁciency and Reform Group (ERG) was established in partnership with HM Treasury to work across
departmental boundaries where this will tackle waste, improve efﬁciency and reform the way services are
delivered.
ERG operates on a “tight-loose” model to ensure tighter control and oversight where collective action is
needed for effectiveness and efﬁciency, whilst pushing responsibility for delivery ever closer to the front line.
This balance is essential in driving out cost and increasing productivity.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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ERG has introduced tight central control over key areas of Government spending and activity, including
procurement of common goods and services, IT infrastructure, property, major projects and standards for
management information. This allows Government to harness economies of scale, acting as a single customer
to drive up standards, reduce cost, improve interoperability and manage risk effectively.
In other areas we are devolving power and breaking down the traditional central monopoly on providing
public services to ensure that they reﬂect local realities. This is achieved, for example, by facilitating new
commercial models and mutuals and supporting departments to redesign their services around the end user,
drawing on capability in the Government Digital Service.
Response to Q1037 on Savings
Cabinet Ofﬁce has made steady progress during 2010–11 and 2011–12 in enabling departments to achieve
savings within their current budgets.
A signiﬁcant amount of work has been completed with NAO to validate the savings that have been achieved.
This was reﬂected in NAO's report on ERG published on 17 April 2013 which stated:
“The Committee of Public Accounts concluded in October 2011 that £3.7 billion of departments'
total spending reductions of over £7.9 billion in 2010–11 were in the area of savings ERG had
targeted, in line with ERG's own estimate of its impact. And overall, we had conﬁdence in ERG's
reported savings of £5.5 billion in 2011–12.”
1]
  Excludes £2m of rounding
Area   2012/13  
Realised 
Saving 
(£m) 
Reduction in consulting   £1,012m  
Supplier renegotiation   £835m  
Reduction in Temp Staff   £598m  
Reduction in marketing and advertising   £378m  
Savings from centralising procurement   £1,024m  
Smaller civil service   £2,216m  
Pensions Reform   £1,160m  
Savings  from telecommunications and 
data centres  
£143m  
Property portfolio optimisation   £620m  
Operational Efficiency Total   £7,986m  
Major projects redirected spend   £1,210m   
Reducing construction costs   £447m  
Better  scrutiny of IT projects and 
moving government web services to 
GOV.UK  
£365m  
Total Prevention of Wasteful Spend 
by Major Projects and Construction  
£2,022 m  
TOTAL   £10,006m [1]  
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Written evidence submitted by the DfT (PROC 41)
Thank you for your letter dated 13 June 2013. I have set out responses to the queries raised in your letter
below, but please let me know if you need any further information.
We are working closely with the Government Procurement Service (GPS) to transfer responsibility for the
procurement of a number of categories of goods and services, as listed below. We consider these categories to
be “common” and the use of centralised procurement arrangements related to them to be “mandated”. Our aim
is to complete this process by the end of 2013, which is the target that has been mandated by the Minister for
the Cabinet Ofﬁce:
— Information and Communications Technology;
— Professional services, eg consultancy contracts;
— Facilities Management;
— Ofﬁce Services;
— Energy and Fuels;
— Fleet Management;
— Print and Print Management;
— Travel;
— Learning and Development;
— Communications;
— Clinical and Medical Supplies.
It should be noted that within some of the categories listed above there are some contracts that will remain
under the Department's control, eg where long term arrangements, such as a Private Finance Initiative deal,
already exist and where it would not be value for money to terminate these contracts to move to a GPS managed
arrangement. Once these current contracts have expired we would also seek to transfer these elements too.
We are also working closely with the GPS in relation to Managed Services. Working relationships are being
established between DfT and GPS procurement staff to facilitate seamless work-package transition. By freeing-
up professional resource which had previously been tied-up with the transactional elements of the procurement
cycle, the DfT can beneﬁt by re-focusing that resource to high impact, maximum value-added procurement
areas.
The Department determines, in consultation with the GPS, which categories are suitable for central
management on a case-by-case basis. The general principle applied is that where a category is clearly
commonly procured across government then the default position is that it will transfer to a centralised
arrangement. This is subject to ensuring value for money and some exceptions are made, eg where long-term
contracts are already in place as outlined in para 3 above. The Department will retain categories of work where
it is generally the major or sole user of the goods and services required, eg roads construction contracts will
continue to be procured and managed by the Highways Agency.
Philip Rutnam
Written evidence submitted by the MOD (PROC 42)
Thank you for your letter dated 13 June 2013 in which you asked a number of questions related to the Public
Administration Select Committee's inquiry into central government procurement. Taking each of your questions
in turn I am happy to provide the following information.
1. What Government Procurement Service (GPS) mandates apply to what procurements within the
Department?
The MOD was originally mandated by the PEX(ER) decision of 31/3/11 to channel its procurement across
nine “common” categories through centralised procurement services managed by GPS. As GPS have
progressively built their services the Department has worked with them to transition spend to central
management.
MOD spend through centralised arrangements has grown from £342 million in 2010–11 to £909 million in
2011–12 and has reached £1.728 billion in 2012–13. MOD accounts for around 30% of GPS spend.
However, the evidence to date is that GPS is not yet providing a full service against these categories,
although it is continuing to build its capacity. Hence the MOD is working cooperatively with GPS, but sees
transition as ongoing work in progress.
In January 2013 PEX(ER) agreed an expanded deﬁnition of common goods and services from nine to 25
categories, and that procurement of all common goods and services should be performed once “either directly
by Government Procurement Service (GPS) or a select few `units' within departments (such as RCUK withincobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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BIS) that are closely aligned to GPS”. The Spending Review announced the MOD would work to transfer
signiﬁcant further spend to GPS arrangements.
2. What categories of procurement does the Department consider to be “common” and therefore would be
suitable for management centrally by the GPS within the Cabinet Ofﬁce?
The scale and scope of MOD procurement is far greater than that of other central government departments.
MOD accounts for around 42% of central government spend and many of the goods and services we buy are
not purchased by other UK central government departments. Our experience of the nine common categories has
been that whilst GPS have developed a service that delivers a large proportion, some of MOD's requirements in
any given category fall outside of the scope of GPS provision eg: secure ICT commodities, complex technical
support requirements, provision of visas.
The Cabinet Ofﬁce's widening to the 25 categories (and numerous sub-categories) also include elements
speciﬁc to MOD which are not purchased by other central government departments and therefore not assessed
to be common. This relatively new requirement is being worked through in detail with GPS to agree the way
forward, and the current estimate is that up to £4.6 billion of MOD spend could be in the common categories.
3. How does the Department determine which procurements to pass to GPS and which should be retained in
house?
In response to the new PEX(ER) agreement, the MOD has analysed its 2012–13 expenditure across the 25
procurement categories and identiﬁed (in addition to our current £1.7 billion GPS spend), a further £2.9 billion
spend that could potentially transition to centralised procurement, subject to more detailed analysis. That sum
allows for the exclusion of spend in DIO (our infrastructure organisation), logistics and the Defence Support
Group because their existing transformation/outsourcing/sale activities are well advanced and should not be
diverted by the GPS activity. We have informed Cabinet Ofﬁce of these exclusions, we await their response,
and they may disagree. We are also working through the (voluminous) detail with GPS in relation to the
potential additional £2.9 billion.
MOD now plans to engage with GPS to understand how GPS intends to:
— Extend its capability beyond the nine common categories;
— Develop a business case, including sourcing plans and beneﬁts for its delivery of each
category; and
— Engage with departments to progressively build its delivery of centralised procurement through
transition of services.
I look forward to reading your report when ﬁnalised.
Jon Thompson
Written evidence submitted by HMRC (PROC 43)
Thank you for your letter regarding the PASC Procurement inquiry dated 13 June 2013. I have addressed
your request in the order shown:
What GPS mandates apply to what procurements within your department?
The mandation of procurement originated in a PEX (ER) paper, dated 28 March 2011 and this speciﬁed the
nine in scope categories. Whilst these were essentially “commodities” and, therefore, presented HMRC with
limited compliance issues, there was one category which was more problematic and that was ICT. I will pick
this point up again shortly.
What categories of procurement does your Department consider to be “common” and therefore would be
suitable for management centrally by the GPS within the Cabinet Ofﬁce?
HMRC are quite ﬂexible in respect of deﬁning what is common although in discussion with MCO my
Commercial Director did highlight that some products/services were “Common but Complex”. This is we
believe an important point and differentiator.
We were more concerned in this appreciation as to whether there was procurement capability in Cabinet
Ofﬁce (GPS) to deliver our business needs. For this reason, and because we were a major user that possessed
specialist procurement skills, we offered to lead two of the nine commodities in scope. This offer was accepted
and has worked well.
We have recently advised the Cabinet Ofﬁce that we are comfortable with the latest centralised procurement
model managing all our procurement with the notable exceptions of our strategic ICT and Estates. The former
is retained because it is too vital to our core business and the latter because of the complex commercial issues
we are managing.cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [18-07-2013 16:37] Job: 031395 Unit: PG01
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How does your Department determine which procurements to pass to GPS and which should be retained in-
house?
Our approach to the balance of spend will be to undertake a product/service by product/service review to
understand the centralised team offering and their capability to deliver. In the event we are not content, then it
will not be transferred until effective value adding plans and capability can be demonstrated.
Lin Homer
Chief Executive
Written evidence submitted by the NAO (PROC 44)
Thank you for your letter for 13 June asking for my thoughts on the GOCO model for the restructuring of
Defence Equipment and Support.
As you know, I am not able to comment on government policy decisions and Ministerial decisions on a
GOCO or other reform of Defence Equipment and Support are still a long way off. The ultimate shape of the
GOCO, if it is selected, is not yet clear and will depend to some extent on the proposals made by bidders in
the competition which the Ministry of Defence plans to launch shortly. Success or failure of new delivery
models depends as much on implementation as on the structure. I am therefore addressing my reply to the
general principles which might apply to the kind of delivery model being considered.
It is worth bearing in mind the drivers of change. The Department needs not only to meet its objective with
a lower budget, but also to overcome long-standing problems in managing its equipment budget. Underlying
issues, which the Department has acknowledged, included a lack of clarity about where responsibilities lay,
lack of transparent and shared management information and a culture of over-optimism as well as a track
record of planning to deliver more than it could afford. Reforms will stand or fall by their ability to address
these past performance issues.
In this context, and in our experience of looking across government delivery models, there are both
opportunities and risks in moving to a commercial delivery model. Realising the opportunities and managing
the risk depend very much on how a competitive process and subsequent implementation are structured. The
key issues can be grouped into the following broad areas:
— Skills and capability: A GOCO has the potential to access and importantly, be better able to
retain scarce skills, expertise and know-how, and incentivise professional expert managers to
deliver improved performance and achieve savings by deploying the workforce more
effectively. But the incentives for the management need to be credible. Competition for scarce
skills may simply push up the cost of employing them without increasing the overall level of
capability available to the Department. Contracting out the management of a GOCO also puts
a premium on the Department's own contract management, weaknesses in which are one of the
main reasons for reform.
— Competitive pressure: There is scope to use competition to generate greater efﬁciency and
innovation. To achieve the beneﬁts of competition in the management of defence acquisition
will require sufﬁcient high-quality bidders with incentives for them to remain involved and
offer a choice of cost-effective solutions. The Department will therefore need to maintain
competitive tension throughout the bidding process, and potentially during the life of the
contract, to achieve this beneﬁt. It will also need strategies to ensure a competitive market
exists at the end of the contract.
— Accountability: A contract with a GOCO has potential to make accountability for performance
clearer. The Government expects a GOCO to reduce frictional costs caused by the weak
interface between the Defence Equipment and Support and the parts of the Department which
request equipment and support services. But there is potential for the relationships between the
organisation and the rest of the Department to remain complex, particularly in the transition to a
new structure, and for frictional costs to increase or move elsewhere in the Department's budget.
— Information: Weak management information is one of the Department's underlying problems
and a contract could strengthen the Department's position in demanding better performance
information. The Department needs a good understanding of current performance and the
potential to improve, and the ability to set quantiﬁable performance targets that fairly reﬂect its
objectives. However, weak management information may be a barrier to the Department's
ability to set and monitor credible yet stretching performance measures. Current performance
also needs to be transparent to the contractor to minimise uncertainty at the time a contract
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— Incentives: A well-structured contract could incentivise new ways of working in Defence
Equipment and Support and drive out practices which have not worked in the past. There may
be scope to trade increases in running costs against potentially larger savings or cost avoidance
on major projects. But the incentives need to be strong enough for the contractor to commit the
resources needed to perform effectively. Poorly structured incentives could encourage a
contractor to focus on driving down management cost or achieve short-term improvements at
the expense of more effective delivery of the acquisition programme in the long term. The
contract needs to enable a ﬂexible response to unpredictable events. A tight contract
speciﬁcation could prevent innovation by creating incentives to do the minimum to fulﬁl the
contract.
— Culture change: A private partner may be better placed to achieve the changes in the culture
of Defence Equipment and Support which the Department considers it needs in order to control
costs more effectively. But a transfer to a private sector management will require a cultural
shift for the staff transferred to work effectively, which may not be achieved just by the
introduction of new management.
— Handling risk: With rare exceptions such as the Olympics, a private sector partner will seek to
limit its risk and to return risks to the public sector when the limit is reached. The Department
will need strategies to deal with a scenario where a contractor defaults or is unable to deliver
improvements. It will need a credible process for resolving disagreements which will inevitably
arise, designed to take into account the balance of negotiating power between the government
and a single contractor.
Whether the Department succeeds in improving performance through its portfolio of transformation
programmes is crucial to it improving the value for money it delivers in the coming years. The effect of
transformation will therefore be a key theme of our audit work on Defence. We will be focusing our attention
on the strategic risks to transformation, including the introduction of new delivery models for Defence
Equipment and Support and other areas of the Department's business. We will wish to explore all the above
issues in more detail as part of our ongoing work.
I am copying this letter to Margaret Hodge.
The Stationery Ofﬁce Limited
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